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Visual processing in humans has both objective and subjective aspects. Objective aspects of 
visual processing consist in an observer’s ability to accurately discern objective properties of visual 
stimuli. Subjective aspects of visual processing consist in an observer’s visual experience of the stimuli 
and the observer’s metacognitive evaluation of the reliability of objective visual processing. What is the 
nature of the relationship between objective and subjective visual processing? A wide range of views 
exists in the literature today, but a broad distinction can be drawn between (1) views holding that 
objective and subjective visual processing are intimately interrelated, such that changes in subjective 
processing should be associated with changes in objective processing; and (2) views holding that 
subjective visual processing is a separate, higher-order process, such that it is possible to change 
subjective processing without changing objective processing. Here we perform a series of 
psychophysical experiments to arbitrate between these views. To make the data analysis more 
powerful, we created a novel extension of signal detection theory for analyzing the informational 
content of subjective ratings of perceptual clarity and confidence (Appendix A).  
We constructed a wide array of signal detection theoretic models capturing different 
hypotheses on the relationship between objective and subjective visual processing and performed a 
formal model comparison analysis in order to discern which model structures best accounted for a data 
set in which objective stimulus discrimination performance was dissociated from subjective ratings of 
visual clarity (Chapter 1). Results from this analysis favor a higher-order view of subjective visual 





carried by subjective ratings of perceptual clarity and decision confidence without affecting an 
observer’s objective ability to visually discriminate stimuli. We found two lines of novel empirical 
evidence for such dissociations. We show that when subjects perform a working memory task in which 
the contents of working memory require extensive manipulation, ratings of confidence in a concurrent 
perceptual task carry less information about perceptual task performance, even taking the influence of 
task performance into account (Chapter 2). Similarly, we show that transcranial magnetic stimulation to 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex selectively impairs the metacognitive sensitivity of visual clarity ratings 
without affecting perceptual task performance (Chapter 3). Finally, we show that perceptual and 
metacognitive performance can dissociate over time as an observer performs a continuous block of 
trials in a visual discrimination task, contrary to views holding that perceptual discrimination and 
metacognition are closely intertwined processes (Chapter 4). We show that this dissociation can be 
partly attributed to individual variability in gray matter volume of regions of anterior prefrontal cortex 
previously linked to visual metacognition. We interpret these results as suggesting that limited 
prefrontal resources can be dynamically allocated to support the performance of either perceptual or 
metacognitive processes.  
Taken together, these results provide converging evidence supporting a higher-order view of 
subjective visual processing. Functionally, objective and subjective processing are organized 
hierarchically, such that downstream subjective processes reflect the properties of objective processing 
but can be independently manipulated. Anatomically, these high-level subjective processes are linked to 
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What does it mean for an observer to “see” something? In everyday usage, the concept of 
“seeing” seems simple and straightforward. To see a stimulus is simply to be visually aware of it. On 
reflection, however, we can discern conceptual distinctions between the component processes and 
properties of seeing. For instance, at the most basic level, seeing a stimulus involves using visual 
information to register the presence of the stimulus, to identify what kind of stimulus it is, and to make 
appropriate behavioral responses to it. Aspects of vision such as these involve the observer’s ability to 
accurately assess and interact with the external world. We may refer to these as the objective aspects of 
visual processing, or objective vision in brief. 
However, for humans, seeing is not limited to the process of interpreting and interacting with 
the external world. Seeing also involves the process of knowing what one sees and knowing how well 
one is seeing. For instance, as you read this sentence, you are not merely engaged in the process of 
identifying the letters, words, word meanings, and so on. Concurrently with such objective visual 
processing, you have an explicit visual experience of colors and forms in a visual field, and a felt sense of 
how the visual stimuli cohere into wholes that have meaning. In this way, you are not only objectively 
seeing words, but you are also aware of yourself as seeing these words; that is, in addition to the bare 
process of objective seeing, there is another aspect of visual processing that represents the fact that an 
act of seeing is occurring. In addition to merely knowing that you are seeing, you may also have a sense 
of how well you are able to see. You probably experience the words in this sentence as being clearly 
legible, but in very poor viewing conditions you might have a sense that the words are difficult to see, or 
might feel uncertain that you can accurately identify a certain letter. Aspects of vision such as these 
involve an observer’s ability to register and evaluate the nature and quality of their own objective visual 
processing.  We may refer to processes such as these as the subjective aspects of visual processing, or 





A simple thought experiment helps to draw out the contrast between objective and subjective 
vision. We might imagine that a simple robot equipped with a video camera and an artificial limb could 
make basic visual discriminations and generate appropriate goal-directed behavior on the basis of this 
visual processing. Such a robot could be said to have a basic kind of objective ability to see, insofar as it 
is able to use visual information to accurately characterize the state of the world and interact 
appropriately with the world on that basis. However, our intuitions would suggest that the robot’s 
objective ability to see is not necessarily accompanied by a first-person phenomenological experience of 
subjective visual qualities such as form and color; at any rate, there seems to be no logical contradiction 
in assuming that the robot would lack such visual experience. From a computational perspective, unless 
we were to endow this robot with additional capacities, the robot would not have a representation of 
itself as a system that is seeing something, nor any way to evaluate how dependable its visual 
discriminations are. In the phrasing of Karmiloff-Smith (1992), although there may be visual knowledge 
in the robot, this is not explicitly represented as visual knowledge for the robot. This example serves to 
illustrate that subjective vision is distinct from, and not necessarily entailed by, objective vision.  
Given that objective and subjective vision are distinct processes, what is the relationship 
between them as implemented in the human observer? To what extent are they interlocked or 
dissociable? What computational architecture best describes the stream of processing in the human 
mind that allows us to objectively and subjectively see? The current work will address questions such as 
these.  Broadly speaking, our main concern will be to determine whether subjective vision is best 
characterized as a low-level sensory process, or as a higher-level process somewhat removed from the 
lower levels of basic perceptual processing. We address this question by collecting data from human 
observers in visual psychophysics experiments and using formal modeling techniques to determine 





subjective aspects of visual processing are best characterized by higher-level, rather than low-level, 
perceptual processes. 
 
Aspects and measures of subjective vision 
 We have already distinguished between two aspects of subjective vision: (1) a representation or 
experience of a stimulus as being seen, and (2) a representation or experience of a stimulus as being 
seen well or poorly. The first aspect we might call visual awareness, as it concerns whether a visual 
stimulus is explicitly registered in consciousness or whether it goes unnoticed and unexperienced, 
receiving only unconscious processing. The second aspect we might call visual metacognition, as it 
concerns to what extent objective visual processing is experienced or judged to be clear, accurate, 
reliable, etc. as opposed to poor, uncertain, degraded, etc. 
 
Visual awareness 
 The study of perceptual awareness (and its complement, unconscious perceptual processing) 
has historically been beset by controversies regarding how to measure whether a stimulus is perceived 
consciously or not. Early approaches relied on taking subjective reports at face value—if an observer 
reports not being aware of a stimulus, then he is not aware of it (e.g. Peirce & Jastrow, 1884; Sidis, 1898; 
Stroh et al, 1908; Adams, 1957). However, theoretical advances in psychophysical research came to view 
perceptual reports as being a flexible, cognitive decision process that is sensitive to factors including, but 
not limited to, the nature of perceptual processing (e.g. Tanner & Swets, 1954; Green & Swets, 1966). 
Essentially, subjective reports might be contaminated by various response biases. For instance, 
consistent with reports that observers tend to be underconfident in sensory discrimination tasks 
(Björkman, Juslin, & Winman, 1993), observers might be reluctant to characterize extant but faint, 





criteria for mapping perceptual experience onto behavioral reports might shift as a function of the 
experimental context (Tanner & Swets, 1954).  
In response to such methodological concerns, Eriksen (1960) proposed that awareness be 
measured by the observer’s objective ability to discriminate the stimulus. Under this proposal, 
awareness can only be said to be absent if the observer’s objective performance in identifying the 
stimulus is at chance levels. However, this method does not seem to respect the already mentioned 
conceptual distinctions between objective and subjective processing, and a priori rules out the 
possibility of unconscious perceptual processing, a phenomenon that has subsequently received strong 
empirical support from case studies on blindsight patients (Weiskrantz, 1986). Subsequent approaches 
to measuring perceptual awareness have proposed to corroborate subjective reports with more 
objective considerations, such as by demonstrating qualitative differences between the processing of 
sub- and supra-threshold stimuli (Cheesman & Merikle, 1986; Debner & Jacoby, 1994), or by measuring 
the extent to which subjective reports of confidence or post-decision wagering predict task performance 
(Dienes, Kwan, & Goode, 1995; Kunimoto, Miller, & Pashler, 2001; Persaud, McLeod, & Cowey, 2007).  
However, for such proposals the conceptual question of what exactly we are measuring still 
looms large. For instance, if an observer consistently reports “clear” and “very clear” visual experiences 
of a stimulus, we would have strong reason to believe he experiences something, even if his distinction 
between “clear” and “very clear” experience does not carry predictive value regarding task performance 
(Dienes, 2004; Maniscalco & Lau, 2012). Considerations like these are suggestive that we should always 
take the direct contents of an observer’s subjective reports into consideration in some form or another 
when assessing perceptual awareness (Maniscalco & Lau, 2012). For all their potential methodological 
flaws, subjective reports nonetheless seem to provide a crucially important window into the nature of 









 There are some senses in which the measurement of visual metacognition is not as 
methodologically problematic as the measurement of visual awareness. Whereas assessing visual 
awareness involves making an absolute distinction between the presence or absence of a private visual 
experience, visual metacognition can be cast as making relative distinctions between visual processing 
that is experienced with more or less phenomenological clarity, or engenders more or less confidence. 
Thus, for instance, even if we cannot be sure precisely what an observer might mean to communicate by 
reporting that a visual experience is clear or cause for high confidence, it is less problematic to interpret 
differences in reports of clarity or confidence across trials or experimental conditions, particularly for 
within-subject comparisons.  
 Additionally, the construct of visual metacognition avails itself to a more straightforward 
methodological treatment than does visual awareness. Because metacognitive reports can be seen as 
evaluations of the efficacy of objective perceptual processing, and because the efficacy of objective 
perceptual processing can be directly measured, it is relatively straightforward to operationalize 
metacognition as the degree to which metacognitive reports predict objective performance (see 
Appendix A for our signal detection theory approach to doing so). The analogous procedure is not 
available in the case of measuring visual awareness, since we have no direct access to the subjective 
experiences that subjective reports of awareness bear upon.  
Thus far we have equivocated between reports on the phenomenological clarity of a visual 
experience, and the degree of confidence in the efficacy of visual processing, treating both of these as 





experienced could be seen as a form of metacognitive appraisal intrinsically woven into the 
phenomenological character of the experience; clearer, more vivid, less ambiguous experiences are 
more likely to be associated with effective objective performance (and higher reports of confidence). 
Indeed, according to some proposals, sensory representations only enter awareness if they are assessed 
to be sufficiently statistically reliable, implying a close connection between perceptual awareness, 
perceptual clarity, and perceptual confidence (Lau, 2008a). A similar construct to perceptual clarity is 
the construct of perceptual fluency, the sense of ease with which a stimulus is perceived; perceptual 
fluency has similarly been taken to serve a kind of experientially grounded metacognitive function 
(Oppenheimer, 2008).  
Nonetheless, confidence is a more general concept, in that it characterizes the efficacy of 
perceptual performance without explicitly specifying the qualitative clarity of perceptual experience as 
the source of such characterizations. Thus, in principle, we might expect that judgments of confidence 
admit of more sources of influence than judgments of visual clarity. For instance, an observer’s 
introspective rating of confidence in his perceptual decision may be influenced not only by how clearly 
he perceived the stimulus phenomenologically, but also by more abstract, non-sensory ‘fringe’ 
experiences such as a ‘gut feeling’ of rightness (James, 1890; Mangan, 2001; cf type 2 blindsight in 
Weiskrantz, 1997), as well as other non-perceptual considerations such as the observer’s previous 
experience with similar stimuli, the observer’s access to performance feedback, etc.  
This conceptual observation that judgments of confidence may draw upon more sources of 
information than do judgments of perceptual clarity is supported by empirical observations. Patients 
with a neurological condition termed ‘blindsight’ have damage to areas of the primary visual cortex, V1, 
which entails the loss of all visual experience in the corresponding part of the patient’s visual field. Yet, 
such patients can make objective forced-choice discriminations about stimuli presented in the 





experiments where blindsight patient GY has been asked to place a wager on every trial regarding the 
accuracy of his perceptual decisions, his wagers can predict accuracy for stimuli presented to his blind 
field at above-chance levels of performance (Persaud et al., 2007; Persaud et al., 2011). Similarly, 
healthy observers are able to rate confidence in such a way as to predict objective performance in visual 
tasks at above-chance levels for trials on which they deny having detected the visual target (Kanai, 
Walsh, & Tseng, 2010).Thus, to the extent that judgments of confidence can carry effective information 
about perceptual processing even in the absence of reports of visual awareness, such judgments must 
have access to information about perceptual processing beyond what is captured by experiences of 
visual clarity.  
However, although not identical in their content, ratings of confidence and visual clarity are 
conceptually and empirically alike. Conceptually, they both carry metacognitive appraisals about the 
efficacy of objective perceptual processing. In an open-ended phenomenological study, Ramsøy and 
Overgaard (2004) had subjects perform a visual discrimination task and asked the subjects to report the 
“degree of clearness of experience” on each trial. Subjects were not presented with an a priori reporting 
scheme, but rather were invited to construct their own rating scales, assigning meaning to each 
category of the scale in such a way as to capture the range of clarity in visual experience elicited by the 
experimental stimuli. All five subjects in the experiment wound up converging on essentially the same 4-
category classification scheme, with the semantic content of the categories summarized by the authors 
as “no experience whatsoever,” “brief glimpse,” “almost clear experience,” and “clear experience.” 
Thus, subjects spontaneously reported the phenomenology of visual clarity on a graded scale resembling 
graded ratings of confidence in their ability to discriminate the target. Indeed, the subjects indicated in 
post-experiment interviews that for stimuli that elicited “no experience,” the forced choice visual 
discrimination response was experienced as a pure guess, whereas “almost clear” and “clear” stimuli 





Empirically, although dissociable, ratings of clarity and confidence tend to be well correlated. An 
indirect empirical suggestion that such correlation might exist comes from studies showing that fluency 
in memory retrieval tasks is positively related with ratings of confidence (Kelley & Lindsay, 1993; Koriat, 
1993). More direct evidence on the similarity between ratings of clarity and confidence comes from 
Sandberg, Timmermans, Overgaard, & Cleeremans (2010). Subjects performed a visual discrimination 
task and provided a metacognitive report on every trial after the forced choice visual discrimination. In 
one condition, subjects used the 4-point “perceptual awareness scale” of visual clarity previously 
described by Ramsøy and Overgaard (2004). In another condition, subjects used a 4-point confidence 
rating scale whose categories were “not confident at all,” “slightly confident,” “quite confident,” and 
“very confident.”  In a third condition, subjects placed one of 4 possible wagers on their task 
performance with imaginary monetary bets. Distributions of rating scale responses as a function of 
stimulus strength, and the relationship of task performance to stimulus strength as a function of rating 
scale response, were qualitatively similar for ratings of clarity and confidence, whereas both scales were 
relatively less similar to the wagering scale.  
Unpublished data from our lab further corroborates the relationship between ratings of visual 
clarity and confidence. Three subjects performed a metacontrast masking task similar to that described 
in Chapter 1. On each trial, a square or diamond was presented, followed by a metacontrast mask. The 
stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) between the target and mask could take on one of eight possible 
values. In one experimental condition, after providing a forced choice discrimination regarded the 
identity of the visual target, subjects rated confidence in the discrimination on a scale of 1 to 4. In 
another condition, subjects reported the clarity with which the target was perceived on a scale of 1 to 4. 
All three subjects exhibited strong across-SOA correlations for average ratings of clarity and confidence 





For the purposes of the present work, then, we treat perceptual clarity and perceptual 
confidence as similar constructs. The distinction between these processes is not important for the 
broader questions we address in this manuscript, but nor does our methodological approach and 
interpretation of the data crucially rely upon not making a sharp distinction between them. We will 
sometimes use the phrase “perceptual metacognition” to refer to both types of judgments 
interchangeably.  
 
Candidate computational architectures relating objective and subjective vision 
 Given that objective and subjective vision are distinct processes, how are they implemented in 
the physical structure and functional architecture of the human brain? There has been an explosion of 
interest in this question in the last two decades, and a wide range of views have been put forth in the 
literature (Tong, 2003; Tononi & Koch, 2008; Dehaene & Changeux, 2011; Lau & Rosenthal, 2011). 
Consideration of the wide range of views intended to account for perceptual awareness can be helpfully 
simplified and organized by adopting the taxonomy described in Lau and Rosenthal (2011). These 
authors distinguished between first-order theories, information integration theory, neuronal global 
workspace theory, and higher-order theories. 
 First-order theories (Pins & Ffytche, 2003; Tong, 2003; Zeki, 2003; Tse, Martinez-Conde, Schlegel, 
& Macknik, 2005; Lamme, 2006) hold that perceptual awareness arises as a function of early sensory 
processing regions in the brain. For instance, in the case of vision, visual awareness should be associated 
with processing in primary visual cortex (Tong, 2003) and/or extrastriate visual cortex (Zeki, 2003; Tse et 
al., 2005; Lamme, 2006).  
 Information integration theory (Tononi, 2008) holds that awareness arises as a function of the 
computational complexity of a physical system. Specifically, systems that feature higher degrees of 





the information generated by causal interactions in the whole, over and above the information 
generated by the parts” (Tononi, 2008, p. 221). 
 Neuronal global workspace theory (Dehaene, Sergent, & Changeux, 2003; Dehaene & Changeux, 
2011) builds on the cognitive global workspace theory first put forth by Baars (1989). According to this 
view, the contents of consciousness correspond to activations in a ‘neuronal global workspace’ 
consisting of a dynamic, coherent network of interacting neurons based crucially upon long range 
cortico-cortical connections in prefrontal and parietal cortex. If processing in early sensory areas is 
sufficiently strong and receives top-down amplification via attentional selection, then this low-level 
sensory activation may cross a threshold and gain access to the global neuronal workspace, and thus 
enter perceptual awareness (Dehaene, Changeux, Naccache, Sackur, & Sergent, 2006).  Access to the 
global workspace entails extended processing that makes the first-order sensory processing more robust 
and accessible to a diverse range of higher cognitive functions such as introspective report and cognitive 
control (Dehaene & Changeux, 2011). 
 Higher-order theories (Lau, 2008a; Lau, 2011; Dienes, 2008; Pasquali, Timmermans, & 
Cleeremans, 2010) hold that perceptual awareness occurs as the result of higher-order cognitive and 
neural processing that is ‘about’ first-order sensory processing. For instance, a sensory representation 
may enter perceptual awareness if judged by higher-order mechanisms to have a sufficiently high 
degree of statistical reliability (Lau, 2008a; Cleeremans, 2008). Thus, in a sense, there is a relatively clean 
division of labor whereby lower-order processes are responsible for evaluating the state of the world 
(objective perceptual processing) and higher-order processes are responsible for evaluating the state of 
lower-order processes (subjective perceptual processing). 
 Thus, not only are there many views on the manner in which perceptual awareness is 
implemented anatomically and functionally, but these views span a wide gamut, ranging from views that 





views that locate perceptual awareness in the very latest stages. This situation is a reflection of the 
empirical and methodological difficulties and ambiguities in studying perceptual awareness. 
 For the purposes of the current work, we will be particularly concerned to assess the 
relationship between objective and subjective perceptual processing. Because first-order theories locate 
perceptual awareness in sensory cortex, they posit a tight relationship between objective and subjective 
perception; in particular, changes in an observer’s subjective reports about perceptual awareness and 
clarity should tend to be associated with changes in objective perceptual performance (Lau & Rosenthal, 
2011). Although neuronal global workspace theory posits that perceptual awareness is associated with 
higher-level activations in prefrontal and parietal cortex, rather than being restricted to earlier sensory 
regions, it nonetheless is similar to first-order theories to the extent that it posits a direct relationship 
between objective and subjective perception (Lau & Rosenthal, 2011). Changes in subjective reports 
reflect changes in a sensory representation’s access to the global workspace, which according to global 
workspace theory should entail changes in objective processing, e.g. changes in the robustness of the 
sensory representation and its degree of access to higher cognitive evaluation. By contrast, higher-order 
theories are unique in positing that changes in subjective perceptual processing can occur in the 
absence of a concurrent change in objective processing. (At its current stage of development, it is not 
yet entirely clear how the formalisms of information integration theory might map onto specific 
predictions about the relationship between objective and subjective perception.) 
 A similarly broad contrast between low-level and high-level views has occurred independently in 
the narrower literature focused specifically on perceptual confidence. Some labs contend that 
evaluations of confidence in perceptual processing bear simple and straightforward relationships to 
objective perceptual processing, such that confidence is essentially a direct measure of perceptual signal 
strength and the two therefore co-vary in reliable ways (Kepecs, Uchida, Zariwala, & Mainen, 2008; Kiani 





order evaluations of first-order perceptual processing, such that the two are partly dissociable (Fleming, 
Weil, Nagy, Dolan, & Rees, 2010; Pleskac & Busemeyer, 2010; McCurdy et al., 2013). 
 Thus, our fundamental concern in this work will be to help arbitrate between views positing that 
perceptual clarity and confidence are intimately related to objective perceptual processing and perhaps 
even based upon the same underlying information, and views positing that perceptual clarity and 
confidence are somewhat functionally removed from, and thus partially dissociable from, objective 
perceptual processing. In order to place our approach in the proper context, we will first discuss the 
conceptual and methodological importance of dissociating objective and subjective perception, prior 
empirical demonstrations of such dissociations, and the utility of analyzing objective and subjective 
perception in the computational framework of signal detection theory.  
 
Methodological importance of dissociations 
 In order to isolate the neural and functional processes underpinning subjective perception, it is 
crucial to rule out the potential influence of experimental confounds. In the context of neuroimaging 
experiments seeking to discover the neural correlates of perceptual awareness, great emphasis has 
been placed upon controlling for stimulus confounds—i.e.in making perceptual stimuli as similar as 
possible across experimental conditions, in order to ensure that comparisons of neural activity across 
conditions captures differences in perceptual awareness in and of itself, and not low-level differences in 
sensory processing due to differences in the stimuli (e.g. Dehaene et al., 2001; Blake & Logothetis, 
2002).  
However, a less appreciated principle is that it is also necessary to control for performance 
confounds (Lau, 2008b; Weiskrantz, Barbur, & Sahraie, 1995), since experimental manipulations that 
induce changes in reports of perceptual awareness also tend to induce changes in objective perceptual 





awareness and confidence typically exhibit robust correlations (see e.g. a representative example of 
how objective performance and subjective ratings exhibit similar changes as a function of stimulus 
strength in Figure B-1, reprinted from Figure S3 of Del Cul, Dehaene, Reyes, Bravo, & Slachevsky, 2009). 
Thus, the study of perceptual awareness and metacognition must take great care to disentangle the 
interrelated but distinct strands of objective and subjective perceptual processing. The most 
straightforward and effective way to accomplish this is to discover and leverage empirical dissociations 
between objective perceptual performance and subjective reports. 
Dissociating objective and subjective perception takes on an even more important role in our 
endeavor to compare different theories that make different predictions about how objective and 
subjective processing are related. In this context, such dissociations are not just serving the role of 
helping to rule out confounds in the interpretation of experimental outcomes, but rather are central to 
the project of arbitrating between the different theories. 
 
Dissociations between objective and subjective perception 
 Probably the most ubiquitous kind of objective-subjective dissociation in psychological science is 
the demonstration that some degree of stimulus processing can occur even in the absence of awareness 
of the stimulus (e.g. Kouider & Dehaene, 2007; Bargh & Morsella, 2008), even in spite of the previously 
discussed methodological difficulties involved in conclusively demonstrating the complete absence of 
stimulus awareness (Eriksen, 1960; Holender, 1986; Holender & Duscherer, 2004).  However, many such 
studies involve demonstrating indirect effects of unconscious stimuli on behavior, such as effects of an 
unconscious prime on reaction times for a subsequently presented suprathreshold stimulus. A stronger 
and more informative kind of dissociation for the present purposes would involve differences in 
objective and subjective processing related to the very same stimulus. The aforementioned 





as it demonstrates that objective performance in forced-choice visual discriminations of a stimulus can 
occur at above-chance levels even though the blindsight patient profusely denies having any awareness 
of the stimuli.  
 However, even more germane to the current agenda than demonstrations of objective 
processing without awareness would be investigations on the extent to which the overall relationship 
between objective and subjective processing is malleable. This is because different theories of 
perceptual awareness and metacognition differ on how they characterize the relationship between 
objective and subjective processing, as already noted. Fortuitously, potential demonstrations of 
dissociation in the relationship between objective and subjective perception also allow us to side-step 
the methodologically thorny issues of demonstrating the absence of perceptual awareness. Such 
“objective-subjective relationship” dissociations are also conceptually stronger than “unconscious 
perception” dissociations, in the sense that weaker assumptions are needed for such dissociations to 
support inferences to underlying processes (Schmidt & Vorberg, 2006). 
  One such kind of dissociation consists in finding two experimental conditions that yield identical 
levels of objective perceptual performance and yet differ in average levels of reported perceptual clarity 
or confidence. For instance, Lau and Passingham (2006) had subjects perform a simple shape 
discrimination task and indicate whether the target was seen or unseen for stimuli that were backward-
masked with a metacontrast mask. They systematically altered the stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) 
between target and mask, ranging from -50 ms to 133 ms. It is well known that when percentage of 
correct responses is plotted as a function of SOA, a U-shaped function results (Breitmeyer, 1984), such 
that task performance is best for short and long SOAs and worse for intermediate SOAs, and this pattern 
was replicated by Lau and Passingham. When they plotted the percentage of “seen” responses as a 
function of SOA, they found that this curve was also U-shaped, but was asymmetric with respect to the 





correct but differing levels of percent seen. They termed this finding a “relative blindsight” effect. 
Similarly, Rahnev et al. (2011) had subjects perform a tilt discrimination task for grating stimuli that 
could be either attended (cued) or unattended (uncued). They adjusted the contrast of the grating 
stimuli so that task performance was equivalent in the attended and unattended conditions, and found 
that subjects rated the average visibility of unattended stimuli to be higher than that of attended stimuli 
in spite of having identical levels of task performance. Notably, such dissociations significantly facilitate 
the study of subjective perception by providing a means of circumventing the problem of performance 
confounds discussed previously (Lau, 2008b). 
 A related kind of dissociation focuses on the relationship between objective perceptual 
performance and perceptual metacognitive sensitivity, where the latter term refers to the efficacy with 
which ratings of clarity or confidence discriminate between an observer’s own correct and incorrect 
perceptual decisions. Modest demonstrations that perceptual and metacognitive sensitivity can 
dissociate have come from analyses of individual differences. Maniscalco and Lau (2012) found that 
there is across-subject variability in the relationship between perceptual and metacognitive sensitivity, 
and Fleming et al. (2010) found that there is across-subject variability in metacognitive sensitivity even 
when stimuli are adjusted so as to yield the same level of objective task performance for all subjects. In 
the current work we will demonstrate several stronger, within-subject dissociations between perceptual 
and metacognitive sensitivity, and such dissociations will play a key role in abdicating between lower- 
and higher-order views of the subjective aspects of visual processing. 
Dissociations between perceptual and metacognitive sensitivity have conceptual advantages 
over dissociations between perceptual sensitivity and average levels of reports of awareness, clarity, or 
confidence. Metacognitive sensitivity measures the informational content of subjective ratings, rather 
than just the mean reported level of such ratings. As a consequence, (1) the objective measure 





comparable, both being measures of sensitivity, and (2) the subjective measure is less prone to the 
potential influence of response biases. As we will see in the next section, comparisons of perceptual and 
metacognitive sensitivity provides a third advantage when analyzed in the context of signal detection 
theory (SDT), since this theoretical framework provides theoretical, quantitative predictions on how 
these measures should be related according to the assumptions of SDT. The comparison of such 
predictions to observed outcomes can provide useful context and insight in the interpretation of the 
data. 
 
Signal detection theory analysis of objective and subjective perception 
 Signal detection theory (Green & Swets, 1966; Macmillan & Creelman, 2005) provides a simple 
yet powerful computational framework for characterizing performance in perceptual tasks. An 
observer’s response bias in a perceptual task is fluid and can change as a function of the experimental 
context (Tanner & Swets, 1954). However, even as an observer’s criteria for how to translate perceptual 
processing into behavioral responses change, presumably the observer’s underlying ability to objectively 
process the stimuli—i.e. the observer’s perceptual sensitivity—remains unchanged. SDT’s primary 
empirical virtue is that its measure of perceptual sensitivity, d’, remains constant even as an observer’s 
response bias changes (Swets, 1986b). Thus, SDT provides a model that can distinguish and 
independently characterize an observer’s perceptual sensitivity and response bias. This aspect of SDT 
makes it an ideal framework for the current purposes, since we are concerned with characterizing the 
relationship between objective perceptual processing—perceptual sensitivity—and subjective reports. 
 Recent theoretical developments extending SDT to the domain of metacognitive performance 
(Clarke, Birdsall, & Tanner, 1959; Galvin, Podd, Drga, & Whitmore, 2003; Maniscalco & Lau, 2012; 
Appendix A) have made SDT even more useful for the current purposes. These developments show that 





metacognitive performance. Given that an observer exhibits a given level of objective perceptual 
processing—i.e. a certain value of d’ and response bias c—SDT makes a quantitative prediction 
regarding how informative the observer’s confidence ratings should be about his perceptual 
performance. This prediction can be quantified with the measure meta-d’, which is defined such that an 
SDT-ideal observer has d’ = meta-d’ (Maniscalco & Lau, 2012; Appendix A). This prediction provides a 
theoretical reference point against which we can evaluate an observer’s actual metacognitive 
performance. For instance, if the observer has d’ = meta-d’, then the observer exhibits metacognitive 
performance consistent with the SDT-ideal observer, whereas if d’ > meta-d’, then the observer is 
metacognitively suboptimal. 
 In addition to providing a benchmark for interpreting an observer’s metacognitive performance 
in a given experimental condition, meta-d’ also facilitates the comparison of objective and subjective 
perceptual processing across conditions. For instance, we have previously argued that analyses of 
subjective perception should be careful to control for performance confounds, and that one means of 
doing so is to compare experimental conditions where subjective perception differs and yet objective 
performance is the same. This empirical method of controlling for performance confounds is effective, 
but is limited by the (to date) relatively small number of experimental procedures that can produce the 
performance-matching dissociation. However, the framework of SDT provides a theoretical, rather than 
empirical, way of assessing subjective perception while controlling for performance confounds. 
Numerical comparisons between d’ and meta-d’ can quantify metacognitive sensitivity in such a way as 
to take into account the influence of the objective d’ measure on the subjective meta-d’ measure. For 
instance, if in condition A an observer has d’ = 1 and meta-d’ = 1, whereas in condition B he has d’ = 2 
and meta-d’ = 1.5, then we can infer that, after taking into account his level of task performance, the 
observer’s metacognition is worse in condition B, since e.g. meta-d’ only achieves 75% of the value of d’ 





considerable flexibility and power in the study of the relationship between objective, perceptual 
sensitivity and subjective, metacognitive sensitivity.  
For a fuller treatment on SDT approaches to measuring metacognition, see Appendix A and 
Maniscalco & Lau (2012).  
 
Summary of theoretical questions and methodological approach 
 A brief summary of the above could be stated as follows. Although there are many theories of 
perceptual awareness and metacognition, a common denominator is that some predict that objective 
and subjective perceptual processing are intimately related, whereas others predict that the two are 
more loosely related and can dissociate in interesting ways. In this work, we will make use of 
experimental paradigms that yield various kinds of dissociations between objective perceptual 
performance and subjective ratings of perceptual clarity and confidence. We will make extensive use of 
the computational framework of SDT in order to demonstrate the existence of these dissociations and 
model the possible underlying mechanisms. We will use the SDT analyses of these empirical data in 
order to argue that higher-order theories of perceptual awareness and metacognition are best suited to 
account for the full range of the data. 
 
Outline of the present manuscript 
 The current manuscript is composed of four chapters and two appendices. 
In Chapter 1, we replicate the relative blindsight finding from Lau and Passingham (2006). We 
create multiple SDT models intended to capture the core computational principles of three classes of 
views on perceptual awareness—single channel models (akin to first-order theories), dual channel 





hierarchical models (akin to higher-order theories). Formal model comparison analysis suggests that the 
hierarchical model structure is best able to account for the relative blindsight dissociation. 
 In Chapter 2, we probe the effects of working memory demands on objective and subjective 
vision in two experiments. Concurrent with performing a basic perceptual task, subjects perform a 
demanding working memory task. The results suggest that when subjects are required to manipulate 
the contents of working memory under conditions of high load, metacognitive sensitivity is selectively 
reduced. The nature of the observed dissociation is consistent with higher-order, but not first-order, 
views. In conjunction with prior empirical findings, the results suggest a role of dorsolateral prefrontal 
cortex (DLPFC) in supporting perceptual metacognition. 
 In Chapter 3, we probe the effects of transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) to DLPFC on 
objective and subjective vision. We find that TMS selectively inhibits metacognitive sensitivity but not 
perceptual sensitivity. The nature of the observed dissociation is consistent with higher-order, but not 
first-order, views.The results provide further evidence for the role of DLPFC in supporting perceptual 
metacognition. 
 In Chapter 4, we perform four experiments to probe the dynamics of perceptual and 
metacognitive sensitivity over time in blocks of experimental trials. We find that changes in the two are 
weakly or negatively correlated, rather than the strong positive correlation that would be predicted by 
first-order views. We find that between-subject variability in this pattern can be explained by between-
subject variability in gray matter volume of anterior prefrontal cortex. We construct a cognitive resource 
account of the neural findings and corroborate a prediction of this account in two further behavioral 
experiments.  
 In Appendix A, we provide an extensive formal treatment of the SDT model of objective 






In Appendix B, we provide a supplement to the model analysis of Chapter 1, demonstrating the 




























The signal processing architecture underlying subjective reports of perceptual clarity 
 
Introduction 
What are the mechanisms that drive subjective and objective visual judgments in humans, and 
how are they related? As discussed in the General Introduction, several prominent classes of theories 
characterizing the relationship between objective and subjective vision are currently in circulation 
(Tong, 2003; Tononi & Koch, 2008; Dehaene & Changeux, 2011; Lau & Rosenthal, 2011). Here we 
consider the general forms of different signal processing architectures that map onto the various 
theories. 
The most parsimonious kind of account holds that subjective and objective judgments, though 
distinct, are generated from the same underlying process (Single Channel models, Figure 1-1 left panel). 
For instance, on a common signal detection theory (SDT) account, perceptual decisions result from a 
binary comparison between an internal signal and a criterion (Green & Swets, 1966; Macmillan & 
Creelman, 2005), whereas subjective judgments of the quality of evidence are made by evaluating some 
transformation of the signal, such as its distance from the criterion (Clarke et al., 1959; Galvin et al., 
2003). According to this kind of model, subjective and objective judgments are just different ways of 
evaluating the same underlying evidence (Figure 1-3; Appendix A). 
  Alternatively, even if subjective and objective judgments are based on the same evidence, the 
quality of evidence available for each kind of judgment might differ. For instance, a Hierarchical model 
(Figure 1-1 right panel) might suppose that evidence is first used to generate objective perceptual 
decisions, and subsequently undergoes further processing in order to make subjective judgments 







Figure 1-1. Schematic diagram for the three categories of models. (Left) According to a Single Channel 
model, the same process gives rise to both objective judgments (e.g. perceptual decisions about the 
identity of a stimulus) and subjective judgments (e.g. confidence ratings or visibility ratings). The model 
can still support some independence between task performance and subjective reports by supposing 
that the sensory evidence is a continuous variable that can be evaluated by setting various decision 
criteria (Figure 1-3; Appendix A; Green & Swets, 1966; Macmillan and Creelman, 2005). (Middle) An 
alternative model is that objective and subjective judgments are driven by two parallel processes, each 
influenced by independent sources of noise. Differential contribution of the two channels to objective 
and subjective judgments can lead to dissociations between the two kinds of responses. Note that the 
model can allow that each channel can contribute both kinds of judgment to some extent. In particular, 
one would expect that the channel which primarily influences one’s subjective ratings would also heavily 
influence one’s objective task response. For instance, when an observer subjectively reports clearly and 
vividly seeing squares, this should strongly correlate with objective judgments that the stimuli on the 
current trial are squares. (Right) Another alternative is that objective and subjective judgments are 
driven by different processes that are organized in a serial hierarchy, such that an early stage of 
processing generates the objective judgment and a later stage of processing generates the subjective 
judgment, as if the latter evaluates the quality of the former. Note that on this model, the second stage 
inherits the noise of the first stage, and thus the two are not entirely independent. However, the 







become degraded by the time it is processed by subjective judgment mechanisms, due to a decaying 
signal and/or the accrual of noise (Pleskac & Busemeyer, 2010).  
A third possibility is a Dual Channel model (Figure 1-1 middle panel) in which subjective and 
objective judgments are based on separate cognitive or neurophysiological processes (Jacoby, 1991; Jolij 
& Lamme, 2005; Del Cul et al., 2009; Morewedge & Kahneman, 2010). For instance, perhaps there are 
two independent visual processing routes, one of which supports conscious vision and another whose 
visual processing is entirely unconscious. On such an account, subjective and objective judgments access 
different sources of information (and noise). 
In this chapter, we capitalize on a psychophysical paradigm that dissociates changes in objective 
perceptual decision performance from changes in subjective visibility ratings (Lau & Passingham, 2006) 
in order to evaluate SDT implementations of the model categories described above.  
 
Methods 
In the metacontrast masking procedure, stimulus identification performance varies with 
stimulus-mask onset asynchrony (SOA) in a U-shaped fashion (Figure 1-2). Visibility judgments follow a 
similar U-shape that is asymmetrical with respect to the objective performance curve, thus yielding 
similar levels of performance associated with different levels of subjective stimulus visibility. We 
compared the ability of various implementations of the Single Channel, Dual Channel, and Hierarchical 




 59 students from the Columbia University undergraduate population participated in the 





regarding the purpose of the experiment, had normal or corrected-to-normal vision, and signed an 
informed-consent statement. The research was approved by the Columbia University’s Committee for 
the Protection of Human Subjects.  
 
Experimental procedure 
Subjects were seated in a dim room, 60 cm away from the computer monitor. Stimuli were 
generated using Psychophysics Toolbox (Brainard, 1997; Pelli, 1997) in MATLAB® (MathWorks, Natick, 
MA) and were shown on an iMac monitor (19 inch monitor size, 1680 x 1050 pixel resolution, 60 Hz 
refresh rate). 
On each trial, a ring of eight shapes with a 4° radius was presented around a central fixation 
point (Figure 1-2). (A ring of stimuli was used with potential extension to fMRI in mind; to facilitate 
efficient retinotopic delineation of visual areas it is useful to present stimuli outside of the fovea. 
However, behavioral results similar to those reported here were also found with foveal presentation of 
single stimuli in Lau & Passingham, 2006.) Within each trial, each of the eight shapes was identical. The 
shapes could be either squares or diamonds with sides measuring 1.5° of visual angle. The shapes were 
presented for 33 ms on a gray background. Shapes were darker than the background, with the precise 
darkness determined separately for each subject by a thresholding procedure. A set of metacontrast 
masks designed to trace the outline of the square and diamond stimuli without physically overlapping 
with them (line width .025°) was subsequently displayed for 50 ms. Stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) 
between stimulus and mask was determined randomly on each trial and counterbalanced among 8 
possible durations, ranging from 0 ms to 116.7 ms in increments of 16.7 ms. 
Following each stimulus presentation, subjects provided two responses. First, they made a 
forced choice objective judgment about the shapes of the stimuli (squares or diamonds). Next, they 






Figure 1-2. Experimental design and basic behavioral results. (Left) We used a paradigm based on 
metacontrast masking, similar to the one used in a previous study (Lau and Passingham, 2006). In every 
trial the subject was presented with a set of squares or diamonds (i.e. tilted squares). After a varying 
stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA; the temporal gap between the two sets of stimuli), a mask was 
presented. The mask did not overlap spatially with the targets, but nevertheless impaired their visibility. 
In each trial subjects first decided whether the targets were squares or diamonds, and then gave 
subjective visibility ratings (4 levels) to indicate how clearly they saw the identity of the targets. (Right) 
Replicating previous findings (Lau and Passingham, 2006), this masking procedure gives rise to a U-
shaped masking function when stimulus identification performance is plotted against SOA. The average 
level of subjective visibility ratings across SOAs, however, did not take the same shape, and reflected a 
bias towards giving lower ratings at lower SOAs. Shown here were data from a selected group subjects 
(n=20) who particularly demonstrated this pattern of dissociation in a relatively pronounced fashion.  
 
 
subjects were asked to rate how clearly they had perceived the stimuli. Subjects were encouraged to use 
the entire rating scale while still accurately characterizing what they had visually experienced. Stimulus 





if subjects failed to enter both the stimulus identity judgment and the visibility rating within 5 seconds of 
stimulus offset, the current trial was aborted and the next trial commenced automatically. 
 After receiving task instructions, subjects completed two blocks of 28 practice trials. Following 
practice, subjects completed a block of 120 trials in order to determine the Weber contrast of the 
stimuli at which threshold performance across all SOAs could be obtained. Because performance in this 
task is close to maximal with an SOA of 0 ms (Lau & Passingham, 2006), all trials in the thresholding 
procedure had the minimum stimulus-mask SOA of 0 ms. We reasoned that if near maximal 
performance at 0 ms could be controlled to be at threshold levels, performance at other SOA values 
would also be near threshold. Stimuli were initially set to a Weber contrast of -.15 and were 
subsequently adjusted online using a QUEST procedure (Watson & Pelli, 1983). Three separate QUEST 
tracks were recorded (40 trials each). Each QUEST track provided an independent estimate of the 
stimulus contrast needed to produce threshold performance (84% correct) at the minimum SOA. Trials 
for each track were interleaved randomly. Among the 3 resulting QUEST estimates, the median stimulus 
contrast was selected as the contrast to be used throughout the remainder of the experiment. 
In the main experimental block, subjects completed 800 trials (100 trials for each of the 8 SOAs). 
SOAs were distributed across trials randomly. Every 100 trials, subjects received a self-terminated break 
lasting up to 60 seconds. 
 
Subject selection 
 In order to maximize the suitability of the data for model fitting, we omitted from analysis all 
subjects who performed below chance levels at any of the SOAs (n=16), any who performed perfectly at 
any of the SOAs (n=3), and any whose mean visibility rating was lower than 5% of the maximum possible 
value at any SOA (n=1). Most subjects were excluded due to having at least one SOA with below chance 





procedure on only the 0 ms SOA and subjects had many chances at each of the other SOAs to perform 
considerably worse, potentially recording average performance below chance. Nonetheless, we kept 
strict inclusion criteria in order to optimize model fitting. 
 For the remaining 39 subjects, we quantified the extent to which each subject exhibited a 
dissociation between objective task performance and subjective visibility ratings across SOA as follows. 
For each subject, we ran a least-squares regression between d’ and mean visibility rating at all but one 
SOA. Empirically observed visibility at the left-out SOA was then subtracted from the “expected” 
visibility predicted by the regression on the other SOAs. We defined the absolute value of this difference 
between observed and expected visibility for the left-out SOA as the “dissociation score” for that SOA. 
We calculated the dissociation score for each SOA and defined each subject’s “dissociation index” as the 
maximum dissociation score across all SOA from that subject’s data. Each subject’s dissociation index 
provides a measure of the extent to which that subject exhibited a dissociation between task 
performance and visibility ratings.  
We performed a median split on the dissociation index, selecting the 20 subjects who exhibited 
the highest such value for model fitting. For these 20 subjects, the mean dissociation index was 0.57 and 
was greater than zero, p < .001. For all 39 subjects, the mean dissociation index was slightly weaker but 
still evident at 0.39 (p < .001). Without excluding any subjects at all (n = 59), a similar mean value of 0.41 
obtains (p < .001).  
 Note that these procedures were performed in order to improve the quality of the data analysis. 
Omitting subjects with noisy data reduces the noisiness of model fits. Selecting the subjects who show 
the strongest dissociations between task performance and stimulus visibility provides a more stringent 
test for the models and thus provides a sharper way to compare their efficacy in characterizing the data. 





 One might worry that selecting only those subjects with the highest dissociation index creates a 
skewed or biased sample. However, for data sets that do not exhibit a dissociation, the traditional Single 
Channel SDT model is sufficient to characterize the data, and the Dual Channel and Hierarchical models 
can mimic Single Channel model behavior by appropriate adjustment of the model parameters. Thus, 
data that do not exhibit the dissociation are not informative with respect to the model selection. The 
logic of this approach is not to claim that one model or another is the “correct” one in the broadest 
sense, but rather to answer the following question: in those subjects who exhibit a dissociation between 
objective task performance and subjective ratings of perceptual clarity, what kind of processing 
structure best accounts for this dissociation? If one model structure clearly outperforms the other, this 
suggests that we must posit that the supported model structure describes some aspect of human 
perception, although it leaves open the possibility that other structures may be necessary to account for 
other kinds of perceptual phenomena.  
 
Model assumptions 
In each model, we made standard signal detection theory assumptions, as summarized in Figure 
1-3: (1) the two stimuli used in the experiment gave rise to internal signals normally distributed along 
some decision axis; (2) perceptual decisions were made by comparing the signal on some decision axis 
to a criterion; and (3) visibility judgments were made by comparing the signal on some decision axis to 
multiple criteria, corresponding to the multiple visibility ratings available to subjects in this experiment. 
 In order to further constrain model fitting, we made one further assumption: (4) criteria for 
perceptual decisions and visibility ratings were set in the same way for each stimulus-mask SOA. That is, 
we assumed that subjects did not use different standards for deciding a stimulus's identity or visibility 
across the different SOAs. This assumption is justified by previous psychophysical findings. Gorea and 





Figure 1-3. The standard signal detection theory model. All models under consideration built upon the 
foundation of the standard signal detection theory model. This model assumes that stimulus categories 
S1 and S2 each generate normal distributions of perceptual evidence along an internal decision axis. The 
observer segments the decision axis into discrete regions using a type 1 criterion (for making a stimulus 
classification response) and a set of type 2 criteria (for rating subjective levels of decision confidence or 
percept visibility). The stimulus classification and subjective rating reported by the observer on any 
given trial are determined by which region of the decision axis contains the perceptual evidence 
observed on that trial, as illustrated in the figure. The probability with which the observer produces a 
given (response, visibility) pair upon being shown stimulus SN is equal to the area under the curve 
f(x|SN) in the region of the decision axis corresponding to that response pair. For a more in-depth 
treatment, see Appendix A. 
 
 
subjects do not judge stimulus classes with separate criteria, but rather use a single, non-optimal 
criterion for both. In our experiment, task difficulty varied across SOA, but SOAs were presented 
randomly, and thus task difficulty changed randomly across trials as it did in Gorea and Sagi (2000). If 





is highly unlikely that they could maintain seven distinct sets of criteria corresponding to the seven SOAs 
used in the current experiment. 
           Furthermore, in a study on the dynamics of criterion shifting, Brown and Steyvers (2005) found 
that criterion shifting is a slow process. In their experiment, task difficulty changed every 40 trials, 
requiring subjects to shift their decision criteria in order to maintain optimal task performance. 
However, even with this predictable block design, and even when subjects were forewarned that task  
difficulty would change during the experiment, subjects required about 8 - 22 trials (each trial lasting 
about 3.2 sec) to change their decision criteria. In the current experiment, task difficultly changed 
randomly and rapidly from trial to trial. The results of Brown and Steyvers suggest that this rapid and 
random shift in stimulus difficulty would far outstrip subjects' ability to slowly adjust their decision 
criteria. Taken together, these experimental results suggest that it is unlikely that subjects could have 
used different sets of decision criteria for each SOA, thus justifying our fourth modeling assumption. 
 
Model descriptions 
 All models conformed to the broad specifications listed above, but differed from each other in 
overall model structure (Single Channel, Dual Channel, or Hierarchical). Because there are many ways 
each model structure can be implemented, we compared multiple kinds of implementations for each 
model type. In total we fit 4 Single Channel models, 10 Dual Channel models, and 12 Hierarchical 
models. In the following we give brief descriptions of each model tested. The names of the models in 









Single Channel models 
Single Channel 
parameters: μdiff (8), c (7) 
The simplest model we tested was this basic SDT model. We suppose that the distance between 
the evidence distributions, μdiff, changes for each of the 8 stimulus-mask SOAs. The observer must set 7 
decision criteria in order to partition the decision axis into 8 regions, which correspond to the 8 kinds of 
responses the observer can give on a given trial (2 stimulus classifications * 4 levels of subjective 
visibility; Figure 1-3; Appendix A). For all models, we suppose that the decision criteria are constant 
across SOA. 
 
Single Channel CV (“changing variance”) 
parameters: μdiff (8), σ (8), c (7) 
This is a modification of the Single Channel model which supposes that SOA affects not only the 
absolute distance between the stimulus distributions μ, but also their common standard deviation σ. 
 
Other CV models 
For every model listed below, we analyzed versions which did and did not allow the standard 
deviation of the stimulus distributions σ to vary across SOA. Every model following the naming format 
“Model X CV” is identical to the simpler model “Model X” with the exception that it has 8 added 
parameters in order to allow σ to vary with SOA.  
 
Decision Noise 





This model supposes that the type 2 criteria (the six decision criteria used to evaluate subjective 
visibility) are not constant from trial to trial, but in fact are drawn from a normal distribution with some 
standard deviation σc, where σc can vary with SOA. This model is based on Mueller and Weidemann 
(2008).  
 
Dual Channel models 
Dual channel models suppose that two separate information processing streams accruing noise 
from independent sources contribute to the perceptual decision making process. In SDT terms, these 
models posit the existence of two decision axes, one of which corresponds to conscious processing and 
the other, unconscious processing. The versions of these models considered here differ on how they 
suppose information from the conscious and unconscious processing channels are combined. 
 
Independent Dual Channel 
parameters: μdiff C (8), μdiff U (8), cC (6), cU (1) 
The distance between stimulus distributions is modulated by SOA for both the conscious (μC) 
and unconscious (μU) decision axes. The conscious decision axis is only used to categorize stimuli that 
have a visibility of at least 2 or higher, i.e. it is not used to classify stimuli with visibility = 1. For this 
reason, only 6 decision criteria cC are set on the conscious decision axis. For stimuli whose visibility is 
only rated as 1, the stimulus classification is made by doing signal detection on the unconscious decision 
axis using the criterion cU. This model is based on Del Cul et al. (2009). (See Appendix B for an explicit 
comparison between our Independent Dual Channel model and the model used in Del Cul et al.) 
 
Modulated Dual Channel N (N = 1, 2, 3) 





These models are identical to the Independent Dual Channel model, with one exception. 
Modulated Dual Channel N has a provision for altering subjective reports of visibility made from the 
conscious decision axis when its stimulus classification conflicts with the stimulus classification provided 
by the unconscious channel. Specifically, if visibility > 1 and visibility ≤ N+1, and if the stimulus 
classification of the conscious and unconscious channels disagree, then the classification from the 
conscious channel is used but the report of subjective visibility is reduced to 1.  
 
Weighted Dual Channel 
parameters: μdiff C (8), μdiff U (8), cC (6), cTOT (1) 
Rather than treat information from the conscious and unconscious channels separately, the 
observer combines them into a new decision axis by computing a weighted average. The weight given to 
evidence arising from the conscious channel is wC = d’C / (d’C + d’U), where d’ = μdiff / σ and σ = 1 for the 
non-CV models. This formula can give results outside of [0, 1] if negative d’ values are entered. As a 
correction for this possibility, if the computation yields wC < 0 then wC is set to 0, and if it yields wC > 1 
then wC is set to 1.  
If visibility = 1, the stimulus is classified using the combined channel. If visibility > 1 and the 
conscious channel and combined channel agree on stimulus classification, then stimulus classification is 
given with the level of visibility dictated by the conscious channel. But if visibility > 1 and the conscious 
channel and combined channel disagree on stimulus classification, then the classification from the 
conscious channel is used but the report of subjective visibility is reduced to 1.  
(Although it would be optimal to always use the stimulus classification provided by the 
combined channel, implementing this in the model would allow the nonsensical result that reports of 
stimulus classification could conflict with reports of subjective visibility, e.g. “the stimuli were squares, 






Hierarchical models suppose that stimulus classification occurs according to Single Channel SDT 
principles, but that the perceptual evidence used to do stimulus classification changes before it is used 
to report subjective visibility, becoming weaker and / or noisier.  
 
Decay Only 
parameters: μdiff (8), k (8), c (7) 
The perceptual evidence used for performing stimulus classification is multiplied by a factor of k 
before it is used for reporting subjective visibility, where 0 ≤ k ≤ 1. k varies across SOA. 
 
Noise Only 
parameters: μdiff (8), σh (8), c (7) 
Mechanisms for reporting subjective visibility access a noisier version of the perceptual evidence 
used for performing the stimulus classification task. The extra noise is sampled from a normal 
distribution with mean 0 and standard deviation σh. σh varies across SOA. 
 
Noise + Decay 
parameters: μdiff (8), σh (8), k (8), c (7) 
A combination of the Decay Only and Noise Only models. 
 
Noise + Constant Decay 
parameters: μdiff (8),  σh (8), k (1), c (7) 






Constant Noise + Decay 
parameters: μdiff (8),  σh (1), k (8), c (7) 
Same as Noise + Decay, but the hierarchical noise parameter σh is constrained to be constant 
across SOA. 
 
Constant Noise + Constant Decay 
parameters: μdiff (8),  σh (1), k (1), c (7) 
Same as Noise + Decay, but the hierarchical noise parameter σh and signal decay parameter k 
are constrained to be constant across SOA. 
 
Model fitting 
 Past efforts to fit signal detection theory parameters to rating data have used the following 
approach (Ogilvie & Creelman, 1968; Dorfman & Alf, 1969). First, we make two simplifying assumptions: 
(1) responses on each trial are independent from one another; (2) the probability of each response type 
associated with each stimulus class is constant across trials. When these assumptions are met, the 
likelihood of a set of signal detection model parameters given the observed data can be calculated using 
the multinomial model. Formally, 
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where “resp” indicates stimulus classification response (square or diamond), “vis” indicates 
subjective rating of stimulus clarity (1 – 4), and “stim” indicates objective stimulus identity (square or 
diamond). r, v, and s, are indeces ranging over all possible values for the response, visibility, and 





which the subject produces the response “r” and visibility rating “v” after being presented with the 
stimulus “s”. This probability is determined by the SDT model specified with parameters θ. The set of 
parameters θ for each SDT model under consideration is listed above in the section titled “Model 
descriptions.”      (             |      ) is a count of how many times a subject actually 
produced a response “r” and visibility rating “v” for the stimulus “s”. 
The set of parameters θ that maximizes the probability of the data is referred to as the 
maximum likelihood estimate of the parameters θ, given the observed data. The signal detection models 
under consideration in this study differ in the distributions of      (             |       ) 
values they can produce, which in turn determines the extent to which the different models can fit the 
data well and achieve a high maximum likelihood in the multinomial model.  
Note that the models were not fit to summary statistics of performance such as percent correct 
or average visibility. Rather, models were fit to the full distribution of probabilities of each response and 
visibility rating contingent on each stimulus type. From this full behavioral profile of stimulus-contingent 
response probabilities, we can derive various summary statistics such as percent correct and average 
visibility (Figure 1-4), as well as type 2 performance (Figure 1-5). Thus, the behavioral data shown in 
these figures are not the data upon which the models were explicitly fit, but rather are different ways of 
highlighting aspects of that data. 
We fit all models under consideration to the observed data by finding the maximum-likelihood 
parameter values θ. Maximum likelihood fits were found using a simulated annealing procedure 
(Kirkpatrick, Gelatt, & Vecchi, 1983). Model fitting was conducted separately for each subject’s data. 
 
Formal model comparison 
 The maximum likelihood associated with each model characterizes how well that model 





be misleading; greater model complexity can allow for tighter fits to the data but can also lead to 
undesirable levels of overfitting, i.e. the erroneous modeling of random variation in the data. The Akaike 
Information Criterion (AIC), motivated by considerations from information theory, provides a means for 
comparing models on the basis of their maximum likelihood fits to the data while correcting for model 
complexity (Burnham & Anderson, 2002). We used AICc, a variant of AIC which corrects for finite sample 
sizes: 
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where K is the number of parameters in the model and n is the number of observations being fit. In this 
data set, the number of observations is the number of response probabilities being estimated, so n = 2 
(stimulus type) * 2 (response type) * 4 (visibility rating) * 8 (SOA) = 128. Lower values of AICc are 
desirable because they indicate a higher model likelihood and/or a lower model complexity (lower 
number of parameters).  
 
We use the likelihood of each model, given the data, as a basis for model comparison: 
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AICci is the AICc for model i and AICcmin is the lowest AICc exhibited by all models under consideration. 
These model likelihoods can be scaled to sum to 1, and the resulting "Akaike weights" reveal the relative 
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The foregoing analysis can be replicated using the Baysian Information Criterion (BIC) in place of 
AICc, where 
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In this case, calculating the analogue of the Akaike weights gives an estimate of the posterior 
probabilities of each model, assuming uniform prior probabilities (Burnham & Anderson, 2002): 
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Model fitting results 
Complete model comparison results are listed in Table 1-1. To simplify analysis, we focus on 
comparing the best-performing models in each model class. These are the models titled “Single Channel 
CV,” “Weighted Dual Channel,” and “Constant Noise + Decay.” Details of model specifications can be 
found in Materials & Methods under the heading “Model descriptions.”  
Figure 1-4 displays the fits of these models to stimulus classification accuracy and mean visibility 
ratings at each SOA. The same data are re-plotted in the bottom panel to show mean visibility as a 





Table 1-1. Complete model comparison results. 
 
 





Single channel Single Channel -1243.4525 15 0.013 0.1025 
Single channel Single Channel CV -1212.9751 23 0.1572 0.1517 
Single channel Decision Noise -1329.3143 23 0 0 
Single channel Decision Noise CV -1334.7274 31 0 0 
Dual channel Independent Dual 
Channel 
-1233.6579 23 0 0.0001 
Dual channel Independent Dual 
Channel CV 
-1204.2176 31 0.0001 0 
Dual channel Modulated Dual 
Channel 1 
-1242.7603 23 0.0005 0.0001 
Dual channel Modulated Dual 
Channel 1 CV 
-1212.6913 31 0 0 
Dual channel Modulated Dual 
Channel 2 
-1272.0836 23 0 0 
Dual channel Modulated Dual 
Channel 2 CV 
-1244.7851 31 0 0 
Dual channel Modulated Dual 
Channel 3 
-1299.3272 23 0 0 
Dual channel Modulated Dual 
Channel 3 CV 
-1271.9443 31 0 0 
Dual channel Weighted Dual 
Channel 
-1223.7024 23 0.1391 0.1226 
Dual channel Weighted Dual 
Channel CV 
-1201.0265 31 0.083 0.001 
Hierarchical Decay Only -1215.7354 23 0.0119 0.0135 
Hierarchical Decay Only CV -1209.3047 31 0 0 





Hierarchical Noise Only CV -1199.8421 31 0.0763 0.0316 
Hierarchical Noise + Decay -1199.6372 31 0.0525 0.0443 
Hierarchical Noise + Decay CV -1196.0596 39 0 0 
Hierarchical Noise + Constant 
Decay 
-1221.6126 24 0.0001 0.0001 
Hierarchical Noise + Constant 
Decay CV 
-1198.2169 32 0.0086 0.0001 
Hierarchical Constant Noise + 
Decay 
-1206.93 24 0.3012 0.3627 
Hierarchical Constant Noise + 
Decay CV 
-1201.4194 32 0.0006 0 
Hierarchical Constant Noise + 
Constant Decay 
-1233.0909 17 0.0507 0.0654 
Hierarchical Constant Noise + 
Constant Decay CV 
-1204.0892 25 0.1052 0.1014 
 
“Class” denotes model category (see Figure 1-1). Descriptions of each model listed under “Model name” 
are available in Materials and Methods, Model descriptions. “log L” is the quantitative measure of 
goodness of fit for each model, the log of the likelihood of the observed empirical data given the model 
structure and optimal parameter values. Larger values indicate better fit. “# param” lists the number of 
parameters for each model, a measure of model complexity. “Akaike weight” and “Bayesian posterior 
probability” are measures of overall model quality, taking into account goodness of fit and model 
complexity. Larger values indicate better models, and the data is scaled such that both measures sum to 
1. For more details on these measures see Materials and Methods, Formal model comparison. The best 












Figure 1-4. Model fits for task performance and reported visibility. Three categories of models (Single 
Channel, Dual Channel, and Hierarchical) were fitted to the behavioral data from the metacontrast 
masking paradigm. We tested multiple versions of each category of model (see Materials and Methods 
for details). Shown here are the best-fitting models from each category, selected according to formal 
model comparison techniques (Figure 1-6). The Hierarchical model performed best at capturing the 
dissociation between task performance and reported levels of stimulus visibility. This dissociation is 
made readily apparent by plotting visibility reports against task performance, as depicted in the bottom 
row of figures; the relationship is not monotonic, but exhibits a sharp spike at around 80-85% correct, 






behavioral data. Visual inspection suggests that the best Single Channel model slightly but systematically 
overestimates visibility as a function of accuracy, whereas the best Dual Channel model only produces a 
relatively small dissociation between accuracy and visibility. By contrast, the Hierarchical model provides 
a close fit to the data.  
Another way of probing the relationship between objective task performance and subjective 
visibility rating is to analyze the behavior of subjective ratings conditioned on accuracy, what has been 
called “type 2” analysis to distinguish it from the “type 1” analysis of basic stimulus identification 
performance (Clarke et al., 1959; Galvin et al., 2003). In the top panel of Figure 1-5 we show model fits 
to type 2 hit rate (HR; p(high visibility | correct)) and type 2 false alarm rate (FAR; p(high visibility | 
incorrect)), where “high visibility” is defined for each subject as a visibility rating greater than that  
subject’s median visibility rating across all trials. In the bottom panel we show area under the type 2 
ROC curve (estimated using Ag; Pollack & Hsieh, 1969), a measure of how well subjective ratings 
discriminate between correct and incorrect trials. In general, the basic signal detection theory model 
predicts that as stimulus classification performance improves, type 2 HR and type 2 FAR should diverge, 
and area under the type 2 ROC curve should increase (Galvin et al., 2003; Appendix A). However, in this 
data set type 2 performance is generally lower at longer SOAs than at shorter SOAs, even though task 
performance is similar at these SOAs. This pattern is difficult for both the Single and Dual Channel 
models to reconcile; as depicted in Figure 1-5, both overestimate type 2 performance, particularly at 
long SOAs. The Hierarchical model gives a reasonably good overall fit to the type 2 data, although even 
this fit did not produce a difference between type 2 performance at short and long SOAs as pronounced 
as in the data.  
The results reported in Figure 1-5 are easy to intuit. For the Single Channel model, area under 
the type 2 ROC curve is already largely determined by specifying type 1 task performance, i.e. the 






Figure 1-5. Model fits for type 2 data. In addition to the distinctive dissociation between task 
performance and visibility (Figure 1-4), the behavioral data also included a set of type 2 data that 
provided a challenge for model fitting. By “type 2 data” we refer to the probability of giving different 
levels of visibility ratings conditional upon task performance. (Top panel) Type 2 hit rate (HR; probability 
of high visibility for correct responses) and type 2 false alarm rate (FAR; probability of high visibility for 
incorrect responses) as a function of SOA. (Bottom panel) Area under the type 2 ROC curve as a function 
of SOA. In general, signal detection theory models predict that as task performance increases, type 2 hit 
rate and type 2 false alarm rate should diverge and area under the type 2 ROC curve should increase. In 
this data set, type 2 performance at long SOAs was worse than at short SOAs even though task 
performance was similar, a pattern difficult to reconcile for standard signal detection theory and its Dual 






relationship between stimulus classification performance and type 2 performance is essentially due to 
the fact that they are based on the same underlying information; there is no additional process by 
means of which the quality of information available to type 1 and type 2 mechanisms could differ. Thus, 
this fundamental assumption of the Single Channel models makes them somewhat inflexible in 
capturing the relationship between type 1 and type 2 data, particularly like those in the current 
experiment where area under the type 2 ROC curve exhibited a dissociation from task accuracy across 
SOA (compare Figure 1-4 and Figure 1-5). In principle, Single Channel models can reduce type 2 
performance without affecting classification accuracy by supposing that type 2 criterion setting is a noisy 
process, such that the placement of the criteria varies randomly from trial to trial (Mueller & 
Weidemann, 2008), but this class of models gave poor overall fits to the current data set (Table 1-1). 
One may expect the Dual Channel model to fare better because it postulates two different 
processes. However, this was not the case. The reason is that the “conscious” channel essentially acts 
like a Single Channel model, supposing a tight relationship between task performance and subjective 
visibility, and the “unconscious” channel is limited in the extent to which it can interfere with fully 
“conscious” processing. (For instance, one would not expect an observer to make a subjective report of 
having a distinct visual awareness of seeing squares and yet simultaneously claim that the stimuli 
presented on the screen were diamonds.)  It is possible that Dual Channel models featuring more 
extensive and complicated interactions between the two channels could fare better, but such models 
would potentially constitute a departure from the fundamental dichotomy between “conscious” and 
“unconscious” processing streams that arguably is the main conceptual motivation for proposing the 
Dual Channel class of models. As it stands, the best Dual Channel model we tested already posits that in 
cases of conflict in the stimulus classification response, the “unconscious” channel can modulate 
visibility ratings made by the “conscious” channel; simpler Dual Channel models that better respected 





By contrast, the dissociation between type 1 and type 2 performance is more naturally captured 
by Hierarchical models, as they stipulate a less restrictive relationship between the quality of 
information available for type 1 and type 2 decision making. Changing the degree to which the evidence 
becomes degraded at the second stage of processing provides a means of changing the patterns of 
subjective rating without affecting basic task performance, which is determined by the first stage of 
processing. 
 As models become more complex, in general they become better able to capture real patterns 
in data, but also become more prone to erroneously capture noise in the data (overfitting). Thus, one 
approach to conducting formal model analysis involves using metrics like the Akaike Information 
Criterion (AIC) or Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC), which reward models for closeness of fit to 
observed data while punishing them for complexity (number of parameters). In Figure 1-6 we present 
model comparison results based on a finite-sample correction of AIC, AICc (Burnham & Anderson, 2002). 
Overall, the hierarchical category of models collectively outperformed the Single Channel and Dual 
Channel models (top panel), and this pattern held up when comparing only the best models in each 
category (bottom panel). Essentially identical results are found using BIC (Table 1-1). Thus, the superior 
goodness of fit for the Hierarchical model evident in Figures 4 and 5 cannot be written off to overfitting. 
In fact, the three best models in each model category, though visibly differing in quality of data fitting, 
had essentially the same number of parameters (Single Channel and Dual Channel, 23; Hierarchical, 24). 
 
Parameter values for the model fits 
We can derive further insight into the way the best models in each category captured the data 
by investigating their parameter values (Figure 1-7).  
The fit for the Single Channel model indicates a U-shaped curve for σ, the standard deviation of 






Figure 1-6. Model selection results. Formal model comparison was conducted using a finite sample size 
correction of the Akaike Information Criterion (AICc), which rewards models for closely fitting observed 
data while punishing models for the degree of complexity (i.e. number of free parameters; for list of free 
parameters for all models please see Materials and Methods). For ease of interpretation we display a 
transformation of AICc values into Akaike weights, which quantify the information theoretic evidence in 
favor of each model such that the weights sum to 1 (Burnham and Anderson, 2002). (Top panel) Model 
selection on all 26 models. The best hierarchical model had an average Akaike weight roughly twice as 
large as those of the best single channel and dual channel models. Similarly, the best model for each 
subject was roughly 2 – 3 times as likely to belong to the hierarchical class than to the other two model 
classes. The average Akaike weight summed across all hierarchical models was roughly 3 – 4 times as 
great as the Akaike weight sums for the other two classes. (Bottom panel) Similar results were found 
when restricting the analysis to the best models in each model class. Model comparison results were 
nearly identical when using the Bayesian information criterion to estimate the posterior probability of 










are held constant across SOA (a stipulation for all models, see Materials and Methods), larger values of σ 
entail higher levels of mean visibility rating (see e.g. Figure 1-3), and yet the model can predict similar  
levels of task performance at short and long SOAs since task accuracy depends on d’ = μdiff / σ. In this 
way, provided that the standard deviations of the evidence distributions can vary independently from 
their distance, the Single Channel model can capture the accuracy / visibility dissociation in the 
behavioral data (Figure 1-4). Thus, in order for the Single Channel model to capture this data, it must 
assume that the variance of the internal signal is highest at long SOAs where task performance and 
visibility are maximal. Although such a Poisson-like correlation of signal and noise is not in itself 
implausible, the specific patterns predicted are some cause for doubt. For instance, the model predicts 





simultaneous presentation of stimulus and mask is less noisy than when their presentation is separated 
by a full 100 ms. It seems more likely that, controlling for the magnitude of the absolute signal, stimulus 
representations should be noisier when the mask is presented simultaneously than when the mask is 
presented 100 ms later. 
The Dual Channel model predicts that perceptual sensitivity is greater in the “unconscious” 
channel than in the “conscious” channel for several short SOAs. Because this model resets visibility 
ratings to 1 when the two channels disagree on stimulus classification, setting the sensitivity of the 
“unconscious” channel higher at the short SOAs has the effect of increasing the frequency of 
disagreements between the two channels, thus reducing visibility at those SOAs without having a drastic 
effect on task performance. This allows visibility to be lower at shorter SOAs than at longer ones even 
though task performance at those SOAs is similar. However, the model only manages to produce a 
somewhat weak dissociation (Figure 1-4). Furthermore, it seems unlikely that processing in an 
unconscious channel could be so robustly high and consistently superior than conscious processing 
across several SOAs. 
The Hierarchical model predicts that perceptual evidence decays in the second stage of 
“subjective” processing more readily at short than at long SOAs, thus leading to lower overall levels of 
visibility at the short SOAs in spite of similar stimulus discrimination sensitivity. By contrast, the model 
supposes that noise at the late processing stage is independent of SOA. This seems plausible if we 
imagine that signal transmission from early to later stages of perceptual processing depends in part on 
the processing that occurs in early sensory areas, whereas the noise intrinsic to later processing stages is 
independent of the noise in earlier stages. 
The structure and parameter values of the Hierarchical model are also consistent with previous 
empirical findings from experiments focusing on the dissociation between objective task performance 





masking paradigm as in the present study, and in the fMRI scanner they focused on a short and a long 
SOA where task performance was matched, and yet the subjective ratings of visual awareness differed. 
Higher subjective ratings of visibility at the long SOA were associated with higher level of activity in the 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex. Interestingly, no significant difference in level of fMRI activity was found 
in posterior sensory areas. This is compatible with the Hierarchical model if we assume that the 
prefrontal activity reflects the hierarchical model’s late stage process. Indeed, according to the 
parameter values of the best Hierarchical model (Figure 1-7), reported visibility was higher at the long 
SOAs than it was at the earlier, performance-matched SOAs due to a superior transmission of perceptual 
evidence to the late processing stage (i.e., higher values for the parameter k). This corroborates well 
with the fMRI result.  
 
The two key-press design of the task did not favor the Hierarchical models 
 One might worry that the design of the current experiment is biased in favor of the Hierarchical 
model. We required subjects to report stimulus visibility after they reported stimulus identity, with a 
second key press. Perhaps signal degradation did occur between the “objective” and “subjective” 
decisions, in a fashion predicted by the Hierarchical model, but only because the design forced subjects 
to report visibility after reporting their perceptual decisions. This timing difference between the two key 
presses could trivialize our findings.  
 However, the implicit reasoning behind this argument is that signal degradation could be 
artificially introduced by increasing response time. The longer the subject takes to respond, the more 
degraded a signal presumably becomes. If this deflationary account of the modeling results were true, 
we might expect that the Hierarchical model's estimated values of signal decay and late processing noise 
should correlate with the time separating the stimulus classification key press from the subjective rating 





decay and rating RT was not significant for any subject (ps > .15), and the average correlation did not 
differ from zero (Fisher’s r-to-z transform, p = .4; Fisher, 1915).  
Since the parameter for late processing noise was constant across SOA for the best Hierarchical 
model, we cannot compute within-subject correlations of this parameters with rating RT. We did find 
that across subjects, the estimated amount of late noise correlated with average rating RT, r = -.48, p = 
.03. However, this result is in the opposite direction of that proposed by the trivializing critique 
regarding two separate key presses. That is, longer rating RTs were associated with smaller, rather than 
larger, estimates of late-stage processing noise.  
Finally, we note that rating RT was not modulated by SOA (p = .4) and that the average rating RT 
was relatively small (426 ms). This suggests that the time between the first and the second key presses 
was mainly for motor preparation, i.e. subjects probably made both objective and subjective decisions, 
and then pressed two keys to reflect them in quick succession without much “thinking” in between. In 
our subjective experience this is how one would perform the task as well. Taken together, these results 
suggest that the success of the Hierarchical model in fitting the data cannot be trivially attributed to the 
two key press design of the task.  
 
Discussion 
 In order to compare models of how subjective reports of visibility relate to objective perceptual 
processing, we collected data from a metacontrast masking paradigm that has been shown to induce 
dissociations between stimulus classification accuracy and reported levels of visibility across different 
levels of stimulus-mask onset asynchroncy (SOA) (Lau & Passingham, 2006). We reasoned that the 
unusual, nonlinear relationship between accuracy and visibility across SOA (Figure 1-4) would pose a 
challenge to models of perceptual decision making, and thus prove useful for distinguishing amongst 





visibility ratings were more predictive of task accuracy at short than at long SOAs (Figure 1-5), even 
though stimulus classification accuracy at these SOAs was similar. Overall, the Hierarchical model 
provided the best and most parsimonious fit to the data. The model parameters it used to fit the data 
also seem plausible (Figure 1-7), and overall the model seems compatible with previous empirical 
findings (Lau & Passingham, 2006). 
 Why was the Hierarchical model successful where the Single Channel and Dual Channel models 
were not? The best-performing Hierarchical model (Constant Noise + Decay) was able to accommodate 
the relative dissociation between task performance and visibility ratings by supposing that early-stage 
perceptual processing is better transmitted to late-stage processing at long than at short SOAs. Because 
the early stage governs task performance and the late stage governs subjective reports, this allows for 
long SOAs to have higher subjective visibility than short SOAs in spite of having similar task performance.  
This concept of differential transmission of information from earlier to later stages of processing 
bears some similarity to notions of processing bottlenecks in multi-stage processing hierarchies. For 
instance, Chun and Potter (1995) accounted for the attentional blink with a two-stage model wherein 
the processing of an initial stimulus interferes with the access of subsequent stimuli to late-stage 
processing responsible for mechanisms of conscious access and report. However, the attentional blink 
concerns interrupted access for a subsequent stimulus presented 150 – 400 ms after an initial stimulus, 
whereas here we are concerned with the interrupted processing of an initial stimulus presented ~16 ms 
prior to a mask. Furthermore, whereas the attentional blink involves interruption of objective stimulus 
processing, the effect we are focusing on in the metacontrast masking paradigm concerns suppressed 
subjective processing of a stimulus whose objective processing is otherwise intact.  
 The best-performing Single Channel model (Changing Variance) was able to accommodate this 
pattern to some extent by supposing that perceptual processing becomes more variable at long SOAs, 





visibility ratings. However, although this model captured the gist of the performance-visibility 
dissociation, it sometimes produced too-high estimates of visibility ratings or too-low estimates of task 
performance (Figure 1-4, lower left panel).  
 By comparison, none of the Dual Channel models we considered appeared to capture the 
performance-visibility dissociation particularly well. Our SDT implementation of the Independent Dual 
Channel model (which most closely followed the model of Del Cul et al. (2009); see Appendix B) 
essentially acts like a Single Channel model with added flexibility for adjusting task performance at the 
lowest level of subjective visibility. This provides only a relatively limited mechanism for adjusting the 
relationship between task performance and visibility; holding the parameters of the “conscious” channel 
constant, changes in the “unconscious” channel can only influence task performance to the extent that 
subjects report the lowest level of subjective visibility. Thus, this model can accommodate only relatively 
small differences in task performance for conditions with similar mean levels of reported visibility. 
Additionally, because task performance at higher (presumably conscious) visibility levels cannot be 
affected by changing parameters of the “unconscious” channel, this model makes the relatively strong 
prediction that whatever differences in task performance do occur for visibility-matched conditions, 
they should arise purely from differences in task performance for trials with the lowest visibility rating. 
The best-performing Dual Channel model (Weighted Dual Channel) was somewhat more flexible, but 
still did not adequately capture the dissociation (Figure 1-4, bottom center panel).  
 In addition to the performance-visibility dissociation across SOA, we also found that the models 
differed in their ability to capture the degree to which visibility ratings were diagnostic of accuracy on a 
trial to trial basis. Visibility ratings for incorrect responses at short and long SOAs were generally higher 
than the model fits (Figure 1-5 top row), and the ability of visibility ratings to predict accuracy was 
generally lower than the model fits (Figure 1-5 bottom row). The Hierarchical model performed best at 





stages. This reduces the information that such sensory signals carry regarding task performance on the 
trial level, which manifests as lower area under the type 2 ROC curve. By contrast, the Single Channel 
model posits that the same sensory evidence is used to make both the objective response and the 
visibility rating, and thus is considerably less flexible in the relationships it allows between task 
performance and type 2 accuracy (Maniscalco & Lau, 2012; Appendix A). Dual Channel models behaved 
similarly to Single Channel models in this respect, as they primarily differed with respect to processing at 
low levels of visibility. 
 All models we tested were constructed using signal detection theory (SDT) as a basis (Figure 1-3; 
Appendix A; Green & Swets, 1996; Macmillan & Creelman, 2005). In this work, SDT provided an ideal 
basis to compare overall model architectures in a simple but powerful framework. SDT is sufficiently 
powerful to be able to dissociate perceptual sensitivity from response bias—essential for the study of 
perceptual decision making and subjective reports of visibility—while also being sufficiently general as 
to be readily adapted to different model architectures. Using the same SDT framework for all models 
also facilitated direct model comparison by minimizing idiosyncratic computational differences between 
the models. Because our SDT models captured the core computational principles lying behind broadly 
divergent theories of how perceptual decision making and subjective visibility are related, the model 
comparison analysis sheds light on these broad conceptual issues.  
 One limitation to this approach is that the conclusions we have drawn may be somewhat 
specific to the particular SDT implementations we have used. (However, see Appendix B for evidence 
that our SDT implementation of the Independent Dual Channel model behaves similarly to the dual 
channel accumulation model in Del Cul et al. (2009).) Nonetheless, the relative simplicity of the SDT 
models we have chosen, in conjunction with the broad differences in the model classes being compared 





comprehensive analysis that directly compares a wide range of models’ ability to account for the data, 
rather than simply demonstrating that a single model can produce reasonable fits to the data. 
 We also acknowledge that this analysis is driven by the current data set and is thus limited in its 
generalizability. For instance, it is possible that a Dual Channel model may perform better for capturing 
other kinds of empirical phenomena. Future work employing similar formal comparison strategies needs 
to be performed in these cases.  
 
Are the models biologically realistic? 
On the face of it, the models we considered depict a purely feedforward style of information 
processing. What of the fact that anatomically, the most related brain regions are linked by both 
feedforward and feedback connections? For instance, for the Hierarchical model it is perhaps natural to 
think of the first stage as representing processing in the early sensory regions in the brain, and the 
second stage as representing processing in higher regions such as the prefrontal cortex. In this sense, 
the model ignores the presence of top-down modulations from prefrontal cortex to early sensory areas. 
However, formally the model does not necessarily commit to such anatomical identifications. Strictly 
speaking, the model is agnostic as to whether the late stage is mediated by a feedforward or feedback 
process; late stage simply means it is late in the stream of information processing and thereby inherits 
the noise of earlier stages.   
Even on the plausible and intuitive interpretation that in the Hierarchical model the first stage 
reflects early sensory processes and the second stage fronto-parietal processes, the model does not 
deny the existence of feedback connections. Nor does it deny the existence of parallel pathways as 
intuitively depicted by the Dual Channel model. The Hierarchical model suggests that with respect to 
explaining the relationships and potential dissociations of objective stimulus responses and subjective 





the Hierarchical model explains all facts regarding brain processes or subjective experience. It is for the 
same reasons that the Single Channel model cannot be rejected on the grounds that the brain is clearly 
more complex than a single-stage processor.  
 
Implications for theories of visual awareness 
One currently popular theory suggests that feedback, and specifically feedback from extrastriate 
to primary visual cortex, is essential for visual awareness (Lamme, 2006; Block, 2007). One might take 
the point of view that the feedforward wave of processing from primary visual cortex to extrastriate 
areas represents an early stage of processing, and that feedback represents a second stage of 
processing, such that together they form a hierarchy. 
Another dominant theory of visual awareness is the global workspace theory (Dehaene et al., 
2003; Dehaene et al., 2006), according to which early sensory processing itself does not support 
conscious experience. In order to enter consciousness, the early perceptual signal must propagate into a 
second stage of processing mediated by a global workspace structure located in prefrontal and parietal 
cortices. Considerations like these may give the impression that both theories of visual awareness 
discussed above are compatible with the Hierarchical model.  
However, it is important to emphasize that the present work focuses on the dissociation 
between objective task performance and subjective reports. According to the Hierarchical model, 
manipulation of the second stage of processing changes subjective reports but not task performance. 
But the feedback model and the global workspace model would not make such predictions. In these 
models, the supposed second stage of processing supports both subjective experience as well as 
amplification of the perceptual signal itself, which is essential for objective task performance. Thus, 
according to these theories, if the second stage of processing (feedback to striate cortex, or global 





affected. Therefore, these models bear more functional resemblance to the Single Channel models than 
the Hierarchical models. In order for such theories to obtain a reduction in subjectively reported level of 
awareness while keeping task performance constant, one natural solution would be that the perceptual 
signal from a separate, unconscious channel (e.g. a subcortical route) would need to be increased to 
compensate for the signal loss in the “conscious” channel. In other words, a Dual Channel model would 
need to be stipulated. 
Therefore, as far as dissociations between task performance and subjective reports are 
concerned (e.g. when we are specifically trying to explain the kind of performance-matched difference 
in subjective rating and type 2 performance depicted in Figures 1-4 and 1-5), both aforementioned 
theories are more congenial with Single Channel and Dual Channel models than with Hierarchical 
models (Del Cul et al., 2009; Lau, 2011). The present results are thus surprising, or maybe even 
problematic, for these theories. 
 
Viability of the metacontrast masking paradigm for dissociating objective and subjective processing 
 Recent research has called into question the viability of the metacontrast masking paradigm 
used here and previously (Lau & Passingham, 2006) for the purposes of dissociating ratings of awareness 
from objective task performance. These objections are based upon a putative difference in the nature of 
stimulus processing at short and long SOAs, such that a direct comparison between the two is 
problematic. 
Jannati and Di Lollo (2012) argue that the “criterion contents” used to guide behavioral 
responses at short and long SOAs in Lau and Passingham’s stimulus set differ. At short SOAs, the square 
/ diamond target may perceptually ‘fuse’ with the metacontrast mask. In Lau and Passingham’s stimuli, 
square and diamond targets were always presented at the same contrast, and the mask was similar to 





within a solid-colored circle, rather than being a sparse line drawing as in the current experiment. Thus, 
at short SOAs, the square/diamond target may have perceptually fused with the circular mask, such that 
the salient perceptual feature for distinguishing between squares and diamonds would be the small 
gaps between target and mask, rather than the luminance-defined shape of the target itself (see Jannati 
and Di Lollo’s Figure 1). Thus, the salient perceptual feature used to evaluate the stimulus—the 
“criterion content”—may have differed at short (orientation of target-mask gaps) and long (luminance-
defined target shape) SOAs. To support their interpretation that the performance / awareness 
dissociation occurs due to differing criterion contents at short and long SOAs, Jannati and Di Lollo 
performed a separate metacontrast masking experiment in which they argue that the criterion content 
is the same at short and long SOAs. In this experiment, they failed to find short and long SOA pairs in 
which task performance was the same and reports of awareness significantly differed. If the criterion 
content does in fact differ between short and long SOAs, then a direct comparison between the two is 
problematic. If reports of stimulus visibility qualitatively differ, e.g. in regards to the perceptual feature 
which they evaluate, then direct quantitative comparison between them may not be meaningful. 
However, although Jannati and Di Lollo failed to find performance-matched SOAs that exhibited 
differences in awareness in their revised experiment, there was nonetheless a Measure 
(Performance/Awareness) x SOA interaction, significant at the p < .001 level, due to the fact that the 
awareness curve was lower than the performance curve at short but not long SOAs. Thus, contrary to 
their interpretation of the findings, their results in the revised, single criterion content experiment seem 
to be consistent with the general pattern we have observed here and previously. As a result, their 
interpretation that the dissociation found in Lau and Passingham is due to a criterion content confound, 
such that removing this confound also removes the dissociation, does not seem justified by their data. 
Additionally, our stimuli differ in important respects from those used in Lau and Passingham 





significantly less perceptually salient due to being a 1-pixel wide line drawing rather than a shape 
embedded in a solid-colored circle. Additionally, we adjusted stimulus contrast in order to control task 
performance, such that the stimulus contrast for each subject (mean Weber contrast = -0.11) was 
substantially lower than the mask contrast (Weber contrast = -1). Thus, even at short SOAs where the 
target and mask may have perceptually fused, luminance-defined shape of the target remained a highly 
salient perceptual cue for performing the shape discrimination task, and in this respect the same 
criterion content (luminance-defined target shape) was perceptually available across all SOAs. 
Sackur (2013) used a multidimensional scaling analysis to investigate the perceptual dimensions 
underlying perceptual performance in metacontrast masking tasks. He argued that his analysis revealed 
three salient perceptual dimensions: one coding for SOA, and the other two coding separately for 
perception at short and long SOAs. Sackur argued that this finding upholds the idea that criterion 
content for metacontrast masking stimuli differs at short and long SOA. However, in Sackur’s 
metacontrast masking task, the target was a square, and the mask was a thick square frame with the 
same contrast as the target. Unlike the masks we have discussed to this point, the inner perimeter of 
this square-frame mask perfectly traced the contours of the square target, leaving no gaps. Thus, at 
short SOA when the target and mask were presented simultaneously, the target was literally no longer 
discernable as such; what was physically presented on the screen was simply an unusually large square, 
i.e. the thick frame of the mask with its center filled in by the target. Indeed, in Sackur’s analysis, the 
dimension coding for perception at short SOA time scales primarily differentiated the two SOA during 
which the target and mask physically overlapped in this way (SOA = 0 ms and 10 ms) from the remaining 
SOA (Sackur’s Figure 5). Thus, the difference in perception at short and long SOAs found in Sackur’s 
study is readily attributable to the fact that an unusually large version of the target stimulus (large 
square mask filled in with target) was briefly presented at short SOAs but not at long SOAs. No such 





Sackur’s results do not seem to provide reason to believe that criterion content differed as a function of 
SOA with these stimuli. 
 
Potential relations to the memory literature 
         It has been proposed that there are two distinct and dissociable memory systems, one 
supporting explicit, “conscious” recollection, and the other more relevant for vaguer judgments of 
familiarity or feelings of knowing, or unconscious priming behavior (e.g. Jacoby, 1991; Hintzman & 
Curran, 1994). However, it has also been argued that a single system view is more parsimonious (Squire, 
Wixted, & Clark, 2007; Wixted, 2007; Berry, Shanks, & Henson, 2008), and that the apparent dissociation 
between conscious recollection and unconscious memory is due to different levels of activation within 
the same system. Our results may contribute to this controversy, because the paradigms used in some 
of these memory studies are conceptually very similar to the paradigm used here: subjects make an 
objective judgment about the state of the world (identity of visual stimulus, or whether an item has 
been presented previously or not), and then make a subjective judgment about how they subjectively 
feel about the first-order process (high vs low visibility, or “Remember” vs “Know” in some memory 
studies). Here we offer a third alternative to this debate between a single system versus two dissociated 
systems: it could be that there are two processes that work in hierarchy. Future studies may employ the 
same model comparison method to arbitrate which is the best model for memory function by fitting the 
models to experimental data where the objective memory performance and the subjective reports of 
recollection experience dissociate. 
 
Conclusion 
Here we introduce a distinction between different signal processing architectures supporting 





approach, such as that it depends on the specific fitted dataset. Regardless of whether these results hold 
true, one important message is that we can go beyond the traditional assumption that perception 
depends on a single decision making process (Green & Swets, 1966; Macmillan & Creelman, 2005). 
These simple single process models have enjoyed great success in explaining many aspects of 
perception, and remain powerful contenders because of their simplicity, as shown in our model 
comparison analysis (which punishes complex models). But in cases where objective task performance 
and subjective reports dissociate, it may be important to consider perceptual decision models that 
postulate more than a single process, at least as possibilities. Our investigation suggests that, of the two 





















Manipulation of working memory contents impairs relative metacognitive sensitivity in a concurrent 
visual discrimination task 
 
Introduction 
 As we showed in Chapter 1, a Hierarchical modeling structure provides a good explanation for 
the behavioral phenomenon of relative blindsight discovered by Lau and Passingham (2006), whereby 
objective stimulus discrimination performance and subjective reports of stimulus visibility can 
dissociate. The functional structure of early and late processing stages of the Hierarchical model is 
suggestive of a mapping onto the anatomical structure of neural sites situated in earlier and later stages 
in the processing stream of visual information. Consistent with this notion, Lau and Passingham (2006) 
found that when subjective reports of visibility differed for target-mask stimulus onset asynchronies in 
which objective stimulus discrimination was matched, the elevated reports of subjective visibility were 
associated with enhanced activity in dlPFC but not in earlier, more posterior stages responsible for visual 
processing. 
Several additional lines of evidence in the literature link higher-level portions of the frontal 
cortex function (including dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC), rostrolateral prefrontal cortex (rlPFC), 
and anterior prefrontal cortex (aPFC)) to visual metacognition. Activations in dlPFC and rlPFC have been 
found to inversely correlate with reports of confidence in visual and memory tasks (Henson, Rugg, 
Shallice, & Dolan, 2000; Fleck, Daselaar, Dobbins, & Cabeza, 2006; Fleming, Huijgen, & Dolan, 2012), and 
rlPFC activations have been found to directly (in a memory task; Yokoyama et al., 2010) and indirectly (in 
a visual task; Fleming et al., 2012) correlate with metacognitive sensitivity. Individual differences in gray 
matter volume in aPFC positively correlate with visual metacognitive sensitivity (Fleming et al., 2010; 





following correct decisions in a cuing task, even before task feedback is provided (Tsujimoto, Genovesio, 
& Wise, 2010). Finally, as we will show in Chapter 3, transcranial magnetic stimulation to bilateral dlPFC 
can impair metacognitive sensitivity. 
 dlPFC is also involved in working memory (WM) performance. Multiple lines of evidence 
implicate dlPFC particularly in the active processing of WM contents, rather than the mere storage of 
WM contents, which is typically attributed to more posterior brain regions, e.g. parietal and occipital 
cortex (Petrides, 2000; Miller & Cohen, 2001; Curtis & D’Esposito, 2003). For instance, dlPFC activations 
during delay periods in WM tasks increase when the task requires WM contents to be manipulated 
(D’Esposito, Postle, Ballard, & Lease, 1999), and other studies have found that dlPFC does not 
preferentially activate during delay periods, but rather its activation profile reflects the specific process 
of response selection performed on the basis of WM contents (Rowe, Toni, Josephs, Frackowiak, & 
Passingham, 2000; Rowe & Passingham, 2001; Rowe, Friston, Frackowiak, & Passingham, 2002). Basic 
short-term memory performance can be spared in patients with bilateral prefrontal damage (Petrides, 
1989; Owen, Morris, Sahakian, Polkey, & Robbins, 1996), but dlPFC lesions impair performance on tasks 
that require active monitoring and manipulation of WM contents in humans (Petrides & Milner, 1982) 
and macaques (Petrides 1995).  dlPFC also becomes more activated in WM tasks in which a cognitive 
strategy allows WM contents to be “chunked” into higher-level units, even though such chunking 
strategies effectively reduce the number of “items” in WM (Bor, Duncan, Wiseman, & Owen, 2003). This 
finding again suggests that dlPFC is more closely linked to strategic monitoring and manipulation of WM 
contents than it is to the overall difficulty of the memory task or to the number of items that need to be 
stored in WM. 
 Given that PFC is recruited in both metacognition and executive processing of WM contents, it is 
possible that common underlying mechanisms are at play in both kinds of cognitive functions. If so, we 





manipulating WM contents, especially in light of general processing capacity limits and bottlenecks in 
PFC (Marois & Ivanoff, 2005). Here we test this hypothesis in a dual-task paradigm. While holding a 
letter string in memory and alphabetizing it, subjects performed a simple 2-interval forced choice visual 
task and provided confidence ratings. After the visual task, a probe assessed memory for the 
alphabetized string. We analyzed metacognitive performance under low and high WM load. Within the 
high WM load condition, we further distinguished between trials that placed low and high manipulation 
demand (i.e. strings requiring little or extensive alphabetization).  To anticipate, we found that 
metacognitive performance was selectively impaired under high WM load with high manipulation 
demand, suggesting that a common mechanism contributes to metacognitive evaluation of perceptual 





 Twenty-three Columbia University students participated in the experiment. Participants gave 
informed consent and were paid $10 for approximately one hour of participation. The research was 
approved by the Columbia University’s Committee for the Protection of Human Subjects. 
 One participant was omitted from data analysis, due to producing outlying data in the 
perceptual metacognitive task under high working memory load (Figure 2-4). 
 
Experimental procedure 
 Subjects were seated in a dimmed room 60 cm away from a computer monitor. Stimuli were 





MA) and were shown on an iMac monitor (LCD, 24 inches monitor size, 1920x 1200 pixel resolution, 60 
Hz refresh rate). 
 On every trial, a working memory task was performed concurrently with a visual discrimination 
task (Figure 2-1). At the start of the trial, an uppercase letter string in black font was displayed on a gray 
background for 2000 ms. The letter string could consist of either one letter (low WM load) or four letters 
(high WM load). The across-trial sequence of one- and four-letter string presentations was randomized, 
such that each string size occurred with equal frequency. Letters in the four-letter strings were 
presented in random alphabetical order. Letters were chosen randomly from the following letter bank: 
{F, G, H, J, K, L, M, N, P, Q, R, S, T}. Vowels and letters early and late in the alphabet were omitted to 
increase memorization and alphabetization difficulty. Subjects were instructed to hold the letter string 
presented at the start of the trial in memory and to alphabetize it, since memory for the alphabetized 
string would be probed at the end of the trial. 
 After the letter string was presented, a crosshair (.35° wide) was presented centrally for 500 ms, 
and then the stimuli for the visual discrimination task were presented. Two stimuli were presented 
simultaneously for 33 ms, one 4° to the left of fixation and one 4° to the right. Each stimulus was a circle 
(3° diameter) consisting of randomly generated visual noise. The target stimulus contained a randomly 
oriented sinusoidal grating (2 cycles per degree) embedded in the visual noise. After stimulus 
presentation, subjects provided a forced-choice judgment of whether the left or the right stimulus 
contained a grating. The grating location was determined randomly on each trial, and gratings appeared 
equally often on the left and right. Following stimulus classification, subjects rated their confidence in 
the accuracy of their response on a scale of 1 through 4. Subjects were encouraged to use the entire 
confidence scale. If the confidence rating was not registered within 5 s of stimulus offset, the trial 







Figure 2-1. Experimental design. Subjects performed a working memory (WM) task concurrently with a 
perceptual decision making task. At the start of the trial, a letter string was presented. Subjects were 
informed to hold the string in memory and sort it into alphabetical order. Strings could be either one 
letter long (low WM load) or four letters long (high WM load). Due to randomization of the four letter 
strings, these could be either easy to alphabetize (high load/easy alphabetization or “high/easy”) or 
difficult (high load/hard alphabetization or “high/hard”). Subsequently, subjects performed a 2-interval 
forced choice discrimination task. Two noisy stimuli appears to the left and right of fixation, and one of 
these contained a sinusoidal grating. Subjects indicated which side the grating appears on and rated 
decision confidence on a scale of 1 – 4. Finally, subjects performed the WM task. A memory probe 
consisting of a letter-number pair inquired as to whether the probe-letter was located at probe-number 
position of the alphabetized string. Experiments 1 and 2 used this same basic design, with slight 






was a 500 ms interval between the entry of confidence rating and the presentation of the memory 
probe. 
 The memory probe consisted of a letter and a number, e.g. T-3. Subjects judged whether it was 
true that the letter of the memorized and alphabetized string picked out by the probe number matched 
the probe letter. For instance, suppose that the initial letter string was TMLS, and the memory probe 
was T-3. The T-3 probe would pose the question, “is it true that the 3rd letter in the alphabetized letter 
string is a T?” Subjects indicated either “yes” or “no” in response to the probe. In this example, the 
correct answer is “no,” since the alphabetized string is LMST, and the third letter of this string is S, not T. 
Probe letters were always selected randomly from one of the letters contained in the original letter 
string. As a consequence of this policy, for one-letter strings, the correct answer was always “yes.”  For 
four-letter strings, the probe letter was chosen randomly. For half of all trials, the probe number 
corresponded to the true index of the probe letter in the alphabetized string. For the remaining half of 
all trials, the probe number was chosen randomly from one of the three remaining indeces. Thus, for 
four-letter strings, the correct answer was “yes” for half of all trials. Grating location, letter string size, 
and correct answer for four-letter strings (“yes” or “no”) were counterbalanced. 
 If no memory response was entered within 5 s of probe onset, the trial proceeded as if a 
response had been entered. Such trials were omitted from all analyses. After entry of the memory 
response, a crosshair was presented centrally for 1200 ms, after which time the next letter string was 
presented. At the beginning of this interval, a 200 ms tone indicated accuracy for the working memory 
task—a brief high-pitched tone indicated a correct memory response, and a brief low-pitched tone 
indicated an incorrect response. 
 At the start of each experimental session, subjects completed 2 practice blocks (20 trials each) 
and 1 calibration block (120 trials). In the calibration block, performance on the 2-interval forced choice 





performance using the QUEST threshold estimation procedure (Watson & Pelli, 1983). In order to 
shorten trial length, no letter strings or memory probes were presented during the calibration block; 
each trial consisted only of presentation of the visual stimuli, followed by the subject’s key presses 
indicating the grating location and decision confidence. Target stimuli were defined as the sum of a 
grating with Michelson contrast Cgrating and a patch of visual noise with Michelson contrast Cnoise. The 
total contrast of the target stimulus, Ctarget = Cgrating + Cnoise, was set to 0.9. The non-target stimulus 
containing only noise was also set to a Michelson contrast of 0.9. The QUEST procedure was used to 
estimate the ratio of the grating contrast to the noise contrast, Rg/n = Cgrating / Cnoise, which yielded 72% 
correct performance in the 2IFC task. Three independent threshold estimates of Rg/n were acquired, with 
40 randomly ordered trials contributing to each, and the median estimate of these was used to create 
stimuli for the main experiment.  
 In the main experiment, subjects completed 8 blocks of 50 trials each, for a total of 400 trials. 




 Thirty Columbia University students participated in the experiment. Participants gave informed 
consent and were paid $10 for approximately one hour of participation. The research was approved by 
the Columbia University’s Committee for the Protection of Human Subjects. 
 One participant was omitted from data analysis, due to producing outlying data in the 
perceptual metacognitive task under high working memory load (Figure 2-4). 
 
Experimental procedure 





 First, in the working memory task, the probe letter was now allowed to differ from the original 
letter string for one-letter strings. For one-letter strings, the probe letter matched the original letter for 
half of all trials, and thus the correct answer for the memory task was “yes” on half of all trials. However, 
as in Experiment 1, the probe letter for four-letter strings was always randomly selected from one of the 
letters contained in the initially presented string. 
 Second, in the visual discrimination task, two levels of grating contrast were used. The higher 
level of contrast was determined in the calibration block, as in Experiment 1. The lower level of grating 
contrast was set equal to half the value of the higher grating contrast. As with the high grating contrast 
stimuli, the low grating contrast stimuli were defined by adding the low-contrast grating to a white noise 
pattern, such that the contrast of the grating+noise stimulus as a whole was set to 0.9. Contrast level 
was counterbalanced with grating location, letter string size, and correct answer for the memory task 
(“yes” or “no”). 
 Third, the presentation of one- and four-letter strings was now blocked, rather than randomly 
interleaved across trials. For 14 subjects, the first 4 blocks (200 trials) of the main experiment contained 
only one-letter strings, and the last 4 blocks (200 trials) contained only four-letter strings. For the 
remaining 16 subjects, the order was reversed. Assignment of subjects to the low-load-first and high-
load-first conditions was randomized. 
Data analysis for the perceptual task 
  We measured perceptual and metacognitive performance in the visual task using signal 
detection theory (SDT) analysis (Green & Swets, 1966; Macmillan & Creelman, 2005; Appendix A). We 
defined hit rate (HR) as the probability that the subject reported that the grating was on the right, given 
that the grating was on the right, and false alarm rate (FAR) as the probability that the subject reported 
that the grating was on the right, given that the grating was on the left. We calculated d’ = z(HR) – z(FAR) 





We similarly quantified metacognitive sensitivity, i.e. the efficacy with which confidence ratings 
discriminate between a subject’s own correct and incorrect responses, with meta-d’ (Maniscalco & Lau, 
2012; Appendix A). Specifically, for each WM condition of each subject’s data, we found the value of 
meta-d’ that jointly maximized the likelihood of the response-specific type 2 ROC curves, where 
response-specific type 2 ROC curves are derived from “type 2” probabilities of the general form 
P(confidence = c | stimulus = s and response = r). Maximization of likelihood was achieved using the 
Optimization Toolbox in MATLAB (MathWorks, Natick, MA). Essentially, estimating meta-d’ in this 
analysis amounts to fitting the SDT model to the type 2 probabilities of every subject/condition for every 
possible permutation of stimulus, response, and confidence level. Please see Appendix A for a more in-
depth treatment of the methodology for estimating meta-d’.  
According to SDT, perceptual sensitivity and metacognitive sensitivity are directly correlated; as 
an observer becomes better at performing a perceptual tasks, it theoretically follows that metacognitive 
sensitivity also improves (Galvin et al, 2003; Maniscalco & Lau, 2012). Meta-d’ is defined such that, if an 
observer with perceptual sensitivity d’ exhibits metacognitive performance exactly in line with the SDT 
prediction, then meta-d’ = d’. However, if the observer underperforms SDT expectation, then meta-d’ < 
d’.   
As suggested in Maniscalco & Lau (2012), these observations suggest a useful conceptual 
distinction between absolute and relative metacognitive sensitivity. Absolute metacognitive sensitivity 
concerns how well confidence ratings discriminate correct from incorrect responses overall. Relative 
metacognitive sensitivity concerns how well confidence ratings discriminate correct from incorrect 
responses, relative to how informative we might expect those confidence ratings to be in light of the 
observer’s perceptual performance. Whereas absolute metacognitive sensitivity can be measured 
straightforwardly with meta-d’, relative metacognitive sensitivity can be measured by means of a 





that it allows us to take the theoretical relationship between perceptual and metacognitive performance 
into account when evaluating metacognitive performance, which in turn facilitates discovery of 
“genuinely” metacognitive effects, as opposed to differences in absolute metacognitive sensitivity that 
can potentially be attributed to differences in the underlying perceptual task performance. 
In Experiment 2, the low contrast condition led to unexpectedly low levels of performance in the 
perceptual task. Average d’ for the low contrast stimuli was .25, which for an unbiased observer 
corresponds to a rate of 55% correct responding. One sample t-tests revealed that both d’ and meta-d’ 
were significantly greater than zero (i.e., the chance level of responding) in the low contrast condition 
(ps < .05). However, at these near-chance levels of performance, data are noisy and subject to floor 
effects. For these reasons, we will focus on analyzing only the high contrast condition of Experiment 2. 
Nonetheless, the data from the low contrast condition are useful to the extent that they demonstrate 
that meta-d’ scales directly with d’ and can be significantly better than chance even when d’ is itself 
close to chance performance. In turn, this suggests that the function relating d’ and meta-d’ has a y-
intercept approximately equal to zero. On the assumption that the function relating d’ and meta-d’ is 
linear (with a zero y-intercept), the slope of this line would then indicate the quality of metacognitive 
performance relative to perceptual performance. But the slope of a line with zero y-intercept is just the 
ratio of y to x, as e.g. for two points on a line, y1 = mx1 and y2 = mx2, it follows that m = y1 / x1 = y2 / x2. 
Therefore, computing the ratio meta-d’ / d’ is akin to measuring the slope of the line relating meta-d’ 
and d’, and thus provides a means of measuring the quality of metacognitive performance, relative to 








 Due to the similarities in experimental design and empirical outcomes in Experiments 1 and 2, 
we will present the results from these experiments concurrently. The primary analysis of interest is to 
assess performance in the perceptual task as a function of difficulty of the working memory (WM) task. 
We therefore distinguish between low WM load (one-letter memory string) and high WM load (four-
letter memory string) conditions.  
We further categorize the four-letter strings by the degree to which these randomly created 
strings were initially presented in alphabetical order. Since subjects were required not only to hold the 
strings in memory but also to alphabetize them, the degree to which the strings were initially well-
alphabetized or scrambled could further modulate the resources or processes required to perform the 
memory task. We classified string alphabetization by counting how many of the three consecutive letter 
pairs in each four-letter string were in alphabetical order. For instance, in the string ADBC, two 
consecutive letter pairs are in alphabetical order (AD and BC) but one is not (DB). Strings with two or 
three letter pairs in alphabetical order were considered to be well alphabetized, and strings with zero or 
one letter pair in alphabetical order were considered to be poorly alphabetized. We refer to well 
alphabetized four-letter strings as “high WM load / easy alphabetization” or “high/easy” for short, and 
poorly alphabetized strings as “high WM load / hard alphabetization” or “high/hard” for short.  
 
Working memory performance 
 Overall, the WM load manipulation was successful in presenting a challenging working memory 
task (Figure 2-2), as revealed by separate 2 (WM load: high, low) x 2 (Experiment: 1, 2) mixed-measures 
ANOVAs on accuracy and reaction time in the WM task. Compared to the low load condition, high WM 
load decreased accuracy (main effect of WM load, p < .001; Experiment 1: low load mean = 97.4% 
correct, high load mean = 77.8% correct; Experiment 2: low load mean = 88.4% correct, high load mean 






Figure 2-2. Working memory performance. As expected, the memory task was significantly more 
difficult under high WM load than under low load, exhibiting significantly lower rates of correct 
responding and longer reactions times. However, within the high WM load condition, the distinction 
between easy and difficult alphabetization did not manifest as an observable change in WM task 
performance. Error bars represent 1 SEM. 
 
 
ms, high load mean = 1537 ms; Expt 2: low load mean = 761 ms, high load mean = 1519 ms). However, 
alphabetization difficulty did not affect accuracy (p = .4) or median reaction time (p > .9) in the memory 
task. 
 The main effect of WM load on task performance was modulated by a significant WM load x 
Experiment interaction (p = .008). The source of this interaction was that memory performance under 
low load was significantly better in Experiment 1 than in Experiment 2 (independent samples t-test on % 
correct, p < .001). (Median reaction time on the memory task was also faster in Experiment 1, although 
the WM load x Experiment interaction for median RT did not achieve significance, p = .19.) This 





always the same as the one-letter string, whereas in Experiment 2, the probe only matched the one-
letter string on half of all trials and thus posed a simple but non-trivial memory demand (see Methods). 
However, the structure of the memory task under high load was identical for the two experiments, and 
here memory performance did not differ for either accuracy or reaction time (ps > .8). 
 
Perceptual task performance as a function of WM load 
We plot d’ and meta-d’ as a function of WM load and alphabetization difficulty in Figure 2-3. We 
analyzed this data with separate 2 (WM load: high, low) x 2 (Experiment: 1, 2) mixed design ANOVAs for 
d’ and meta-d’. In both experiments, WM load impaired perceptual sensitivity (d’; WM load, p < .001; 
WM load x Experiment, p > .9; Expt 1: low load mean = 1.88, high load mean = 1.63; Expt 2: low load 
mean = 1.96, high load mean = 1.72) and metacognitive sensitivity (meta-d’; WM load, p = .004; WM 
load x Experiment, p = .6; Expt 1: low load mean = 1.26, high load mean = .95; Expt 2: low load mean = 
1.25, high load mean = 1.03). 
However, the reduction in meta-d’ due to WM load is qualified by the fact that WM load also 
reduced d’. Since d’ and meta-d’ correlate (Galvin et al., 2003; Maniscalco & Lau, 2012), the reduction in 
meta-d’ under high WM load might be attributable merely to the reduction in d’, rather than to a direct, 
independent effect on metacognitive performance per se. If WM load impaired metacognitive 
performance over and above its impairment of perceptual performance, we might expect that WM load 
would decrease the ratio meta-d’ / d’, which we shall hereafter refer to as M. Although M was 
numerically lower under high load (Expt 1: low load mean = .74, high load mean = .61; Expt 2: low load 
mean = .68, high load mean = .63), these differences were not statistically significant in the WM load x 
Experiment ANOVA (WM load, p = .16; WM load x Experiment, p > .5). Thus, overall WM load did not 







Figure 2-3. Perceptual and metacognitive performance as a function of WM load. We measured 
perceptual sensitivity with the signal detection theory (SDT) measure d’ (Green & Swets, 1966) and 
metacognitive sensitivity with the SDT measure meta-d’ (Maniscalco & Lau, 2012). If subjects perform 
according to SDT expectations, data should fall along the dashed line of unity, meta-d’ = d’. Here, 
subjects’ metacognitive sensitivity underperformed SDT expectation. Overall, under high WM load, d’ 
and meta-d’ were equally impaired. Crucially, well-scrambled WM strings were associated with an 
impaired ratio of meta-d’ to d’, suggesting that the process of manipulating the contents of working 
memory had a selective deficit on relative metacognitive sensitivity. On these plots, this result manifests 
as the data for the “high load / hard alphabetization” condition occupying a lower region on the y-axis of 
the meta-d’ vs d’ plot than the other data points in spite of having a similar x-axis value. Error bars 
represent 1 SEM. 
 
 
Perceptual task performance as a function of WM load and alphabetization difficulty 
 In order to take into account the effect of alphabetization difficulty, we calculated M separately 
for the high load / easy alphabetization and high load / hard alphabetization conditions. Scatterplots 
relating M for these conditions as well as M under low load are displayed in Figure 2-4. One subject in 
each of Experiments 1 and 2 produced outlying data on these plots, and were therefore excluded from 
all analyses. Inspection of the remaining data suggests that M was lower under high load / hard 






Figure 2-4. Scatterplots of M under the different WM conditions. M, as the ratio of meta-d’ to d’, 
measures how well the subject performed metacognitively (meta-d’) in relation to perceptual 
performance (d’). For subjects behaving according to signal detection theory expectation, M = 1, 
whereas M < 1 indicates metacognitive performance that is suboptimal relative to SDT expectation. In 
the scatterplots, dashed horizontal lines connect the two data points generated by single subjects. Most 
points fall below the line of unity, suggesting that M is impaired in the “high/hard” condition compared 
to the “low” and “high/easy” conditions. Data shown in circles were considered to be outliers, and data 
from these two subjects was omitted from all analysis.  
 
 
 To investigate this possibility, we conducted a 2 (WM demand: low, high/hard) x 2 (Experiment: 
1, 2) mixed-design ANOVA on M, where we use the factor name “WM demand” rather than “WM load” 
to highlight the fact that this factor now subdivides the high load condition according to alphabetization 
difficulty. Indeed, we found that, compared to low WM load, high load / hard alphabetization impaired 
M in both experiments (WM demand, p = .003; WM demand x Experiment, p = .9; Expt 1: low load mean 
= .74, high/hard mean = .54; Expt 2: low load mean = .68, high/hard mean = .46). By stark contrast, high 
load / easy alphabetization strings did not impair M relative to low WM load (WM demand, p > .9; WM 





= .68, high/easy mean = .71). M under high load / hard alphabetization was also significantly lower than 
under high load / easy alphabetization (WM demand, p = .006; WM demand x Experiment, p > .6). Thus, 
relative metacognitive sensitivity in the perceptual task was not affected by the overall memorization 
load placed upon WM, but rather was selectively impaired by the need to perform extensive 
alphabetization on high load WM strings. These findings are portrayed in Figure 2-5. 
 We pursued these findings further by investigating the separate effects of alphabetization 
difficulty under high WM load on d’ and meta-d’.  A 2 (WM demand: high/easy, high/hard) x 2 
(Experiment: 1, 2) mixed-design ANOVA on d’ did not reveal any significant effects (WM demand, p = 
.12; WM demand x Experiment, p = .19; Expt 1: high/easy mean = 1.61, high/hard mean = 1.63; Expt 2: 
high/easy mean = 1.59, high/hard mean = 1.84). However, a similar ANOVA for meta-d’ did reveal an 
effect of alphabetization difficulty for both experiments (WM demand, p = .004; WM demand x 
Experiment, p > .6; Expt 1: high/easy mean = 1.05, high/hard mean = 0.78; Expt 2: high/easy mean = 
1.07, high/hard mean = 0.71). Thus, whereas overall WM load impaired both d’ and meta-d’, the added 
component of alphabetization difficulty within the high load condition did not modulate d’, but did 
impose a selective deficit for meta-d’. 
 
Confidence as a function of accuracy and WM demand 
 Metacognitive sensitivity is determined by how an observer places confidence ratings for correct 
and incorrect responses. There are several ways in which high WM demand may have impaired 
metacognitive performance—e.g. by reducing confidence for correct responses, increasing confidence 
for incorrect responses, or both. To investigate, we performed a 2 (Accuracy: correct, incorrect) x 2 (WM 
demand: low, high/hard) x 2 (Experiment: 1, 2) mixed-design ANOVA on confidence in the perceptual 
task. In addition, a significant main effect of Accuracy on confidence (p < .001), reflecting higher 






Figure 2-5. Average values of M across WM load conditions. In both experiments, although M was 
numerically lower under high overall WM load than under low load, the difference was not significant. 
However, M under high WM load and difficult alphabetization was significantly lower than it was under 
low load. Error bars represent 1 SEM. 
 
 
.006) which was not modulated by Experiment (Accuracy x WM demand x Experiment, p > .6). The 
Accuracy x WM demand interaction reflects the fact that under high/hard WM demand, confidence for 
correct responses decreased whereas confidence for incorrect responses increased (Figure 2-6). This 
pattern can also be seen in the pooled type 2 ROC curves described in more detail in the following 
section (Figure 2-7), as under high/hard WM demand, type 2 false alarm rates increased whereas type 2 
hit rates decreased relative to the low WM load condition. 
 
Pooled type 2 ROC curve analysis 
 One potential concern with the foregoing analyses is that trial counts were somewhat low, a 







Figure 2-6. Mean levels of confidence as a function of accuracy in the perceptual task and WM load. 
Overall levels of confidence did not differ for low and high/hard WM load. A qualitatively similar pattern 
arose in both experiments, whereby under high/hard WM load, confidence for correct decisions 
decreased and confidence for incorrect decisions increased. Error bars represent 1 SEM. 
 
 
200 trials contributed to the low load condition, and roughly 100 trials contributed to each of the 
high/easy and high/hard conditions. In Experiment 2, for each level of grating contrast, 100 trials  
contributed to the low load condition, and roughly 50 trials contributed to each of the high/easy and 
high/hard conditions. In order to lend further support to the findings described above, we therefore 
performed a complementary analysis that pooled data across subjects. 
 The ideal approach to performing an SDT analysis is to calculate metrics such as d’ separately for 
each subject, using their individual hit rate and false alarm rate data. But in cases where within-subject 
trial counts are a concern but there is ample between-subject data, an alternative approach is to 
average hit rates and false alarm rates across subjects, and use this pooled data to perform SDT analysis 
on the group as a whole (Macmillan & Kaplan, 1985; Macmillan & Creelman, 2005). This pooling 





demonstrating SDT’s ability to characterize a wide variety of empirical ROC curves (Swets, 1986a). 
Although the pooling approach potentially underestimates sensitivity if subjects have very different 
values for sensitivity or response bias (Macmillan & Kaplan, 1985), such concerns are mitigated for the 
present purposes, as we are primarily concerned in analyzing the difference in metacognitive sensitivity 
between two conditions, rather than the overall level of metacognitive sensitivity in a single condition. 
 For the present purposes, we wish to compare metacognitive performance in the low WM load 
and the high/hard WM load conditions. Thus, we pooled data across subjects to construct pooled type 2 
relative operating characteristic (ROC) curves. The type 2 ROC curve is a plot of type 2 hit rate (i.e. 
probability of high confidence for correct responses) against type 2 false alarm rate (i.e. probability of 
high confidence for incorrect responses) (Galvin et al., 2003). The “type 2” designation indicates the task 
of classifying response accuracy with confidence ratings, in contradistinction to the “type 1” task of 
performing an objective classification of the stimuli. Because subjects rated confidence on a scale of 1 
through 4, three (type 2 FAR, type 2 HR) pairs could be calculated for each subject by separately 
considering “high confidence” to consist in all confidence ratings greater than 1, all ratings greater than 
2, or all ratings greater than 3 (Macmillan & Creelman, 2005). We computed the (type 2 FAR, type 2 HR) 
pairs for each subject in the low WM load and high/hard WM load conditions and averaged these across 
subjects. The resulting ROC curves are displayed in Figure 2-7.We similarly computed the across-subject 
average (FAR, HR) for the visual discrimination task, and computed a group d’ from this pooled data. We 
used this value of pooled d’ to construct the ideal pooled type 2 ROC curve, assuming unbiased 
responding in the visual discrimination task (Maniscalco & Lau, 2012).  
Visual inspection of the pooled type 2 ROC curves confirms that metacognitive performance was 
worse under high/hard WM load than under low WM load, as under this condition the type 2 ROC curve 
lies closer to the line of chance metacognitive performance, i.e. the line where type 2 FAR = type 2 HR. 






Figure 2-7. Pooled type 2 ROC curves. In the analyses depicted in the previous figures, d’ and meta-d’ 
were computed separately for each subject. We supplemented this analysis by pooling together 
(averaging) type 2 hit rates (p(high conf | correct)) and type 2 false alarm rates (p(high conf | incorrect)) 
across subjects and using the averaged data to construct the pooled type 2 ROC curves displayed here. 
Similar features are evident in the pooled analysis—the empirical type 2 ROC curves are closer to the 
diagonal line of chance metacognitive performance than are the SDT-ideal dashed curves (echoing the 
finding that M < 1), and the type 2 ROC curve is closer to chance in the high/hard WM load condition 
than it is under the low WM load condition (echoing the finding that M is lower for “high/hard” is lower 
than M for “low”). A bootstrap analysis provided quantitative statistical support for these qualitative 
observations (see Results). 
 
 
bootstrap procedure, the sampling distribution for a variable is estimated by repeatedly resampling with 
replacement from the original data set and computing the value of the variable for each such bootstrap  
sample. We constructed 1000 bootstrap samples of the type 1 and type 2 hit rate and false alarm rate 
data for each WM load condition. For each bootstrap sample, we calculated d’ and estimated meta-d’ by 
finding the least-squares fit of the meta-d’ model to the type 2 ROC curve (Maniscalco & Lau, 2012). We 
then analyzed the distribution of values for MD = Mlow – Mhigh/hard. For Experiment 1, the mean MD was 
.21 and only 3.9% of all bootstrap samples had MD < 0. For Experiment 2, the mean MD was .28 and only 





2 ROC data provides converging evidence for the claim that metacognitive performance was impaired 
under the high WM load / hard alphabetization condition. 
 
Analysis of sequential dependencies in confidence rating 
 One possible way in which high/hard WM load might have impaired metacognitive sensitivity is 
by adding noise to type 2 criterion setting (Mueller & Weidemann, 2008; Benjamin, Diaz, & Wee, 2009). 
According to the SDT model, confidence ratings are created by comparing the magnitude of evidence for 
a perceptual decision to a set of criterion values (Macmillan & Creelman, 2005; Appendix A). (We refer 
to “type 2 criteria” to distinguish these decision criteria from the “type 1 criterion” that determines the 
observer’s perceptual decisions about the stimulus.)  If an observer uses different values for the type 2 
criteria across trials, the net effect is that metacognitive sensitivity is reduced (Mueller & Weidemann, 
2008). One tell-tale sign of noise in the criterion setting process is trial-to-trial dependencies in 
perceptual decisions (Mueller & Weidemann, 2008). If an observer’s responses from trial to trial are 
correlated in spite of stimulus strength across trials being randomized, this is evidence that criterion 
setting drifts over the course of the experiment and is therefore not perfectly stationary. However, the 
converse inference does not hold: failure to find trial-to-trial response dependencies does not indicate 
the absence of noise in criterion setting, since e.g. if criterion values were corrupted with noise drawn 
from a random distribution on each trial, such random noise in the criterion setting process would not 
produce systematic across-trial response dependencies. 
 We thus tested the hypothesis that high/hard WM load reduces metacognitive sensitivity by 
inducing sequential dependencies in confidence rating. We limited the analysis to Experiment 2, since 
this experiment used a block design for WM load which thus facilitated analysis of performance under 
the various WM load conditions in sequential trials. We limited analysis to sequential trial pairs 





successfully entered a perceptual decision and confidence rating for both trial i and trial i – 1; and the 
perceptual decision on both trial i and trial i – 1 was correct.  We enforced these conditions in order to 
minimize extraneous sources of variance in confidence ratings for each sequential trial pair. (There were 
an insufficient number of trials to conduct a similar analysis restricted only to incorrect perceptual 
decisions.) For each subject, we computed (1) the mean of the differences in confidence for each trial i 
and trial i – 1; (2) the standard deviation of the differences in confidence for each trial i and trial i – 1; (3) 
the Pearson’s correlation coefficient for confidence on trial i and trial i – 1. 
 Paired t-tests did not reveal a significant difference between low WM load and high/hard WM 
load in terms of either the mean or the standard deviation of the difference in confidence for sequential 
trials (ps > .4). We compared the sequential trial correlations in confidence for low and high/hard WM 
load by transforming each subject’s Pearson’s r value into a normal deviate z value using Fisher’s r-to-z 
transform (Fisher, 1915). A paired t-test on these z values did not reveal a significant difference in the 
trial-to-trial correlations in confidence for low and high/hard WM load (p > .6). Taken together, these 
results suggest that the decrease in metacognitive sensitivity due to high/hard WM load was not 
mediated by the kind of noisy type 2 criterion setting that would result in sequential dependencies in 
confidence rating. However, it remains possible that more random forms of noise in the type 2 criterion 
setting process might be a candidate mechanism for this effect. 
 
Discussion 
 In summary, we found that when experimental subjects had to perform a working memory task 
concurrently with a perceptual decision making task, performance on the two tasks interacted in 
interesting ways. First, there was an overall effect of WM load whereby both perceptual (d’) and 
metacognitive (meta-d’) sensitivity in the perceptual task decreased when longer letter strings had to be 





contents on perceptual metacognition. For letter strings that were initially poorly alphabetized, stronger 
manipulation demand was imposed upon subjects, as they had to perform more mental operations 
upon WM contents in order to arrive at a properly alphabetized string. This manipulation demand had 
selective effects upon relative metacognitive sensitivity, as measured by M = meta-d’ / d’. When 
manipulation demand for four-letter WM strings was low (i.e. the “high/easy” condition), M did not 
differ for high and low WM load. But when manipulation demand for four-letter strings was high (i.e. the 
“high/hard” condition), M was significantly lower than in the low load and high/easy load conditions. 
Thus, relative metacognitive sensitivity was insensitive to overall WM load, but was selectively impaired 
when extensive manipulation of WM contents was required. 
 It is important to interpret these results in light of the theoretical distinction between absolute 
and relative metacognitive sensitivity introduced in Maniscalco & Lau (2012). Absolute metacognitive 
sensitivity refers to the overall efficacy with which confidence ratings discriminate between correct and 
incorrect responses, as measured e.g. by area under the type 2 ROC curve (Galvin et al., 2003; Fleming 
et al., 2010). Relative metacognitive sensitivity evaluates the empirically observed level of absolute 
metacognitive sensitivity with respect to the expected level of absolute metacognitive sensitivity, given 
an observer’s performance on the primary stimulus classification task. Such an expectation can be 
derived by the theoretical machinery of signal detection theory (Galvin et al., 2003), with the important 
features that (1) task performance should place a theoretical limit on metacognitive performance, and 
(2) as task performance improves, so should metacognitive performance. These theoretical predictions 
have been validated in empirical data (Maniscalco & Lau, 2012).  
The SDT measure of absolute metacognitive sensitivity, meta-d’ (Maniscalco & Lau, 2012; 
Appendix A), was designed with an eye towards providing a straightforward way to measure relative 
metacognitive sensitivity. Meta-d’ is defined such that, for an observer whose performance conforms to 





numerical comparison between meta-d’ and d’, e.g. a subtraction or division. In this study, we found 
evidence that the y-intercept of the function relating meta-d’ and d’ is zero (Figure 2-3), thus implicitly 
supporting the usage of meta-d’ / d’ as the appropriate measure of relative metacognitive sensitivity for 
these data. For instance, if we suppose that the true function relating meta-d’ and d’ for a given 
observer is meta-d’ = .8 * d’, then the ratio meta-d’ / d’ would have a constant value of 0.8 regardless of 
the value of d’, whereas the value of the difference meta-d’ – d’ would differ depending on the value of 
d’. 
In the current data set, although meta-d’ decreased under high WM load, d’ also decreased to a 
similar extent. Given the known theoretical and empirical dependence of meta-d’ upon d’ (Galvin et al., 
2003; Maniscalco & Lau, 2012), it is therefore possible to attribute the decline in meta-d’ under high 
WM load to the co-occurring decline in d’, rather than supposing that WM load had a direct effect upon 
overall metacognitive performance.  Indeed, the relative measure of metacognitive sensitivity, meta-d’ / 
d’, did not significantly differ as a function of WM load. Thus, while high WM load imposed an overall 
deficit in performance on the perceptual task, perhaps due to reduced attentional allocation to the 
visual stimuli under high load, we did not find strong evidence that WM load produced a selective deficit 
upon metacognitive processing in and of itself.  
By contrast, we found that relative metacognitive sensitivity in the perceptual task was indeed 
impaired in the specific case where the contents of WM required a substantial degree of manipulation 
(alphabetization). This finding is in keeping with prior empirical investigations on the neural bases of 
visual metacognition and WM performance. Various higher-level regions of the human and monkey 
prefrontal cortex, including dorsolateral, rostrolateral, and anterior prefrontal cortex, have been linked 
to metacognitive performance in visual and memory tasks (Henson et al., 2000; Fleck et al., 2006; 
Fleming et al., 2010; Yokoyama et al., 2010; Tsujimoto et al., 2010; Fleming et al., 2012; McCurdy et al., 





WM tasks, with a strong line of evidence that dlPFC is involved particularly with the manipulation and 
selection of WM contents, rather than just the passive maintenance of items in WM (Petrides & Milner, 
1982; Petrides, 1989; Petrides, 1995; Owen et al., 1996; D’Esposito et al., 1999; Petrides, 2000; Rowe et 
al., 2000; Miller & Cohen, 2001; Rowe & Passingham, 2001; Rowe et al., 2002; Curtis & D’Esposito, 2003; 
Bor et al., 2003). In the current study, the fact that relative metacognitive sensitivity was impaired not 
by overall WM load, but rather by the specific requirement to extensively manipulate WM contents, 
suggests the working of a common, limited neural resource in dlPFC that contributes to both the 
manipulation of WM contents and the metacognitive evaluation of visual task performance.  
We note that a somewhat similar finding to the current study was previously reported in the 
context of visual search tasks by Han & Kim (2004). In that study, the time required to find a visual target 
in a cluttered display as a function of display set size (“search slope”) was compared for concurrent WM 
tasks that either did or did not require active manipulation of WM contents (backwards counting for 
number items, or alphabetization for letter items). Search slope was significantly steeper than in a 
control condition when subjects had to manipulate WM contents, but not when subjects had to 
passively maintain a number or letter string in WM. Thus, as in the present study, Han & Kim found that 
aspects of processing in a visual task could undergo selective impairment due to the requirement to 
manipulate WM contents. Han & Kim concluded that aspects of executive functioning, as reflected in 
manipulation of WM contents, may be required to perform visual search. However, it is unclear to what 
extent this impairment in visual search is related to the impairment on relative metacognitive sensitivity 
observed in the current study. 
 How might it be the case that a cognitive/neural mechanism that contributes to manipulation of 
WM contents also contributes to metacognitive evaluation of visual perception? The explanation cannot 
be an overly general mechanism, such as supposing that additional attentional resources required for 





would presumably induce global changes in visual task performance, affecting both d’ and meta-d’, 
rather than being specific to meta-d’ / d’.  
 One potential mechanism might have to do with strategies for representing and re-representing 
stimuli. In WM tasks, lateral PFC activation has been associated with encoding strategies for WM 
contents—when items are presented in a way that facilitates their reorganization into higher-level units 
or “chunks,” lateral PFC becomes more activated (Bor et al., 2003). Some views hold that metacognition 
similarly involves the construction of higher-order re-representations or meta-representations of 
cognitive/neural processing occurring at lower levels in the processing hierarchy (Nelson & Narens, 
1990; Schooler, 2002; Cleeremans, Timmermans, & Pasquali, 2007; Pasquali et al., 2010). If so, it is 
possible that the same processes involved in manipulating and re-organizing WM contents might also be 
involved in manipulating and re-organizing sensory representations for the purposes of metacognitive 
evaluation. Presumably, occupation of such a resource in the manipulation of WM contents would 
detract from its active employment in the metacognitive evaluation of visual processing, thus impairing 
relative metacognitive sensitivity. 
 Another possible set of common underlying mechanisms concerns response selection and the 
maintenance and flexible adaptation of decision rules. Response selection, defined by Curtis and 
D’Esposito (2003) as “the operation by which information in short-term storage becomes the focus of 
attention such that it can be maintained and eventually used to choose an appropriate motor response” 
(p. 421), has been tied to dlPFC activity in the context of WM tasks (Rowe et al., 2000; Rowe & 
Passingham, 2001; Rowe et al., 2002; Curtis & D’Esposito, 2003). More broadly, PFC has been theorized 
to support varying levels of sophistication and abstraction in the control and organization of behavior as 
a function of stimuli and environmental context, action contingencies, currently active goals, and so on 
(Koechlin & Summerfield, 2007; Badre, 2008). By way of comparison, the SDT model posits that 





processes that are not the rigid outcome of low-level perceptual processing but rather can be flexibly 
adjusted according to the prevailing task instructions, stimulus context, and reward contingencies 
(Tanner & Swets, 1954; Green & Swets, 1966; Macmillan & Creelman, 2005). According to SDT, 
perceptual and metacognitive decisions are determined by defining a set of decision criteria which 
determine the rules according to which graded and ambiguous internal perceptual evidence is mapped 
onto discrete perceptual decisions and motor outputs (Green & Swets, 1966; Macmillan & Creelman, 
2005; Appendix A).  A common mechanism in PFC underlying the processes of selecting, evaluating, and 
manipulating WM contents in the WM task and the processes of metacognitive criterion setting in the 
perceptual task could potentially explain the results of the current study. 
 Regardless of the specific manner in which manipulation of WM contents influences 
metacognitive performance, the results of this study demonstrate a dissociation between perceptual 
and metacognitive sensitivity, suggesting that these depend on separate underlying mechanisms. 
Indirect evidence for such a position comes from anatomical (Fleming et al., 2010; McCurdy et al., 2013) 
and fMRI (Henson et al., 2000; Fleck et al., 2006; Yokoyama et al., 2010; Fleming et al., 2012) studies in 
humans, and single-unit recordings in monkeys (Tsujimoto et al., 2010), that associate metacognitive 
performance with high-level structures in PFC rather than earlier visual processing regions. Here we 
provide stronger evidence for a perceptual/metacognitive dissociation than these prior associational 
studies by demonstrating the existence of an experimental intervention that selectively disrupts 
metacognitive performance. These results closely echo those discussed in Chapter 3, in which we 
demonstrate that transcranial magnetic stimulation to bilateral dlPFC can selectively impair 









Theta-burst transcranial magnetic stimulation to the prefrontal cortex impairs relative metacognitive 
sensitivity in a visual discrimination task 
 
Introduction 
In Chapter 1, we showed that a Hiearchical model best accounts for the dissociation between 
objective task performance and subjective reports of visibility in the metacontrast masking paradigm. 
Comparison of these modeling results with imaging results on the same paradigm (Lau & Passingham, 
2006) is suggestive that the late processing stage posited by the Hierarchical model might correspond to 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC).  In Chapter 2, we demonstrated that when subjects perform a 
working memory task concurrently with a perceptual task, metacognitive sensitivity in the perceptual 
task can be selectively disrupted when extensive manipulation of the contents of working memory is 
required. These results are similarly suggestive of the recruitment of a common neural resource housed 
in dlPFC. However, in both cases the link between visual metacognition and dlPFC is indirect. 
In the current chapter, we more directly probe the influence of dlPFC upon visual metacognition 
by assessing the impact of bilateral transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) to dlPFC on objective and 
subjective perceptual performance. We required volunteers to perform a 2-interval forced-choice visual 
task, identifying the spatial arrangement of two visual stimuli (a square and a diamond, Figure 3-1 A). At 
the same time, they also rated the subjective visibility of the stimuli ('clear' or 'unclear'). Subjects 
performed these tasks before and after TMS applied to bilateral dlPFC (Figure 3-1 B). We used theta-
burst stimulation (TBS), a recently developed protocol that is known to effectively depress cortical 
excitability by mimicking the action of long-term potentiation and long-term depression in cortical 
tissues (Huang, Edwards, Rounis, Bhatia, & Rothwell, 2005). One advantage of this technique is that the 





opportunity to depress both sides of the dlPFC by stimulating them sequentially. We opted for bilateral 
stimulation as this has been suggested to be critical: Sahraie et al. (1997) have suggested that one 
reason visual defects do not seem to frequently follow prefrontal lesions may be that such lesions have 
to be large and bilateral. Using this sequential method to depress the dlPFC bilaterally, we found that 




Twenty healthy volunteers with normal or corrected-to-normal vision and no history of 
neurological disorders or head injury were recruited from the database of volunteers at the Functional 
Imaging Laboratory, Institute of Neurology, University College London, UK. Written informed consent 
was obtained from all participants. The study was approved by the joint ethics committee for the 




Subjects were asked to perform a 2-interval forced-choice task (Figure 3-1 A). Testing was 
performed in a darkened room. Stimuli were presented against the white background of a CRT monitor 
refreshing at 120 Hz. The monitor was placed 40 cm away from the subjects' eyes.  
On each trial, a diamond and square were presented on either side of a central crosshair for 33 
ms. The stimuli had sides measuring 0.8 degrees of visual angle and were centered 1 degree to the left 
and right of the central crosshair. 100 ms after stimulus onset, a metacontrast mask was displayed for 






   
Figure 3-1. Experimental design. (A) Visual task and stimuli. Participants were required to perform a 2-
interval forced-choice visual task, identifying the spatial arrangement of two visual stimuli (square on 
the left and diamond on the right, or the other way round). They rated the subjective visibility ('clear' or 
'unclear') at the same time. Thus, in every trial subjects had 4 options as to which key to press in order 
to respond. (B) Site of stimulation. The dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC) was the targeted site of 
stimulation, and was chosen because neural activity from this area has been shown to reflect a 
difference in the subjective ratings of visibility even when performance in a forced-choice visual task was 
matched (Lau & Passingham, 2006). The image showing the site of stimulation is based on magnetic 
resonance brain scans of 6 of the 20 subjects in this study. The scans were collected after completion of 
the TMS experiments. Right and left dlPFC coordinates were [37 26 50] and [-41 18 52], with standard 
deviations [4.6 5.6 5.3] and [4.3 5.1 3.8] respectively. 
 
 
left and diamond on the right, and vice versa) were presented with equal probability in a pseudo-
random order.  
The subjects' task was to identify which stimulus sequence had just been presented, square left 





('clear' or 'unclear'). Subjects were instructed to make the visibility judgment in a relative manner, to 
distinguish between stimuli that were relatively more or less visible. Since stimulus contrast was 
adjusted so as to yield threshold performance on the stimulus classification task, stimuli used in this 
experiment were somewhat difficult to see. Nonetheless, subjects were instructed to judge stimulus 
visibility on each trial relative to the context of stimuli used in this experiment. For instance, a subject 
might judge that the stimulus on a certain trial was more readily visible than the majority of stimuli seen 
in the experiment up until that point, even if its visibility was poor by everyday standards. Subjects were 
encouraged to judge such stimuli as exhibiting "high clarity," i.e. having relatively high clarity compared 
to other stimuli observed in the experimental context. 
Performance level was controlled to be at approximately 75% correct throughout the 
experiment by titrating the contrast of the stimuli, using a standard up-down transformed-response 
staircasing procedure (Macmillan & Creelman, 2005). Each trial was randomly designated as belonging 
to staircase A or staircase B. For staircase A, contrast on the current trial was increased if the subject 
responded incorrectly on the previous 'A' trial, whereas contrast on the current trial was decreased if 
the subject responded correctly on the two previous 'A' trials. Staircase B worked in a similar manner, 
except it required 3 consecutive correct responses on 'B' trials in order to reduce contrast. 
Subjects attended two separate testing sessions, both preceded by a demonstration and a 
practice phase of 100 trials intended to familiarize the subjects with the task and to allow them to reach 
a stable level of performance. After practice, subjects underwent an initial ('pre') block of 300 trials to 
measure forced-choice task performance and subjective ratings of visibility. On average this took 
10.9 minutes, excluding brief breaks after every 100 trials. After completing this block, two real (or 
sham) continuous theta-burst stimulation (cTBS) conditioning stimulations, one to the left and one to 
the right, were delivered to the dorsolateral prefrontal area. The two stimulations were separated by a 





of 300 trials. On average this took 10.4 minutes, excluding brief breaks after every 100 trials. Session 
order by type of cTBS (real versus sham) was counterbalanced across subjects.   
 
Theta-burst stimulation  
In each TBS session, 600 biphasic stimuli, at a stimulation intensity of 80% of active motor 
threshold (AMT) for the right first dorsal interosseous (FDI) hand muscle, were given over the left and 
right DLPFC area using a Magstim Super Rapid stimulator (Whitland, Wales, UK) connected to four 
booster modules. The conditioning cTBS stimuli were delivered in two separate 20-second trains of 300 
cTBS pulses, one for the left and one for the right, separated by an inter-train interval of 1 minute. A 
similar bilateral procedure has been used in a recent clinical study (Arfeller, Vonthein, Plontke, & 
Plewnia,  2009).  
A standard figure-of-eight-shaped coil (Double 70mm Coil Type P/N 9925; Magstim) was used 
for both real and sham cTBS. Real cTBS was delivered with the coil placed tangentially to the scalp with 
the handle pointing posteriorly. In sham cTBS sessions, the coil was placed perpendicularly to the scalp, 
an ineffective position for the delivery of conditioning pulses, which provided comparable acoustic 
stimuli to the real cTBS condition. The coil was positioned with the handle at 45° to the sagittal plane. 
The current flow in the initial rising phase of the biphasic pulse in the biphasic pulse induced a posterior-
to-anterior current flow in the underlying cortex.   
The basic TBS pattern was a burst containing 3 pulses of 50 Hz magnetic stimulation given in 200 
ms intervals (i.e. at 5 Hz). In the continuous theta burst stimulation paradigm (cTBS), a 20 second train of 
uninterrupted TBS is given (300 pulses or 100 bursts). Physiological studies have shown that this 
produces a decrease in corticospinal excitability which lasts for about 20 minutes (Huang et al., 2005), 
when applied to the primary motor cortex, M1. This rTMS paradigm has the advantage of being a rapid 





shown to involve similar mechanisms to long-term potentiation/depression (LTP/LTD) with NMDA 
dependence (Huang, Rothwell, Edwards, & Chen, 2008), as well as effects on behavior and learning 
(Huang et al., 2005; Talleli et al., 2007).   
The site of cTBS stimulation was located 5 cm anterior to the ‘motor hot spot’ on a line parallel 
to the midsagittal line. This dlPFC location has been used in previous studies and can be shown 
consistently on structural scans (Mottaghy, Gangitano, Sparing, Krause, & Pascual-Leone, 2002; Rounis 
et al., 2006; Figure 3-1 B). The position of the motor hot spot was defined functionally as the point of 
maximum evoked motor response in the slightly contracted right FDI. The active motor threshold was 
defined as the lowest stimulus intensity that elicited at least five twitches in 10 consecutive stimuli given 
over the motor hot spot, while the subject was maintaining a voluntary contraction of about 20% of 
maximum using visual feedback. 
The use of such low subthreshold intensity (80% AMT) had the advantage of decreased spread 
of stimulation away from the targeted site thus keeping the area that was stimulated with the 
conditioning pulses more focal (Pascual-Leone, Valls-Solé, Wassermann, & Hallett, 1994; Münchau, 
Bloem, Irlbacher, Trimble, & Rothwell, 2002). Also, a previous study on the prefrontal cortex that 
applied intensity above motor threshold reported unpleasant vagal reactions in subjects (Grossheinrich 
et al., 2009). However, even at that higher intensity there was no adverse effects on mood, seizure or 
epileptiform observed in the recorded EEG. This suggests that our stimulation at this lower intensity 
should be safe to our subjects. 
Data analysis  
Metacognitive sensitivity (i.e. the efficacy with which visibility ratings distinguish between 
correct and incorrect responses) was assessed using two separate methods. The first method followed 
previous studies (e.g. Kolb & Braun, 1995; Kornell, Son, & Terrace, 2007) in using the correlation 





correlation coefficient phi, which quantifies the degree of correlation between two binary variables, to 
calculate the correlation between task accuracy (correct/incorrect) and stimulus visibility 
(clear/unclear). Phi is equivalent to Pearson's r computed for two binary variables, and like r it ranges 
from -1 (perfect negative correlation) to +1 (perfect positive correlation). We calculated phi for the 300 
trials pre- and post- real and sham TMS for each subject. We predicted that TMS would hinder 
metacognitive sensitivity, and thus that there would be a TMS (real, sham) x Time (pre, post) interaction. 
We also performed a signal detection theoretic (SDT) analysis to estimate metacognitive 
sensitivity by estimating meta-d’ (Maniscalco & Lau, 2012; Appendix A). The need for performing a signal 
detection theory analysis is that phi can be shown to generate non-regular ROC (Receiver Operating 
Characteristic) curves, which in turn implies an underlying threshold model of detection (Swets, 1986b). 
The ROC profile and threshold model of phi are not in good agreement with the standard SDT model 
(Macmillan & Creelman, 2005), nor with theoretical derivations of type 2 ROC curves from the standard 
SDT framework (Galvin et al., 2003; Maniscalco & Lau, 2012; Appendix A). The consequence of this is 
that phi may confound sensitivity and response bias, rather than being a pure measure of sensitivity. 
Thus, we also quantified metacognitive sensitivity, i.e. the efficacy with which confidence ratings 
discriminate between a subject’s own correct and incorrect responses, using meta-d’ (Maniscalco & Lau, 
2012; Appendix A). Specifically, for each TMS x Time condition of each subject’s data, we estimated 
meta-d’ as follows.  First, we estimated the SDT parameters c’ (the stimulus classification criterion 
measured relative to d’) and s (the ratio of standard deviations of internal evidence for the two stimulus 
classes) (Macmillan & Creelman, 2005). Holding c’ and s constant, we estimated the value for meta-d’ 
that minimized the sum of squared errors (SSE) between observed and modeled type 2 ROC curve for 
trials in which the stimulus was classified as "square left/diamond right." We then estimated a separate 
meta-d’ value in the same way, this time for trials in which the stimulus was classified as "diamond 





ROC curves conditional on each stimulus classification type. These two estimates were combined via a 
weighted average, where the weight of each meta-d’ estimate was determined by the number of trials 
used to estimate it. The mean SSE corresponding to each meta-d’ estimate was 9.1 x 10-5, indicating that 
this approach provided an excellent fit to the observed type 2 ROC data. Minimization of SSE was 
achieved using the Optimization Toolbox in MATLAB (MathWorks, Natick, MA).  
Because we are testing a directional hypothesis in a 2 x 2 factorial design (i.e. metacognitive 
sensitivity is reduced following real TMS more so than following sham TMS), we report halved p-values 
for the TMS x Time interaction on phi and meta-d’ – d’.  
 
Results  
In the following we present ANOVA analyses with within-subject factors of TMS (real, sham) and 
Time (pre, post) for several independent variables of interest such as accuracy, response time for correct 
trials, etc. None of these analyses exhibited a main effect of TMS condition (Fs < 1.7), indicating that the 
real and sham TMS sessions were comparable on baseline task performance. 
Stimulus contrast was adjusted online in order to control classification accuracy; thus, as 
expected, frequency of correct responses did not vary as a function of time or the TMS x Time 
interaction (ps > .05) (Figure 3-2 A). A more insightful measure of stimulus classification performance is 
the mean contrast required to keep classification accuracy constant. The stimulus contrast generated by 
the performance staircasing algorithm reduced over time (p < .001), suggesting a perceptual learning 
effect: over time, subjects required a lower level of contrast in order to maintain the same level of 
response accuracy. However, the TMS x Time interaction was not significant (p > .05), indicating that the 
TMS treatment had no effect on stimulus classification performance (Figure 3-2 B). Likewise, reaction 







Figure 3-2. Task performance. (A) Percent correct. Percent correct was controlled by titration of 
stimulus contrast, such that stimulus judgments were about 75% correct throughout the experiment 
(see Methods). Therefore, the lack of any significant effects on these values is trivial. (B) Mean stimulus 
contrast. Stimulus contrast was determined online by the computer program (see Methods), such that if 
subjects performed better than 75% correct, the contrast was reduced, and if subjects performed worse 
than 75% correct, the contrast was increased. There was a main effect of time on contrast (p < .001), 
indicating a perceptual learning effect; had the computer not been programmed to adjust task difficulty 
online, subjects would have shown improved accuracy over time. However, perceptual learning was not 
affected by TMS (TMS x Time interaction F = 0.73). (C) Reaction time for correct responses. Perceptual 
learning was also evident in reaction time data. Subjects were quicker to make correct responses in the 
second half of the experiment (main effect of Time, p = .016). However, again, this learning effect was 
not modulated by TMS (TMS x Time interaction F = 0.79). (D) Mean visibility ratings. Visibility ratings 
decreased over time (p = .005), but the TMS x Time interaction on visibility was not significant (p = .4). 
See the discussion for caveats about the visibility rating analysis. 'Real pre': performance level before 
real TMS. 'Real post': after real TMS. 'Sham pre': before sham TMS. 'Sham post': after sham TMS. * p < 





Similarly, mean visibility ratings decreased over time (p = .005), but independently of the TMS 
manipulation (p > .05) (Figure 3-2 D). We address this null finding more fully in the discussion.  
As hypothesized, TMS significantly impaired metacognitive sensitivity. A TMS x Time interaction 
was evident for the correlation between accuracy and visibility, phi (p = .036) (Figure 3-3 A). 
Investigation of this interaction revealed that phi was lowered following real TMS (one-tailed paired t-
test, p < .001) but not sham TMS (p > .05).  
The bias-free SDT measure of metacognitive sensitivity, meta-d’ – d’, also exhibited a TMS x 
Time interaction effect (p = .015) (Figure 3-3 B). The difference between observed and ideal type 2 
sensitivity decreased following real TMS (one-tailed paired t-test, p = .006) but not sham (p > .05). 
Metacognitive sensitivity was significantly suboptimal following real TMS, i.e. meta-d' < d' (one-tailed t-
test, p = .004) but not in any other TMS x Time condition (p > .05).  
There are several ways in which TMS could have impaired metacognitive sensitivity. One 
possibility is that TMS reduced visibility for correct trials, which would amount to a kind of relative 
blindsight (Lau & Passingham, 2006). Alternatively, TMS may have increased visibility for incorrect trials, 
a kind of “hallucinatory” effect. A third possibility is that the reduction in metacognitive sensitivity was 
not specific to correct or incorrect trials. Thus, to better characterize the effect of TMS, we examined 
visibility ratings separately for correct and incorrect trials pre- and post-TMS (Figure 3-4 A). We found a 
significant Accuracy x Time interaction (p < .001), driven by the fact that TMS reduced visibility for 
correct responses (two-tailed paired t-test, p = .002) but not incorrect responses (p > .05).  Thus, TMS 
impaired metacognitive sensitivity by selectively reducing the visibility of correctly classified stimuli.  
 
Discussion 
Our results show that theta-burst TMS applied to bilateral dlPFC can reduce metacognitive 






Figure 3-3. Effect of TMS on metacognitive sensitivity. (A) Correlation coefficient, phi. TMS significantly 
reduced phi, the correlation between stimulus classification accuracy and stimulus visibility. The effect 
of TMS is evident in a significant TMS x Time interaction, p = .036; phi was lower following real TMS (p < 
.001) but not sham TMS (p = .5). (B) Divergence from optimal metacognitive sensitivity, meta-d’ - d’. A 
signal detection theory analysis revealed that subjects’ relative metacognitive sensitivity, as measured 
by meta-d’ – d’ (Maniscalco & Lau, 2012; Appendix A), was significantly impaired by TMS (TMS x Time, p 
= .015). Metacognitive sensitivity was lower following real TMS (p = .006) but not sham TMS (p = .7). 
Subjects exhibited significantly suboptimal metacognitive sensitivity following real TMS, i.e. meta-d’ - d’ 
< 0 (p = .004) but not in any other experimental condition (ps > .3).  'Real pre': metacognitive 
performance before real TMS. 'Real post': after real TMS. 'Sham pre': before sham TMS. 'Sham post': 
after sham TMS. * p < .05, n.s. denotes not significant. Error bars represent 1 SEM.  
 
 
incorrect stimulus judgments. This effect was driven specifically by a reduction in visibility for correct 
trials, rather than by a specific elevation of visibility for incorrect trials or by a non-specific effect. In this 
sense, the direction of the effect is reminiscent of blindsight (Weiskrantz, 1997), where patients deny 
visual awareness even when they can perform visual discrimination tasks well above chance level. The 







Figure 3-4. Nature of the TMS effect on metacognition. (A) Selective reduction of type 2 hit 
rate. Visibility ratings are displayed as a function of Time (pre/post TMS) and Accuracy 
(correct/incorrect) for the real TMS condition. TMS significantly reduced visibility for correct responses 
(two-tailed paired t-test, p = .002), but not for incorrect responses (p = .5). The Time x Accuracy 
interaction was significant, p < .001. These results suggest that TMS reduced metacognitive sensitivity 
(Fig 3-3) specifically by decreasing visibility ratings for correct responses (as opposed to increasing 
visibility ratings for incorrect responses). Thus, TMS induced a kind of relative blindsight, to the extent 
that TMS suppressed the reports of visibility for accurately processed stimuli. * p < .005, n.s. denotes not 
significant. Error bars represent 1 SEM. (B) Type 2 ROC analysis. Individual data points indicate the type 
2 hit rates and false alarm rates for every subject pre- and post-TMS. Type 2 ROC curves were estimated 
for each subject using estimates of meta-d’, c’, and s; the average of these ROC curves is plotted for the 
pre- and post-real TMS conditions. The distribution of individual data points and the fitted ROC curves 
indicate that TMS influenced metacognitive sensitivity, rather than just response bias. Note that the ROC 
curve reflects meta-d’, and thus is not as sensitive to the effect of TMS as the measure used in the 
analysis, meta-d’ – d’ (Fig 3-3), since some variation in meta-d’ is attributable merely to variation in d’ 
(Maniscalco & Lau, 2012; Appendix A).  
 
 






We did not find a significant effect of TMS on averaged stimulus visibility itself. However, note 
that the effect of TMS is at least partially characterized by a change in visibility ratings, in that TMS 
reduced metacognitive sensitivity precisely by reducing visibility for correctly classified stimuli while 
leaving visibility for incorrectly classified stimuli unaffected (Figure 3-4 A). Indeed, although the 
interaction was not significant, separate paired t-tests show a difference in visibility pre- and post- real 
TMS (two-tailed, t(19) = 3.09, p = .002) but no difference pre- and post- sham TMS (t(19) = 1.47). There 
are two reasons why the design of the current study may not have been ideal to statistically detect an 
effect of TMS on overall stimulus visibility. One reason is that stimulus visibility was affected by an 
experimental factor other than TMS, namely the contrast levels of the stimuli, which were adjusted on-
line throughout the experiment in order to hold discrimination performance constant. Another reason is 
that subjects were instructed to use visibility ratings in a relative manner, in order to distinguish stimuli 
that were relatively more or less visible. The instruction to rate visibility in this relative way may have 
obscured the extent to which visibility ratings reflected absolute differences in stimulus visibility across 
experimental conditions. Nonetheless, these limitations are not important for the main focus of this 
study, which is the metacognitive sensitivity of visibility ratings.  
One typical argument against studies of awareness is that the manipulation in question might 
have only changed subjects' criteria for producing subjective ratings, rather than changing awareness 
per se. A change in response criterion is not necessarily uninteresting-- but more importantly, this is not 
what we found. Our type 2 SDT analysis demonstrates that TMS reduced metacognitive sensitivity (i.e. 
the efficacy with which subjective visibility ratings discriminate between correct and incorrect 
judgments), rather than merely affecting metacognitive response bias (i.e. the overall propensity to give 
high visibility ratings). TMS reduced visibility for correct trials (type 2 HR) but not for incorrect trials 
(type 2 FAR) (Figure 3-4 A), a pattern that cannot be attributed solely to changes in response bias. 





bias (Maniscalco & Lau, 2012; Appendix A). We also demonstrate this point graphically in Figure 3-4 B, 
which shows the type 2 ROC points for each subject, and mean fitted ROC curves, pre- and post-TMS. 
The distribution of type 2 ROC points and the fitted type 2 ROC curves differ, indicating lower type 2 
sensitivity following TMS. If TMS only affected subjects’ criteria for reporting high visibility, the type 2 
ROC curves pre- and post-TMS should overlap (Macmillan & Creelman, 2005), contrary to our findings.  
Our results extend previous work. Similarly to the present study, Del Cul et al. (2009) showed 
that prefrontal lesions can affect subjective reports of visual experience more than visual task 
performance. Slachevsky (Slachevsky et al., 2001; Slachevsky et al., 2003) has shown that lesion to the 
prefrontal cortex can affect awareness in the monitoring of actions or sensory-motor readjustments. 
Other studies show that visual processing can be affected by lesion (Latto & Cowey, 1971) or TMS 
(Grosbras & Paus, 2003; Ruff et al., 2006) to the frontal eye field. Turatto, Sandrini, and Miniussi (2004) 
showed that TMS to the dlPFC can affect performance in change blindness.  These studies show that, 
contrary to what critics have argued (Pollen, 1995), disruption of activity in the prefrontal cortex can in 
fact influence awareness and visual processing. What is new in the present study is that it specifically 
highlights the role of the prefrontal cortex in supporting the metacognitive sensitivity of visual 
awareness. 
The prefrontal cortex is associated with many important cognitive functions, and therefore our 
interpretation is not that it is completely specific to the metacognitive sensitivity of visual awareness. It 
is likely that bilateral theta-burst TMS to the dlPFC would impair performance in other tasks where 
metacognitive visual awareness is not required. Instead of applying the same TMS treatment to 
unrelated control tasks and hoping to show a negative result in those situations, we show that TMS 
impaired a specific process involved in our task, namely metacognitive awareness, but not other 
processes involved in the same task. It is important to note that performance in the stimulus 





is unlikely that TMS affected metacognitive sensitivity by means of non-specific disturbances such as 
reductions in visual attention or general arousal. 
As in Del Cul et al. (2009), one limitation of the present study is that we did not show that a 
similar effect could not be obtained in a control anatomical site. The lack of such control conditions is 
unfortunate and largely constrained by logistics (e.g. we did not have ethical approval for every brain 
regions for this relatively new TMS protocol, and the leading authors have since relocated elsewhere). 
However, given that the TMS was applied offline (i.e. not during task), and that the effect did not change 
basic task performance, it is unlikely that the results we obtained were due to the general distraction 
due to TMS. It is likely that TMS applied to an unrelated region, such as the somatosensory area, would 
not lead to our metacognitive effect. However, it remains an open question whether TMS applied to 
parietal areas that are connected to dlPFC would lead to similar results. 
In any case, our conclusion is not that the neural circuitry that supports metacognitive visual 
awareness is completely localized in the dlPFC. Rather, we conclude that disruption of activity in this 
area can impair the metacognitive sensitivity of visual awareness. The present results show that the 
prefrontal cortex is functionally relevant to visual awareness, in that manipulation of the former can 
affect the latter. Further, the data clarify in what way the prefrontal cortex might contribute. Activity in 
the dlPFC may play a relatively unimportant role in representing the visual signal itself, but it may be 
essential for some form of internal uncertainty monitoring that allows observers to be able to 
distinguish when visual processing is effective and when it is not. It is this introspective and 










Limited cognitive resources explain a tradeoff between perceptual and metacognitive vigilance 
 
Introduction 
 In Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 we demonstrated the existence of cognitive and neural interventions 
that have selective effects on relative metacognitive sensitivity, findings that suggest that objective and 
subjective visual performance are dissociable and may depend on separate underlying mechanisms. In 
this chapter we demonstrate the existence of another dissociation between perceptual and 
metacognitive sensitivity that occurs naturally over the course of time, presumably as a result of 
tradeoffs in perceptual and metacognitive performance necessitated by the onset of fatigue. 
As an observer continuously performs a perceptual task, the observer’s perceptual sensitivity 
tends to decline over time, an effect known as the vigilance decrement (Davies & Parasuraman, 1982; 
Warm, 1984; See, Howe, Warm, & Dember, 1995). Research has suggested that limited cognitive 
resources (Kahneman, 1973; Matthews, Davies, Westerman, & Stammers, 2000; Wickens, 2002) become 
depleted as a vigil progresses, and so the vigilance decrement is better accounted for by resource 
exhaustion than by mindlessness or task disengagement (e.g. Grier et al., 2003; Helton & Warm, 2008; 
Helton et al., 2005; Warm, Parasuraman, & Matthews, 2008). Consistent with the resource depletion 
account, the vigilance decrement is exacerbated by increasing task demands such as stimulus 
degradation, rate of stimulus presentation, and memory load (See et al., 1995), and is associated with 
depleted ratings of energetic arousal, elevated reports of stress, and declines in cerebral blood flow 
velocity (Warm et al., 2008). 
 A seemingly unrelated line of research involves the relationship between perceptual sensitivity 
and perceptual metacognition (e.g., confidence ratings). Recent work has developed a signal detection 





bias-free measure of metacognitive sensitivity (i.e. an observer’s ability to discriminate between his own 
correct and incorrect judgments, regardless of his tendency to report high confidence). Of particular 
interest is how such measures of metacognition are related to perceptual performance. A tacit 
assumption of the classical SDT analysis of confidence rating data is that perceptual decisions and 
confidence ratings are based on the same underlying process (Galvin et al., 2003; Macmillan & 
Creelman, 2005; Maniscalco & Lau, 2012), and this view has received some empirical support (Kepecs et 
al., 2008; Kiani & Shadlen, 2009; Kepecs & Mainen, 2012). Other findings suggest that metacognition is 
subserved by high-level prefrontal mechanisms and is therefore partially dissociable from perceptual 
performance (e.g. Fleming et al., 2010; Pleskac & Busemeter, 2010; McCurdy et al., 2013). 
 In this chapter, we bring these two lines of research together by investigating the joint behavior 
of SDT measures of perceptual and metacognitive sensitivity over time. If a single process generates 
perceptual and metacognitive decisions, we should expect declines in perceptual sensitivity to be 
associated with declines in metacognitive sensitivity (Maniscalco & Lau, 2012). Conversely, if distinct 
processes generate perceptual and metacognitive decisions, we might expect vigilance decrements in 
perception and metacognition to be dissociable.  
 To anticipate, we find a robust effect whereby changes in perceptual and metacognitive 
sensitivity over time are weakly or negatively correlated, contrary to the strong positive correlation 
predicted by a single-process view of perception and metacognition. Voxel based morphometry analysis 
suggests that this finding is mediated by a common cognitive resource housed in anterior prefrontal 
cortex, a region previously associated with visual metacognitive sensitivity (Fleming et al., 2010; 
McCurdy et al., 2013). Consistent with this account, we find that alleviating metacognitive task demands 
reduces the perceptual vigilance decrement. Thus, perception and metacognition appear to be distinct 








 Data from this experiment were originally reported in Maniscalco & Lau (2012). 
Participants 
 Thirty Columbia University students participated in the experiment. Participants gave informed 
consent and were paid $10 for approximately one hour of participation. The research was approved by 
the Columbia University’s Committee for the Protection of Human Subjects. 
 Four participants were omitted from data analysis. One exhibited perfect task performance. The 
other three used an extreme confidence rating (lowest / highest rating) more than 89% of the time, an 




 Participants were seated in a dimmed room 60 cm away from a computer monitor. Stimuli were 
generated using Psychophysics Toolbox (Brainard, 1997; Pelli, 1997) in MATLAB (MathWorks, Natick, 
MA) and were shown on an iMac monitor (LCD, 24 inches monitor size, 1920x 1200 pixel resolution, 60 
Hz refresh rate). 
 On every trial, two stimuli were presented simultaneously, one 4° to the left of fixation and one 
4° to the right (Figure 4-1 A). Stimuli were presented on a gray background for 33 ms. Each stimulus was 
a circle (3° diameter) consisting of randomly generated visual noise. The target stimulus contained a 
randomly oriented sinusoidal grating (2 cycles per degree) embedded in the visual noise. After stimulus 
presentation, participants provided a forced-choice judgment of whether the left or the right stimulus 
contained a grating. Following stimulus classification, participants rated their confidence in the accuracy 






Figure 4-1. Design for Experiments 1 – 4. (A) Experiments 1 – 2. Subjects performed a spatial 2-interval 
forced choice task. On each trial, two patches of visual noise simultaneously appeared to the left and 
right of fixation. One of these patches contained an embedded sinusoidal grating. Subjects first 
indicated whether the left or right patch contained the grating, and then rated decision confidence on a 
scale of 1 – 4. Trial duration was determined by subject response time. (B) Experiments 3 – 4. 
Experiment 3 was similar to Experiments 1 – 2, except that in even-numbered blocks of trials (“partial 
type 2 blocks”), subjects were not required to rate confidence for the first half (50 trials) of the block. A 
written cue appeared above fixation on all trials where subjects were required to rate confidence. Trial 
duration was fixed to be 2.533 s. In Experiment 4, subjects wagered points rather than rating 
confidence, such that they won or lost the number of points wagered depending on the accuracy of the 






scale. If the confidence rating was not registered within 5 seconds of stimulus offset, the next trial 
commenced automatically. (Such trials were omitted from all analyses.) There was a 1 s interval 
between the entry of confidence rating and the presentation of the next stimulus. Participants were 
instructed to maintain fixation on a small crosshair (.35° wide) displayed in the center of the screen for 
the duration of each trial. 
 At the start of each experimental session, participants completed 2 practice blocks (28 trials 
each) and 1 calibration block (120 trials). In the calibration block, the detectability of the grating in noise 
was adjusted continuously between trials on the basis of the participant’s task performance using the 
QUEST threshold estimation procedure (Watson & Pelli, 1983). Target stimuli were defined as the sum 
of a grating with Michelson contrast Cgrating and a patch of visual noise with Michelson contrast Cnoise. The 
total contrast of the target stimulus, Ctarget = Cgrating + Cnoise, was set to 0.9. The non-target stimulus 
containing only noise was also set to a Michelson contrast of 0.9. The QUEST procedure was used to 
estimate the ratio of the grating contrast to the noise contrast, Rg/n = Cgrating / Cnoise, which yielded 75% 
correct performance in the 2AFC task. Three independent threshold estimates of Rg/n were acquired, 
with 40 randomly ordered trials contributing to each, and the median estimate of these was used to 
create stimuli for the main experiment. 
 
Experiment 2 
 Data from this experiment were originally reported in McCurdy et al. (2013). 
 
Participants 
 Forty-one Radboud University students participated in the experiment. Participants gave 





approved by the local ethics committee where the experiment was performed (CMO region Arnhem-
Nijmegen, the Netherlands). 
Experimental procedure 
 Experimental design was identical to Experiment 1, with the following exceptions. 
 Blocks of the visual perception task were interleaved with blocks of a memory task. (Comparison 
of visual and memory task performance is explored in McCurdy et al. (2013); data from the memory task 
is not analyzed here.) Each participant completed two experimental sessions on two consecutive days. 
On day 1, participants completed two practice blocks of the visual task, a calibration block for the visual 
task, and two blocks of the visual task consisting of 102 trials each. On day 2, participants completed 
three more blocks of the visual task, using the stimulus settings acquired from the calibration block on 
day 1. As with Experiment 1, trial duration for the visual task was determined by response times, and 
participants experienced a self-terminated rest period of up to a minute between blocks. 
 Rather than using a single value for the ratio of grating and noise contrast (Rg/n), as in the 
previous experiment, three different levels of Rg/n were used across trials. The calibration block 
determined the highest level of Rg/n, R*g/n, and the two lower levels of contrast ratio were determined 
by multiplying R*g/n by 0.75 and 0.5. In this manuscript, all analyses for Experiment 2 collapse across 
contrast level in order to yield sufficient trials for SDT analysis. 
Image acquisition 
 For thirty-two of the participants, a 1.5T Avanto MR-scanner (Siemens, Erlangen, Germany), 
using a 32-channel head coil, was used to acquire the T1-weighted anatomical MRI images (176 slices, 
echo time = 2.95ms, TR = 2250ms, voxel size 1 mm isotropic). The remaining nine participants were 
scanned using different scanning parameters, and this was included as a covariate in the multiple 






Voxel-based morphometry analysis 
 VBM preprocessing was carried out using SPM8 (http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm). Similar to 
the pre-processing protocol used by Fleming et al. (2010), the scans were first segmented into gray 
matter, white matter, and cerebral spinal fluid in native space. DARTEL (Ashburner, 2007) was used to 
increase the accuracy of inter-subject alignment by aligning and warping the gray matter images to an 
iteratively improved template. The DARTEL template was then registered to MNI space, and then gray 
matter images were modulated such that their tissue volumes were preserved. Images were smoothed 
using an 8 mm full width at half maximum Gaussian kernel. The resultant pre-processed gray matter 
images were analyzed using MarsBar v0.42 software (marsbar.sourceforge.net). ROIs were defined as a 
10 mm sphere around each of the two peak voxel coordinates identified by McCurdy et al. (2013) (peak 
voxel coordinate for left aPFC = [-12 54 16]; peak voxel coordinate for right aPFC = [32 50 7]; both 





 Twenty-one Columbia University students participated in the experiment. Participants gave 
informed consent and were paid $10 for approximately one hour of participation. The research was 
approved by the Columbia University’s Committee for the Protection of Human Subjects. 
One participant was omitted from data analysis due to using the highest confidence rating on 








 Experimental design was identical to Experiment 1, with the following exceptions. 
 The primary manipulation of interest in Experiment 3 was that in odd-numbered experimental 
blocks, participants did not provide confidence ratings in the first 50 of 100 trials in the block. Call these 
“partial type 2 blocks,” as opposed to “whole type 2 blocks” in which confidence ratings were provided 
on all trials. Before each block, participants were instructed which kind of block was about to be 
presented. For partial type 2 blocks, the instruction read as follows: “Upcoming block: There will be NO 
CONFIDENCE RATING for the first 50 trials. Do not enter confidence ratings until you are prompted to do 
so.” For whole type 2 blocks, the instruction read “Upcoming block: There will be confidence rating on 
EVERY trial.” 
 In order to clearly distinguish trials in which confidence ratings were and were not required, a 
text prompt reading “Confidence?” was displayed on every trial where confidence ratings were 
required. The prompt was displayed 6.4° above fixation and appeared after successful entry of the 
perceptual decision. 
 Because some trials did not require confidence ratings, partial type 2 blocks would be shorter in 
duration than whole type 2 blocks if trial duration depended on participant response times, as it did in 
Experiments 1 and 2. Therefore, in order to standardize the temporal duration of the experiment, the 
duration of each trial and the duration of each break period were set constant. In Experiment 1, 
participants entered both the stimulus judgment and confidence rating in 2 seconds or less for 92% of all 
trials. Therefore, following each stimulus presentation in Experiment 2, there was a fixed response 
period of 2 seconds, during which participants had to enter the required stimulus and confidence 
responses. After the response period and prior to the next stimulus presentation, a crosshair was 
displayed for 0.5 sec. Altogether, each trial lasted 2.533 s, a close match to the mean trial duration of 
2.315 s in Experiment 1. Additionally, all break periods between blocks were set to 1 minute. When only 










 Thirty-three Columbia University students participated in the experiment. Participants gave 
informed consent and were paid $10 for approximately one hour of participation. The research was 
approved by the Columbia University’s Committee for the Protection of Human Subjects. 
 Six participants were omitted from data analysis due to using the highest point wager (see 




 Experimental design was identical to Experiment 3, with the following exceptions. 
 In Experiment 4, the confidence rating system was replaced with a point wagering system. 
Participants were instructed that, following each stimulus identification response, they would 
sometimes be prompted to wager points on their stimulus decision. Participants could wager between 1 
and 4 points. For correct trials, the number of wagered points was added to a running point tally, 
whereas for incorrect trials, the number of wagered points was subtracted from the tally.  
 Participants were instructed that their goal was to maximize the number of points they received 
over the whole course of the experiment. They were given the following guidelines for maximizing 
points: (1) get as many stimulus decisions correct as possible; (2) although the optimal wagering strategy 
is to wager 4 points for correct trials and 1 point for incorrect trials, the participant does not have 





participants were encouraged to wager points according to the best estimate of the likelihood that the 
stimulus response was correct, and so the entire wagering scale should be utilized in order to reflect 
variations in this estimated likelihood across trials. 
 For non-wagering trials, participants were instructed that correct trials would add 3 points to 
their tally and incorrect trials would subtract 3 points from their tally. Additionally, in order to 
incentivize participants to enter all required responses for each trial, they were informed that 10 points 
were subtracted from the tally for any trial where not all required responses were entered within the 2 
second time limit. 
 During break periods, participants were provided with feedback on their wagering performance. 
They were shown how many points they had earned in the previous block, how many points they could 
have earned with an “optimal” wagering strategy (i.e., had they wagered 4 points for all correct 
responses and 1 point for all incorrect responses), and their overall wagering efficiency (the former 
quantity divided by the latter). The same information was provided for overall wagering performance 
across all blocks thus far completed. 
 The text prompts used in Experiment 3 to inform participants which kind of block was about to 
come up, and to prompt them to enter wagers on trials where wagers were required, were the same as 
in Experiment 2 except the word “confidence” was replaced by “wager.” 
 
Data analysis 
  We measured perceptual and metacognitive performance in the visual task using signal 
detection theory (SDT) analysis (Green & Swets, 1966; Macmillan & Creelman, 2005; Appendix A). We 
defined hit rate (HR) as the probability that the subject reported that the grating was on the right, given 





that the grating was on the right, given that the grating was on the left. We calculated d’ = z(HR) – z(FAR) 
and used d’ to quantify sensitivity in the visual discrimination task.  
We similarly quantified metacognitive sensitivity, i.e. the efficacy with which confidence ratings 
discriminate between a subject’s own correct and incorrect responses, with meta-d’ (Maniscalco & Lau, 
2012; Appendix A). Specifically, we found the value of meta-d’ that jointly maximized the likelihood of 
the response-specific type 2 ROC curves, where response-specific type 2 ROC curves are derived from 
“type 2” probabilities of the general form P(confidence = c | stimulus = s and response = r). 
Maximization of likelihood was achieved using the Optimization Toolbox in MATLAB (MathWorks, 
Natick, MA). Essentially, estimating meta-d’ in this analysis amounts to fitting the SDT model to the type 
2 probabilities for every possible permutation of stimulus, response, and confidence level. Please see 
Appendix A for a more in-depth treatment of the methodology for estimating meta-d’.  
 
Monte Carlo SDT simulations 
 We performed Monte Carlo SDT simulations in order to assess the extent to which observed 
changes in perceptual and metacognitive performance over time deviated from SDT expectation. We 
structured the simulation so as to closely mirror key features of the empirical data across Experiments 1 
– 4.  
 For each subject in Experiments 1 – 4, we binned together all trials occurring in the first half of 
an experimental block and computed d’ (call this d’1), and similarly binned together all trials occurring in 
the second half of an experimental block and computed d’ (call this d’2). (For Experiments 3 and 4, data 
was gathered only from blocks in which confidence ratings or wagers were provided on every trial.) 
Visual inspection of the scatterplot of d’2 vs d’1 suggested that these variables were roughly distributed 













 for d’1 and d’2 across all experiments, and used a bivariate normal distribution with 
this mean and covariance as the basis for subsequent statistical sampling. 
 In Experiment 1, 500 trials contributed to each estimate of d’1 and d’2, whereas this number was 
reduced to 255 trials in Experiment 2 and 250 trials in Experiments 3 and 4 (after limiting the analysis to 
blocks where confidence ratings were provided on every trial). Therefore, in all simulations, 250 
simulated “trials” contributed to the estimate of each SDT parameter for each simulated subject. 
Because the average number of subjects entered into the analysis for Experiments 1 – 4 was 28.5, each 
simulation contained data for 30 simulated subjects. 
 
Simulation procedure 
 Simulations proceeded as follows. We simulated 2000 experiments, where each experiment had 
30 simulated subjects, with a total of 500 simulated trials for each subject.  
 For each subject, we first obtained “true” values for d’1 and d’2 by randomly sampling from the 
bivariate normal distribution described above. If this resulted in any negative values, the sampling 
procedure was repeated until both d’ values were positive. These “true” d’ values were used as the basis 
for subsequent sampling in order to obtain “simulated” values for d’ and meta-d’, as described below. 
 We also created a unique set of decision criteria for each subject. Decision criteria were 
initialized to values of -2, -1.75, -.75, 0, .75, 1.75, 2. In order to create different decision criteria for 
different simulated subjects, a small amount of random noise from N(0, .5) was added to the initial 
values of the decision criteria. Decision criteria were then re-sorted to ensure they were in ascending 
order. Once the values of the decision criteria were determined for a simulated subject, these same 





 For the first block half consisting of 250 trials, 125 simulated “S1” trials (corresponding to the 
experimental condition where the grating was on the left) generated 125 sensory samples drawn from 
the normal distribution N(-d’1/2,  1). Another 125 simulated “S2” trials (corresponding to the 
experimental condition where where the grating was on the right) generated 125 sensory samples 
drawn from N(+d’1/2,  1). (These reflect the normal distributions of sensory evidence contingent on 
stimulus presentation posited by SDT.) Each such sample was compared to the decision criteria, and this 
comparison determined the simulated subject’s response for each trial (Macmillan & Creelman, 2005). 
Responses for the perceptual task could be either “S1” (i.e. “grating was on the left”) or “S2” (i.e. 
“grating was on the right”), and responses for the metacognitive task were a confidence rating ranging 
from values of 1 through 4. A similar procedure was used to simulate sensory samples and behavioral 
responses for the second block half of 250 trials. 
 Now that each trial was associated with a “true” stimulus configuration as well as the simulated 
subject’s perceptual and metacognitive judgments, we were able to compute d’ and meta-d’ for the first 
and second block half for each simulated subject using standard SDT analyses (Macmillan & Creelman, 
2005; Maniscalco & Lau, 2012). 
 
Modulation of simulated results using aPFC data from Experiment 2 
 Analysis of Experiment 2 suggested a model whereby aPFC gray matter volume is positively 
associated with both meta-d’1 and Δd’ (Results; Figure 4-5). In order to take these effects into account in 
the simulations, we used the following procedure. Using the data from Experiment 2, we applied a 
regression analysis to estimate the β values for the following equation: 
(1) aPFCdata = β1 * Δd’data + β0 
For the analysis of metacognitive performance, we defined the ratio of meta-d’ to d’ in the first 





(2) M1, data = meta-d’1, data / d’1, data 
 Using data from Experiment 2, we applied another regression analysis to estimate the β values 
for the following equation: 
(3) M1, data = β3 * aPFCdata + β2 
 On the basis of the β values obtained from the regression analysis on (1) and the simulated 
values of Δd’, we assigned each simulated subject an aPFC volume: 
(4)  aPFCsim = β1 * Δd’sim + β0 
 We then used the obtained value of aPFCsim to adjust the simulated subject’s simulated value for 
M1 as follows. 
(5) M1, adj = β3 * aPFCsim + M1, sim 
 Since aPFCdata was scaled in such a way that the mean value was 0, the coefficient β2 derived 
from regression analysis on equation (3) codes the mean value of M1 in the data, which was 0.865. 
However, in SDT simulations, the mean value of M1 was 0.996, consistent with the SDT expectation that 
meta-d’ = d’ and therefore meta-d’ / d’ = 1 (Maniscalco & Lau, 2012). Thus, applying the β2 coefficient to 
the simulated data would have been inappropriate. Instead, we replaced the β2 coefficient (an estimate 
of the mean value of M1 in the empirical data) with the actual value of M1 derived for each simulated 
subject. This has the benefit of retaining natural between-subject sampling variation in the values of M1 
arising from the Monte Carlo simulation procedure when calculating the value for M1, adj. 
 Finally, we obtained a new value for meta-d’1, sim using the following equation. 
(6) meta-d’1, adj = M1, adj * d’1, sim 
 Results of the “SDT + aPFC” simulation displayed in Figure 7 are derived by taking the same 
simulated data used for the “SDT” simulation, with the exception that values of meta-d’1, sim were 





modulating the simulated data set such that the relationships between simulated aPFC volume, Δd’, and 
meta-d’1 were similar to the relationships empirically observed in Experiment 2. 
Analysis of correlations between Δmeta-d’ and Δd’ 
 Each of the 2000 simulated experiments contained 30 simulated subjects, and so 30 values of 
Δd’sim and Δmeta-d’sim. For each simulated experiment, we calculated the Pearson’s r correlation 
coefficient between Δd’sim and Δmeta-d’sim. In order to mitigate the influence of outliers, we excluded 
data from all simulated subjects with any d’ value lower than 0.25 or higher than 3. 
 This resulted in 2000 simulated values for Pearson’s r. We used these 2000 values in order to 
estimate the sampling distribution of r with and without the aPFC modulation of the SDT simulations, as 
displayed in Figure 7C. Estimates of the sampling distribution in turn allowed us to characterize the 
likelihood of the empirically observed r values in Experiments 1 – 4 under the null SDT model and the 
SDT model augmented by the aPFC findings. 
 
Regression of Δmeta-d’ onto Δd’ 
 For Experiments 1 – 4, one analysis of interest was to characterize the empirical relationship 
between Δmeta-d’ and Δd’. Ideally, regressions between these variables should take into account that 
both are subject to sampling error. However, errors-in-variables approaches to regression typically 
require some knowledge or assumptions about the error structures of the dependent and independent 
variables.   
 We capitalized on the results of the Monte Carlo SDT simulations in order to characterize the 
error structures for these measures. As described above, for each simulated subject, we selected “true” 
values for d’1, true and d’2, true, and then repeatedly performed a sampling procedure using the SDT model 
parameterized with d’1, true and d’2, true in order to obtain corresponding “simulated” values d’1, sim, d’2, sim, 





(7) errorΔd’ = Δd’ true - Δd’ sim 
 Likewise, since on the basic SDT model used here, meta-d’ = d’, it follows that Δmeta-d’ true = Δd’ 
true. Thus, we calculated error for meta-d’ as 
(8) errorΔmeta-d’ = Δd’true - Δmeta-d’sim 
 Sampling errors for Δd’ and Δmeta-d’ were not correlated (Pearson’s r = -0.015). Therefore, it 
was appropriate to use Deming regression to characterize their relationship (Deming, 1943). Deming 
regression requires knowing the value of the parameter δ, which is the ratio of the variances of error in 
the dependent and independent variables. On the basis of the simulation outcomes, we estimated that 
δ = var(errorΔmeta-d’) / var(errorΔd’) = 2.1535. Therefore, for all regressions of Δmeta-d’ onto Δd’ reported 
in this paper, we used Deming regression with δ = 2.1535. 
 
Results 
 According to SDT, for an ideal observer, perceptual performance should be related to 
metacognitive performance such that d’ = meta-d’ (Maniscalco & Lau, 2012). Deviations from this 
expectation due to sampling error and suboptimal metacognitive performance are to be expected, but a 
robust SDT prediction is that between and within subjects, d’ and meta-d’ should positively correlate. 
Substantiating this general prediction, we found that overall d’ correlated positively with overall meta-d’ 
in all four experiments (rs > .5, ps < .03), and also that d’ correlated positively with meta-d’ within each 
block-half for all experiments (rs > .4, ps < .02), with the lone exception of a non-significant correlation in 
the first block-half of Experiment 3 (r = .15, p = .5). It is thus surprising that, although d’ and meta-d’ 
were consistently positively correlated overall and within each block half, changes in these measures 







 In Experiment 1, we analyzed the time course of perceptual and metacognitive performance 
within brief experimental blocks of trials. Subjects completed 10 blocks, each containing 100 trials, and 
received a self-terminated rest period of up to one minute between blocks.  
 On each trial, two patches of visual noise were presented to the left and right of fixation, and in 
one of these patches a sinusoidal grating was present (Figure 4-1 A). Subjects provided a two interval 
forced choice discrimination on whether the grating was in the left or right stimulus, and then rated 
decision confidence on a scale of 1 through 4. Trial duration depended on response times; mean block 
duration across all participants was 231.5 s.  
 To analyze perceptual and metacognitive performance over the course of a block of trials, we 
binned the trials from the first and second half of each experimental block. Thus, bin 1 contained the 
first 50 trials from all 10 blocks, for a total of 500 trials, and bin 2 similarly contained the last 50 trials 
from all 10 blocks. For each block half, we measured stimulus identification performance independently 
of response bias by using the signal detection theoretic (SDT) measure d’ (Macmillan & Creelman, 2005). 
We measured metacognitive sensitivity (i.e. how well confidence ratings track accuracy) independently 
of biases in confidence rating using the SDT-inspired measure meta-d’ (Maniscalco & Lau, 2012). For 
convenience, we will sometimes refer to stimulus identification performance as “type 1 performance” 
and metacognitive sensitivity as “type 2 performance” (Clarke et al., 1959). Because meta-d’ expresses 
type 2 performance on the same scale as the type 1 measure d’, numerical values of meta-d’ and d’ may 
be compared directly. Meta-d’ is defined such that meta-d’ = d’ for an observer whose metacognitive 
performance conforms to the expectations of the classical SDT model (Maniscalco & Lau, 2012). 
 The results of this analysis are plotted in Figure 4-2 A. To assess the effects of time passage 
within a block of trials on task performance, we conducted a 2 (Task Type: type 1, type 2) x 2 (Time: 1st 







Figure 4-2. Results for Experiment 1. (A) Mean perceptual (d’) and metacognitive (meta-d’) 
performance over time. We analyzed the dynamics of subjects’ task performance over the timecourse 
of blocks of 100 trials. Interestingly, we observed that meta-d’ decreased over time whereas d’ 
remained constant (Task Type x Time, p = .02), suggestive of a selective fatigue effect for metacognition. 
Error bars represent within-subjects standard errors (Morey, 2008). (B) Between-subject correlation of 
changes in perceptual and metacognitive performance. We computed the change in d’ and meta-d’ 
between the first and second half of all blocks (i.e. Δd’ = d’2nd block half – d’1st block half; Δmeta-d’ = meta-d’2nd 
block half – meta-d’1st block half) and found that these measures were inversely related, in stark contrast to SDT 
expectation. This suggests a tradeoff effect whereby maintenance of perceptual performance comes at 
the expense of maintenance in metacognitive performance, and vice versa.  
 
 
Time interaction (p = .024), driven by the fact that over time, d’ remained constant (p = .7) whereas 
meta-d’ decreased (p = .011).  
 We also assessed the relationship between changes in perceptual task performance and 
metacognitive performance over time. For each participant, we calculated d’ and meta-d’ using trials 
from the first and second halves of all blocks. We defined Δd’ = d’2 - d’1 and Δmeta-d’ = meta-d’2 - meta-
d’1 , where subscripts indicate block half. Since the expectation under SDT is that meta-d’ = d’, it follows 





 Contrary to SDT expectation, empirically Δd’ and Δmeta-d’ exhibited an inverse relationship 
(Figure 4-2 B). The observed Pearson’s r correlation was -.18, whereas the SDT-expected value for r, 
according to computational simulations, was .41 (see Figure4- 7 C and “Monte Carlo SDT simulations” in 
Methods). Under the null hypothesis that changes in d’ and meta-d’ are generated by an SDT process 
with an expected r = .41, we estimate that the empirically observed r = -.18 corresponds to a one-tailed 
p-value of 0.0015 (Figure 4-7 C).  Thus, according to SDT, the observed inverse relationship between Δd’ 
and Δmeta-d’ is highly unlikely. The Deming regression slope relating Δd’ and Δmeta-d’ was -3.12, lower 
than the SDT-expected value of 1 (see “Regression of Δmeta-d’ onto Δd’” in Methods).  
 These findings suggest that the observed dynamics of perceptual and metacognitive 
performance over time violate SDT expectation in multiple respects. We found that over time, meta-d’ 
decreased even as d’ remained constant (Figure 4-2 A), suggesting that overall, perceptual and 
metacognitive performance may vary independently. We further found that changes in perceptual and 
metacognitive performance over time were negatively, not positively, correlated (Figure 4-2 B). This 
surprising result is suggestive of a tradeoff in vigilance for the two types of tasks. In order to shed 
further light on this finding, we used a similar experimental design in Experiment 2 and collected 
structural MRI data. 
 
Experiment 2 
 In Experiment 2, we used a nearly identical task design as in Experiment 1, with minor 
adjustments (see Methods). For each subject, we collected estimates of gray matter volume and 
analyzed the relationship between task performance over time and brain structure using voxel-based 
morphometry. 
 As in Experiment 1, trial duration was not fixed, but determined by participant response times. 






Figure 4-3. Brain regions selected for voxel based morphometry analysis. Two regions of interest in 
anterior prefrontal cortex (aPFC) were selected for analysis on the basis of positive correlations with 
metacognitive efficiency (meta-d’ / d’). These regions were identified in a previous analysis of the data, 
conducted in McCurdy et al. (2013), and are consistent with previous findings relating metacognitive 
sensitivity to aPFC gray matter volume (Fleming et al., 2010). To obtain the most robust estimate of 
aPFC volume, we combined both aPFC clusters to produce an average volume, as in McCurdy et al. Peak 
voxel coordinate for left aPFC = [-12 54 16]. Peak voxel coordinate for right aPFC = [32 50 7]. Both 
survived cluster family-wise-error correction. Figure adapted from McCurdy et al. 
 
 
(Time: 1st block half, 2nd block half) repeated measures ANOVA, but there was neither a main effect of 
Time (p = .3) nor a Task Type x Time interaction (p = .14; Figure 4-4 A). However, as in Experiment 1, the 
between-subject relationship between Δd’ and Δmeta-d’ failed to conform to SDT expectation (Figure 4-
4 B). The Pearson’s r correlation coefficient for Δd’ and Δmeta-d’ was .07, whereas the SDT-expected 
value for r, according to computational simulations, was .41 (see Figure 4-7 C and “Monte Carlo SDT 
simulations” in Methods). Under the null hypothesis that changes in d’ and meta-d’ are generated by an 
SDT process with an expected r = .41, we estimate that the empirically observed r = .07 corresponds to a 
one-tailed p-value of 0.026 (Figure 4-7 C).  The Deming regression slope relating Δd’ and Δmeta-d’ was 






Figure 4-4. Results for Experiment 2. A) Mean perceptual (d’) and metacognitive (meta-d’) 
performance over time. On average, neither perceptual nor metacognitive performance changed over 
time (Time, p = .3; Task Type x Time, p = .14). B) Between-subject correlation of changes in perceptual 
and metacognitive performance. As in Experiment 1, the relationship between changes in d’ and meta-
d’ failed to match SDT expectation. C, D) Perception and metacognition as a function of aPFC volume. A 
median split analysis revealed that subjects with lower aPFC volume tended to experience decreases in 
d’ and increases in meta-d’ (Task Type x Time x aPFC Volume, p = .03), contrary to the pattern of 
subjects with higher aPFC volume. This suggests that the between-subject inverse relationship between 
changes in d’ and meta-d’ may be partially accounted for by individual differences in aPFC volume. Error 






as in Experiment 1, the relationship between maintenance of perceptual and metacognitive 
performance was below SDT expectation.  
 We went on to relate this variability in metacognitive efficiency to inter-individual differences in 
brain structure. In a previous study (McCurdy et al., 2013), we defined a measure of metacognitive 
efficiency on a visual behavioral task (Figure 4-1 A) as the ratio meta-d’ / d’; for SDT-ideal observers, this 
ratio should equal 1, and for metacognitively suboptimal observers it should be less than 1. Voxel-based 
morphometry analysis revealed that metacognitive efficiency was positively correlated with gray matter 
volume in regions in anterior prefrontal cortex (aPFC) (Figure 4-3; adapted from McCurdy et al.). In the 
present study, we focused on the two regions in the aPFC identified by McCurdy et al. as regions of 
interest (ROIs). (Peak voxel coordinate for left aPFC = [-12 54 16]; peak voxel coordinate for right aPFC = 
[32 50 7], both survived cluster family-wise-error correction.) The two clusters were used to define ROIs 
using the MarsBar toolbox (Brett, Anton, Valabregue, & Poline, 2002) and gray matter volume in the 
aPFC clusters was calculated. To obtain the most robust estimate of aPFC volume, we combined both 
aPFC clusters in the region to produce an average volume, as in McCurdy et al.; all subsequent analyses 
refer to this combined data as aPFC. 
 In order to assess how aPFC volume influenced the tradeoff effect, we performed a median split 
on aPFC volume and calculated d’ and meta-d’ over time for subjects with low and high aPFC volume 
(Figure 4-4 C-D). A 2 (Task Type: type 1, type 2) x 2 (Time: 1st block half, 2nd block half) x 2 (aPFC 
Volume: low / high) ANOVA revealed a significant Task Type x aPFC Volume interaction (p = .002) and a 
significant Task Type x Time x aPFC Volume interaction (p = .03). On average, subjects with high aPFC 
volume did not exhibit decreases in d’ or meta-d’ over time (Task Type x Time, p = .7), and were also 
metacognitively optimal in the sense that meta-d’ was not significantly different from d’ (Task Type, p = 
.4). By contrast, subjects with low aPFC volume were metacognitively suboptimal overall in the sense 





exhibited a numerical decrease in d’ over time as well as an increase in meta-d’, such that the 
interaction was significant (Task Type x Time, p = .01). This pattern of changes in d’ and meta-d’ having 
the opposite sign for low aPFC subjects mirrors the tradeoff effect exhibited in Experiment 1 (Figure 4-2 
B), Experiment 2 (Figure 4-4 B), and Experiments 3 and 4 (Figure 4-6 C). Thus, individual differences in 
aPFC volume are a candidate mechanism to explain the observed tradeoff effect between Δd’ and 
Δmeta-d’.  
 We further explored the relationship of aPFC volume to changes over time in d’ and meta-d’ by 
analyzing the patterns of correlation between d’1, meta-d’1, d’2, meta-d’2, and aPFC volume. As 
expected, d’1 and d’2 positively correlated (Pearson’s r = 0.82, p < .001; Figure 4-5 A). Consistent with 
SDT expectation, meta-d’ positively correlated with d’ in each block half (rs = 0.57, 0.51; ps < .001; Figure 
4-5 B). 
aPFC volume did not correlate with either d’1 (p = .8) or d’2 (p = .2), but a partial correlation 
between aPFC volume and d’2, controlling for d’1, was significant (r = .33, p = .03; Figure 4-5 C). Thus, 
larger aPFC volume was associated with better perceptual vigilance (higher Δd’).  
 aPFC volume was significantly correlated with meta-d’1 (r = .43, p = .005), and this correlation 
remained significant when controlling for d’1 (r = .50, p = .001; Figure 5C). Although aPFC volume also 
correlated with meta-d’2 (r = .33, p = .04), this correlation did not remain significant when controlling for 
d’2 (r = .26, p = .1) or meta-d’1 (r = -.02, p = .9). Indeed, although aPFC regions were selected on the basis 
of their correlation with overall meta-d’ / d’ (r = .34, p = .03), aPFC volume correlated with meta-d’1 / d’1 
(r  = .51, p = .0006) but not meta-d’2 / d’2 (r = .1, p = .5). Thus, aPFC volume robustly correlated with 
metacognitive sensitivity only in the first block half. The significant correlation between aPFC volume 
and meta-d’2 appears to be attributable to the fact that aPFC volume correlates with d’2, which in turn 







Figure 4-5. Model of the relationship between aPFC volume and changes in perceptual and 
metacognitive performance. Correlation analyses from Experiment 2 reveal significant positive 
correlations between (A) d’ across block halves (p < .001); (B) meta-d’ and d’ within block halves (ps < 
.001); (C) aPFC volume with first-half meta-d’ (p = .001) and second-half d’ (p = .03), after removing 
variation due to first-half d’. (Lines of best fit for both correlations overlap.) (D) A schematic 
representation based on the correlations exhibited in panels A-C. 
 
 
sensitivity only, the sign of the correlation between aPFC volume and Δmeta-d’ was negative (though 
non-significant; r = -.15, p = .3). 
 In Figure 4-5 D, we present a simple schematic account to summarize these patterns of 





block half is largely a consequence of d’. Without further components, this account would be consistent 
with SDT expectation. However, there is an additional component corresponding to aPFC volume, and 
this factor contributes both to better initial metacognition and to better maintenance of perceptual 
performance over time. Larger aPFC is associated with larger meta-d’1 and therefore with smaller 
Δmeta-d’. Larger aPFC is also associated with larger Δd’. Since larger aPFC is associated with positive 
values for Δd’ and negative values for Δmeta-d’, the contributions of aPFC appear to drive the deviation 
from SDT expectation encapsulated in the tradeoff relationship between Δd’ and Δmeta-d’. (See also 
“SDT simulations better characterize the data when taking into account the aPFC model” below.) 
 On this account, aPFC could be considered as a flexible cognitive resource that can contribute to 
both metacognitive monitoring and top-down control of perceptual task performance. To provide an 
additional test of this account, in Experiments 3 and 4 we included conditions where subjects did not 
have to provide metacognitive judgments in the first half of some experimental blocks. On this 
“resource” account, we might expect that when subjects do not have the initial cognitive burden of 
placing metacognitive judgments, the resources shared by perceptual and metacognitive processes can 
be better applied to the task of maintaining perceptual vigilance. 
 
Experiments 3 and 4 
 In Experiment 3, we used a design similar to Experiment 1, with the primary difference that in 
even-numbered blocks, subjects were not asked to provide confidence ratings in the first half of each 
block (Figure 4-1 B). We shall call these blocks “partial type 2 blocks,” as opposed to the blocks in which 
metacognitive judgments are required on every trial, which we shall call “whole type 2 blocks.” 
According to a resource interpretation of the aPFC schematic (Figure 4-5 D), in the absence of the need 
to “boost” metacognitive performance, subjects should be better at maintaining perceptual 





Experiment 3, but used a point-wagering system with feedback on perceptual and metacognitive after 
each block (Figure 4-1 C). In both experiments, trial length was a constant 2.533 s, yielding blocks of a 
253.3 s duration. 
 We verified that, as in Experiments 1 and 2, Δd’ and Δmeta-d’ in whole type 2 blocks exhibited a 
tradeoff in violation of SDT expectation (Figure 4-6 C). The Pearson’s r correlation coefficients for Δd’ 
and Δmeta-d’ were -.22 and -.08 in Experiment 3 and 4, respectively, whereas the SDT-expected value 
for r, according to computational simulations, was .41 (see Figure 4-7 C and “Monte Carlo SDT 
simulations” in Supplemental Information). Under the null hypothesis that changes in d’ and meta-d’ are 
generated by an SDT process with an expected r = .41, we estimate that the empirically observed values 
of r = -.22 and r = -.08 correspond to one-tailed p-values of 0.001 and .004 in Experiment 3 and 4, 
respectively (Figure 4-7 C).  The Deming regression slope relating Δd’ and Δmeta-d’ were -6.22 and -2.29, 
lower than the SDT-expected value of 1 (see “Regression of Δmeta-d’ onto Δd’” in Supplemental 
Information). 
 Next, we tested whether the manipulation on task demand yielded the expected effect on 
perceptual performance over time. A 2 (Block Type: partial type 2, whole type 2) x 2 (Time: 1st block 
half, 2nd block half) x 2 (Experiment: 3, 4) mixed design ANOVA on d’ revealed a significant Block Type x 
Time interaction (p = .002). The interaction is driven by the fact that Δd’ is smaller for whole type 2 
blocks (mean = -.20) than for partial type 2 blocks (mean = .04) (Figure 4-6 A, B).  
 The Block Type x Time x Experiment interaction was not significant (p = .4), suggesting that the 
difference in Δd’ for whole and partial type 2 blocks is robust across Experiment 3 (where participants 
made metacognitive judgments by rating confidence) and Experiment 4 (where participants made 
metacognitive judgments by wagering points, were instructed to maximize points earned, and received 







Figure 4-6. Results for Experiments 3 and 4. (A, B) Mean perceptual (d’) and metacognitive (meta-d’) 
performance over time. When subjects were not required to place metacognitive judgments in the first 
block half (partial type 2 blocks), perceptual vigilance increased (Block Type x Time interaction, p = .002) 
but metacognition in the second block half, as measured by meta-d’2 / d’2,  was not affected (Block type, 
p > .4). Error bars represent within-subjects standard errors (Morey, 2008). (C) Between-subject 
correlation of changes in perceptual and metacognitive performance. As in Experiments 1 and 2, the 
between-subject relationships between changes in d’ and meta-d’ were substantially lower than SDT 
expectation. (D) Resource account of findings. The results of Experiments 3 and 4 can be understood in 
terms of the model derived from Experiment 2. By relieving subjects of the requirement to place 
metacognitive judgments in the first block half, aPFC resources normally dedicated to initial 








not attributable to lack of motivation or lack of a clear objective for how to perform the metacognitive 
task. 
 A 2 (Block Type: whole, partial) x 2 (Experiment: 3, 4) ANOVA yielded a nearly significant main 
effect of Block Type on meta-d’2 (p = .053), such that meta-d’2 was higher for partial type 2 blocks. 
However, the same ANOVA design shows that d’2 was also higher for partial type 2 blocks (p < .001), and 
so the larger value for meta-d’2 in partial type 2 blocks was likely mediated by the larger d’2 value. 
Indeed, the same ANOVA analysis, when applied to the ratio meta-d’2 / d’2, did not reveal a main effect 
of Block Type (p > .4). Thus, the experimental manipulation on initial metacognitive demand did not 
influence metacognitive sensitivity in the second block half. 
 
SDT simulations better characterize the data when taking into account the influence of aPFC 
 Finally, we performed Monte Carlo SDT simulations in order to computationally assess the 
empirical results in light of SDT expectation, and to investigate whether the SDT model could yield a 
closer fit to the empirical data when taking into account the relationship between aPFC volume and task 
performance (Figure 4-5 D). See “Monte Carlo SDT simulations” in Methods for full methods.  
 For each simulated subject, we defined the parameters of an SDT model specifying performance 
in the first and second block half of a binary decision task with confidence ratings. SDT model 
parameters were sampled from distributions closely reflecting the statistical patterns in Experiments 1 – 
4. Random samples were then drawn from the SDT models in order to generate a simulated value for 
Δd’ and Δmeta-d’. In all, we simulated 2000 experiments, each containing 30 simulated subjects. 
Consistent with SDT expectation, these simulations yielded a strong positive correlation between Δd’ 
and Δmeta-d’ (Figure 4-7 A). Next, we adjusted the initial simulation values for meta-d’1 on the basis of 







Figure 4-7. Signal detection theory simulations of the relationship between changes in perceptual and 
metacognitive sensitivity. (A) Basic SDT model. In a series of SDT simulations closely matching the 
properties of Experiments 1 – 4, changes in d’ and meta-d’ across block half are strongly positively 
related. Displayed is a contour plot based on the two-dimensional histogram of Δmeta-d’ vs Δd’ for all 
simulated subjects in all simulated experiments. White line is line of best fit to simulated data; gray 
dashed lines are lines of best fit from data in Experiments 1 – 4. (B) SDT model with aPFC adjustment. 
We adjusted the outcomes of the initial SDT simulation so as to conform to the empirically observed 
relationships between aPFC volume, Δd’, and meta-d’1 / d’1 in Experiment 2 (see Methods for details). 
This substantially weakened the relationship between Δd’ and Δmeta-d’ in the simulated data, as 
demonstrated by a more circular contour plot and smaller slope for the line of best fit. (C) Distributions 
of correlation coefficients for Δd’ and Δmeta-d’. Across 2000 simulated experiments, the basic SDT 
model yielded correlation values consistently higher than those observed in Experiments 1 – 4 (one-
tailed p-values: 0.002, 0.026, 0.001, 0.004). The adjusted model incorporating the aPFC findings from 
Experiment 2 yielded a distribution of correlations more closely in line with the data (one-tailed p-





adjustment significantly attenuated the positive correlation between simulated values for Δd’ and 
Δmeta-d’ (Figure 4-7 B).  
 For each simulated experiment, we computed the Pearson’s r correlation for Δd’ and Δmeta-d’, 
yielding 2000 r values. The distribution of simulated r values under the “SDT” and “SDT + aPFC” models 
is displayed in Figure 4-7 C alongside the empirically observed r values from Experiments 1 – 4.  Under 
the “SDT” model, the distribution’s mean value is 0.412 and only 0.9% of all values are lower than zero. 
Under the “SDT + aPFC” model, the mean shifts to 0.127 and 25.7% of all values are lower than zero, 
which is in better agreement with the data. For each empirical r value, we can compute a corresponding 
one-tailed p-value using the r distribution for the “SDT” and “SDT + aPFC” models. The empirical r values 
from Experiments 1 – 4 are -0.18, 0.07, -0.22, and -.08. Under the “SDT” model, these correspond to p-
values of 0.002, 0.026, 0.001, and 0.004. Under the “SDT + aPFC” model, these p-values increase on 
average by a factor of about 30, to 0.067, 0.383, 0.043, and 0.161. Thus, the “SDT + aPFC” model is 
considerably better in accommodating the observed patterns of correlation between Δd’ and Δmeta-d’ 
than is the standard SDT model. 
 
Discussion 
 In summary, across four experiments, we find a robust tradeoff effect whereby changes in 
perceptual and metacognitive sensitivity within a block of trials are negatively or weakly correlated, 
contradicting the strong positive relationship predicted by single-process signal detection theory (SDT). 
Voxel-based morphometry analysis suggests that this tradeoff effect may be explained by the 
contribution of neural resources in anterior prefrontal cortex (aPFC). Consistent with this account, 
perceptual vigilance decrements are alleviated when subjects are not required to provide metacognitive 






Tradeoff relationship between perceptual and metacognitive vigilance 
 The classical SDT model, which has enjoyed considerable success in modeling two-choice 
decision paradigms with confidence ratings (Swets, 1986a; Macmillan & Creelman, 2005), predicts a 
strong, positive relationship between primary task performance and metacognitive performance (Galvin 
et al., 2003; Maniscalco & Lau, 2012). In agreement with this prediction, we found that overall d’ 
correlated positively with overall meta-d’ in all four experiments, and also that d’ correlated positively 
with meta-d’ in seven out of eight block halves in the four experiments. Thus, when considering the 
Pearson’s correlation between Δd’ and Δmeta-d’, we used SDT as the null hypothesis describing the 
expected distribution of correlation coefficients. We used Monte Carlo SDT simulations to construct the 
SDT-expected distribution of r values for Δd’ and Δmeta-d’, which yielded a distribution with a mean r 
value of .41 (see Figure 4-7 C and “Monte Carlo SDT simulations” in Methods). 
 We found that, although d’ and meta-d’ were robustly positively correlated overall and within 
block halves, nonetheless, changes in these measures across block half failed to exhibit positive 
correlations, contradicting SDT expectation. Importantly, although the correlation coefficients for Δd’ 
and Δmeta-d’ were small in magnitude, the relevant point of comparison is not with a distribution 
whose mean r = 0, but rather with the SDT distribution whose mean r > 0. The correlations in 
Experiments 1 – 4 significantly deviated from this SDT expectation. Thus, relative to the SDT-expected 
positive relationship, perceptual and metacognitive vigilance appeared to “trade off,” such that 
improvement in one precluded comparable improvement in the other. 
 
Interpreting the tradeoff relationship 
 Research on the perceptual vigilance decrement has suggested that the decrement is caused by 
the depletion of limited cognitive resources (e.g. Grier et al., 2003; Helton & Warm, 2008; Helton et al., 





anatomical structure has previously been associated with metacognitive sensitivity in visual tasks 
(Fleming et al., 2010; McCurdy et al., 2013) may partially instantiate the resources supporting 
perceptual vigilance, since larger gray matter volume in these regions is associated with smaller declines 
in perceptual sensitivity.   
 The gray matter volume of aPFC was also associated with better metacognitive sensitivity during 
the first, but not second, half of each block (Figure 4-4 C-D; Figure 4-5 C). This may have driven a 
negative relationship between aPFC volume and Δmeta-d’ in two ways. First, higher values for meta-d’1 
would directly lead to lower values for Δmeta-d’. Second, according to SDT, meta-d’ is theoretically 
constrained to be less than or equal to d’ (Maniscalco & Lau, 2012). Therefore, all else being equal, 
better meta-d’1 leaves less room for meta-d’2 to improve, entailing a smaller maximum possible value 
for Δmeta-d’.  
 Thus, aPFC simultaneously exhibited a positive association with Δd’ and a negative association 
with Δmeta-d’. Subjects with larger aPFC exhibited strong perceptual vigilance (higher Δd’) as well as 
SDT-ideal metacognitive performance (meta-d’ = d’; Figure 4-4 D). Conversely, subjects with smaller 
aPFC exhibited poorer perceptual vigilance (lower Δd’) and poorer initial metacognition (contributing to 
higher Δmeta-d’; Figure 4-4 C). In this way, individual differences in aPFC volume could produce the 
tradeoff effect whereby Δd’ and Δmeta-d’ failed to positively correlate (Figure 4-2 B, 4-4 B, 4-6 C). 
 One way of interpreting these findings is that perception and metacognition are subserved by 
separate processes that can independently tap into a common cognitive resource housed in aPFC. 
Presumably, as a block of trials wears on, resources would be increasingly allocated to the perceptual 
process (and thus away from the metacognitive process) in order to counteract the perceptual vigilance 
decrement (Figure 4-5 D).  
 This account views perception and metacognition as separate processes that can draw upon a 





and competition for resources when both tasks are performed concurrently (Kahneman, 1973; 
Matthews et al., 2000; Wickens, 2002). More generally, this interpretation is consistent with accounts 
ascribing a broadly domain-general functionality to prefrontal cortex in guiding behavior (e.g. Koechlin & 
Summerfield, 2007; Badre, 2008; Passingham & Wise, 2012).  
 An alternative account is that since larger aPFC is associated with superior visual metacognition, 
the positive association between aPFC volume and perceptual vigilance could be mediated by superior 
metacognitive monitoring. Higher metacognitive sensitivity entails better ability to gauge ongoing 
perceptual performance, which could enable better ongoing regulation of task performance. On this 
account, aPFC is not a domain-general resource, but rather serves a specifically metacognitive function. 
 However, if better metacognitive monitoring directly contributes to superior perceptual 
vigilance, we might expect that perceptual vigilance should decrease when subjects are not required to 
engage in metacognitive monitoring. The resource account makes the opposite prediction; relieving the 
burden of placing confidence ratings should free up resources to support perceptual vigilance. In 
Experiments 3 and 4, we found that subjects were indeed more perceptually vigilant when not required 
to place confidence ratings in the first half of a block, more in line with the resource account than the 
metacognitive monitoring account. However, we take this result to be suggestive rather than decisive. 
Ultimately, these hypotheses will need to be further explored in future research. 
 
Implications for models of metacognition 
 An active area of research concerns the relationship between perceptual and metacognitive 
processing. According to some accounts, seemingly complex and high-level functions such as 
metacognition and awareness actually bear simple and direct relationships to basic perceptual 
processing (Kepecs et al., 2008; Kiani and Shadlen, 2009; Kepecs and Mainen, 2012). The intuition 





characterizes perceptual judgments and confidence ratings as originating from the comparison of the 
same sensory information to different decision criteria (Macmillan & Creelman, 2005; Appendix A). 
Crucially, if perceptual and metacognitive judgments are different evaluations of the same underlying 
sensory information, then they should have similar informational content (formally, d’ = meta-d’; Galvin 
et al., 2003; Maniscalco & Lau, 2012). 
 However, whereas the SDT model predicts a strong positive relationship between perceptual 
and metacognitive vigilance, we consistently observed this relationship to be neutral or negative. In our 
SDT-based simulations, we found that the empirical correlations between Δd’ and Δmeta-d’ could not 
plausibly be accounted for by sampling variation under the SDT model (Figure 4-7 A, C). However, 
adjusting the simulation outcomes to reflect the mediating effect of aPFC volume on the behavioral 
measures entailed a theoretical outcome more in line with the data (Figure 4-7 B, C). In turn, the fact 
that aPFC volume had an opposite direction of association with Δd’ and Δmeta-d’ suggests that 
perception and metacognition are separate processes with dissociable levels of sensitivity. 
 
Why do we give subjects short breaks in perceptual experiments? 
 Though originally found in the context of long task durations (30+ min), the vigilance decrement 
has been shown to arise as early as the first 5 – 10 minutes of task performance (e.g. Nuechterlein, 
Parasuraman, & Jiang, 1983; Temple et al., 2000), dependent on factors such as overall perceptual 
sensitivity, rate of stimulus presentation, type of stimuli used, and memory load (See et al., 1995). 
Vigilance decrements are further associated with subjective effects such as reduced arousal and 
elevated feelings of stress (Helton & Warm, 2008; Warm et al., 2008). Thus, a wide range of 






 In the current work, we found that perceptual (Experiments 3 – 4) and metacognitive 
(Experiment 1) vigilance decrements can occur even in experimental blocks of approximately 4 – 5 
minutes in a fairly simple and standard visual discrimination task. Because we analyzed performance as 
a function of time across repeated blocks of trials, rather than analyzing the dynamics of task 
performance across a single prolonged block of trials, these results suggest a systematic pattern of 
performance decrements occurring within repeated blocks of trials that are nonetheless alleviated by 
regular intervals of rest. 
 What cognitive mechanisms benefit from the regular intervals of rest commonly used in 
perceptual experiments? The tradeoff between perceptual and metacognitive vigilance found in 
Experiments 1 – 4, and the elevation of perceptual vigilance solely by relieving metacognitive task 
demand in Experiments 3 – 4, suggest the workings of a higher-level cognitive resource. The results of 
Experiment 2 identify aPFC as a contributor to this resource. Thus, our results suggest that rest primarily 


















Summary of findings 
 The main thrust of this dissertation is to probe the relationship between objective and 
subjective performance in visual tasks in order to make inferences about the overall structure of the 
processes that underlie objective and subjective vision. We have demonstrated dissociations between 
objective and subjective aspects of visual processing caused by a variety of factors: stimulus properties 
(Chapter 1), dual task demands (Chapter 2), direct interference with brain activity (Chapter 3), and 
naturally occurring changes in performance over time (Chapter 4). In each case, the existence of the 
observed dissociation appears to be attributable to properties of the prefrontal cortex. Taken together, 
these findings are difficult to reconcile for some currently popular theories of subjective visual 
experience and metacognition, but are readily accounted for by higher-order, hierarchical models of the 
nature of subjective visual perception. 
 In Chapter 1, we replicated the finding of Lau and Passingham (2006) that objective stimulus 
discrimination performance and subjective reports of perceptual clarity in the metacontrast masking 
paradigm can dissociate. Although both objective and subjective measures are U-shaped functions of 
the target-mask stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA), these functions are asymmetric, such that there exist 
certain SOAs for which objective performance is equivalent but subjective reports of perceptual clarity 
differ. A formal comparison of a wide array of signal detection (SDT) models implementing Single 
Channel, Dual Channel, and Hierarchical structures suggests that the data are best accounted for by a 
Hierarchical model in which there exists an early, objective processing stage and a late, subjective 
processing stage. Processing in the early stage determines objective stimulus discrimination 
performance. Processing in the late stage, which generates a subjective report of perceptual clarity, 





judgment. According to the parameter values of the best-fitting Hierarchical model, short and long SOAs 
can elicit the same objective discrimination performance and different reports of subjective visibility 
because although early, objective perceptual processing is similar at both SOAs, the sensory signal is 
better transmitted to the later, subjective processing stage at the long SOA than at the short SOA. This 
characterization is consistent with the finding of Lau and Passingham (2006) that higher visibility at the 
long SOA is associated with heightened activation of dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC). 
 Comparison of the Single Channel, Dual Channel, and Hierarchical model structures in Figure 1-1 
suggests a general way in which the models can be distinguished. According to the Hierarchical model, 
interference with sensory representations at late-stage subjective processing should impair visual 
metacognition while leaving objective processing intact. By way of contrast, the Single Channel and Dual 
Channel models both suppose that differences in processing that manifest as differences in 
metacognitive sensitivity should also manifest as differences in perceptual sensitivity. Thus, further 
support for the Hierarchical model can be provided by demonstrating interventions that selectively 
impair metacognitive sensitivity by targeting late stage neural processing. We provided two such 
demonstrations in Chapters 2 and 3. 
 In Chapter 2, we investigated objective and subjective visual processing in the context of a 
concurrent working memory (WM) task. Specifically, we assessed the impact of maintenance and 
manipulation of WM contents on perceptual and metacognitive sensitivity. We found that overall, 
increasing the burden of WM maintenance impairs both objective and subjective visual performance. 
However, increasing the burden of active manipulation of WM contents selectively impaired 
metacognitive sensitivity.  Since active manipulation of WM contents has been previously associated 
with dlPFC function, and since dlPFC and nearby regions of PFC have been previously associated with 
visual metacogniton, these findings suggest that a common mechanism in dlPFC may contribute to both 





 In Chapter 3, we investigated the effect of transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) to bilateral 
dlPFC.  We found that this intervention selectively impairs metacognitive sensitivity while leaving basic 
perceptual performance intact. This result more directly demonstrates the connection between dlPFC 
function and metacognitive sensitivity that was suggested by the findings in Chapter 2.  
We note also that Chapter 2 and 3 showed similar results even though the study in Chapter 2 
made use of confidence ratings entered after the objective stimulus discrimination response, whereas 
the study in Chapter 3 made use of perceptual clarity ratings entered simultaneously with the stimulus 
discrimination response. These similarities further corroborate the close relationship between clarity 
and confidence ratings discussed in the General introduction, and to some extent help mitigate concerns 
over the potential impact of simultaneous or sequential entry of objective and subjective perceptual 
responses on behavioral outcomes. 
 In Chapter 4, we find a naturally occurring dissociation between perceptual and metacognitive 
sensitivity. As time progresses within a continuous block of trials, perceptual and metacognitive 
sensitivity change, but these changes do not correlate with each other across subjects. This failure to 
correlate is surprising, given the robust theoretical expectation (Galvin et al., 2003) and empirical 
evidence (Maniscalco & Lau, 2012) that perceptual and metacognitive sensitivity should positively 
correlate. Indeed, perceptual and metacognitive sensitivity do positively correlate, as expected, within 
each block half. It is only the change between the two across block halves that surprisingly fails to 
correlate. We found that between-subject variation in the relationship between perceptual and 
metacognitive vigilance was associated with gray matter volume in regions of the anterior prefrontal 
cortex (aPFC) that correlate with overall visual metacognition (Fleming et al, 2010; McCurdy et al., 
2013). We took these findings as suggestive of a tradeoff between perceptual and metacognitive 





findings that, when subjects did not have to rate confidence in the first half of a block of trials, 
perceptual vigilance improved. 
 
Relations and contributions to ongoing research 
 As reviewed in the General Introduction, there currently exist a rather wide range of views on 
the cognitive and neural bases of visual awareness and metacognition. Lau & Rosenthal (2011) 
categorized views of visual awareness into first order-views, neuronal global workspace theory, 
information integration theory, and higher-order views. With respect to characterizing the relationship 
between objective and subjective visual processing, first-order views and neuronal global workspace 
theory are alike in that they assume a direct and intimate relationship between objective and subjective 
vision. Thus, in this respect, both first-order theories and neuronal global workspace theory can be 
considered to have a Single Channel model structure (Figure 1-1). A revision to neuronal global 
workspace theory that includes a separate processing channel for unconscious processing has recently 
been proposed (Del Cul et al., 2009), thus taking on a Dual Channel structure (Figure 1-1). Higher-order 
theories of visual awareness closely map onto the Hierarchical model structure supported in Chapter 1. 
 In the domain of studying perceptual confidence judgments, there is a similar bifurcation 
between views that suppose a direct and intimate relationship between objective stimulus processing 
and ratings of confidence (Kepecs et al., 2008; Kiani & Shadlen, 2009; Kepecs & Mainen, 2012), and 
views that suppose that confidence ratings are driven by higher-order mechanisms evaluating lower-
level perceptual processing (Fleming et al., 2010; Pleskac & Busemeyer, 2010; McCurdy et al., 2013). 






 We have presented evidence favoring the Hierarchical view, but this is not the first 
demonstration of evidence consistent with such a view. So what novel perspectives, methods, points of 
emphasis, and empirical findings have we introduced in order to advance the discussion? 
 
A signal detection theoretic framework for analyzing and interpreting metacognitive sensitivity 
 How should we analyze metacognitive performance? A straightforward approach is to simply 
compute averages for subjective ratings of perceptual clarity or confidence in different experimental 
conditions. However, raw subjective rating data is determined in large part by an observer’s 
idiosyncratic response biases, and it cannot tell us how well the observer is able to distinguish between 
his own correct and incorrect perceptual responses. Simple measures of metacognitive accuracy, such as 
a correlation between accuracy and confidence (Kornell et al., 2007), can be computed, but such 
measures are in danger of confounding sensitivity and response bias—in general, a measure does not 
purely capture sensitivity unless it can provide a satisfactory fit to Receiver Operating Characteristic 
(ROC) curves (Swets, 1986a). Previous attempts to use SDT to measure metacognitive sensitivity 
(Kunimoto et al., 2001) have been empirically shown to be inadequate (Evans & Azzopardi, 2007) due to 
not properly contextualizing the analysis of subjective ratings into the structure of traditional SDT 
(Galvin et al., 2003).  
Our methodology (Maniscalco & Lau, 2012; Appendix A) builds on the theoretical analysis of 
Galvin et al and provides a straightforward way to measure metacognitive sensitivity, independently 
from response bias. Furthermore, this SDT framework allows us to meaningfully interpret the actual 
level of metacognitive sensitivity (meta-d’) by way of comparison to the SDT-expected level of 
metacognitive sensitivity (equivalent to d’).  Thus, the framework is very useful for measuring and 





informative and useful for hypothesis testing. This methodological advance has formed the backbone of 
the current work and can be fruitfully put to use in future studies. 
 
Isolating subjective measures from performance confounds 
 Most studies on objective and subjective visual processing to date have not properly controlled 
for aspects of objective perceptual processing when studying awareness and metacognition. For 
instance, a common approach is to create experimental conditions where the stimuli are similar or 
identical and yet subjective reports differ, and investigate differences in behavior, cognition, and brain 
activity (e.g. Dehaene et al, 2001). A related approach is to compare trials where a subject successfully 
reports the presence of a stimulus (‘hits’) to trials where the stimulus is presented but the subject 
reports not having seen it (‘misses’) (e.g. Lamy, Salti, & Bar-Haim, 2009), or to compare trials where 
reports of confidence are high against trials where reports of confidence are low (e.g. Kiani and Shadlen, 
2009).  
 The problem with approaches such as these is that the comparison groups typically do not differ 
only with respect to subjective reports, but also with respect to objective perceptual processing 
capacity. Experimental conditions where a stimulus is clearly visible, all else being equal, tend to also be 
associated with better, more accurate objective processing of the stimulus. Even the approach of 
comparing aware vs unaware trials, or high vs low confidence trials, suffers a similar problem. Such an 
approach implicitly assume a so-called threshold model of perception, according to which all ‘aware’ 
trials are essentially identical manifestations of the same underlying perceptual state, but this model 
contradicts signal detection theory and provides a poor fit to empirical ROC curves (Swets 1986b). On 
the SDT model, the objective perceptual signal associated with hits and high confidence responses is 
variable, but is higher on average than it is for misses and low confidence responses. Thus, these single 





 Our approach is careful to isolate subjective measures from associated performance confounds. 
In Chapter 1, we capitalized on an experimental paradigm which dissociates objective and subjective 
measures, including conditions in which the ability to objectively discriminate the target is equivalent, 
but average reports of perceptual clarity differ. In Chapters 3 – 4, we use the theoretical SDT framework 
to measure relative metacognitive sensitivity, i.e. the observed value of metacognitive sensitivity in 
comparison with the SDT-expected value based on objective task performance. This computational 
approach allows us to theoretically isolate aspects of metacognitive processing in and of themselves, 
even when perceptual sensitivity is not equated by experimental means (Maniscalco & Lau, 2012; 
Appendix A). 
 Thus, our experimental and methodological approach has allowed us to handle the problem of 
performance confounds and make inferences relating specifically to the subjective aspects of visual 
processing. 
 
Evidence for a causal role of dlPFC in visual metacognitive sensitivity 
 While prior studies have suggested a link between PFC and ratings of visual clarity and 
confidence (e.g. Lau & Passingham, 2006; Fleming et al., 2010; Fleming et al, 2012), it has not been as 
well established in the literature that PFC plays a causal role in visual metacognition. A notable recent 
study in this regard is Del Cul et al. (2009), which found that subjects with prefrontal lesions have similar 
objective visual performance as healthy controls for trials in which they report seeing or not seeing the 
stimulus, and yet have lower mean levels of reported visibility for correct and incorrect trials. However, 
patients also performed worse on the task overall (posing a potential performance confound), and Del 
Cul et al. did not explicitly analyze metacognitive sensitivity.  
 In Chapters 2 and 3, we provided converging evidence that dlPFC plays a causal role in relative 





selectively impair metacognitive performance, even when variability in objective task performance is 
taken into account mathematically in the SDT framework. This suggests the relationship between the 
anatomy and activity of PFC and subjective visual processing is not epiphenomenal, but rather that PFC 
plays a causal role in determining reports of visual clarity and confidence. Importantly, the effects of the 
experimental manipulations reported in Chapters 2 and 3 cannot be attributed to mere changes in 
response bias for the subjective rating task, since we demonstrated that these manipulations affect 
metacognitive sensitivity—the informational capacity with which the subjective ratings distinguish 
between correct and incorrect responses, regardless of response biases in the subjective rating. 
 
Competition between perceptual and metacognitive processes 
 The evidence presented in Chapter 4 suggests that perceptual and metacognitive processes are 
not only separate, but may even compete for limited resources. In turn, this suggests that the common 
experimental scenario of performing a perceptual task and then providing a subjective rating may 
constitute a kind of dual-task scenario, with the potential for the two processes to interfe or compete 
with each other. Along these lines, Petrusic and Baranski (2003) compared performance on a perceptual 
task in two conditions in which confidence ratings were and were not required. They found that when 
subjects had to provide confidence ratings, reaction times for the primary perceptual task became 
longer, although there was no apparent effect on accuracy in the perceptual task. An interesting 
question for future research is whether tradeoffs between perceptual and metacognitive processing can 
be controlled by experimental manipulations or task instruction in a way analogous to the well-known 
speed-accuracy tradeoff. 
If perceptual and metacognitive processes can compete for prefrontal resources, this also raises 
the possibility that certain contributions of the PFC to metacognition may reflect domain general 





functions that are specifically dedicated to metacognition per se (Koechlin & Summerfield, 2007; Badre, 
2008; Passingham & Wise, 2012).  
 
Addressing a common critique from first-order theorists 
 Proponents of first-order views hold that visual awareness and/or metacognition occurs in early 
sensory processing regions, rather than at later, higher-order stages. A common critique of first-order 
theorists is that higher-order processing, as expressed e.g. in prefrontal and frontoparietal networks, 
may reflect cognitive functions such as attention, memory, language, mechanisms for generating 
perceptual reports, and so on (Lamme, 2006). In terms of neural structure and function, such 
mechanisms could conceivably be downstream, higher-level functions that are reliably co-activated with 
aspects of subjective visual processing and yet do not constitute the core features of visual awareness, 
clarity, or confidence per se (Pins & Ffytche, 2003). In terms of cognition and behavior, it may be difficult 
to disentangle such secondary functions from subjective visual processing since these functions, 
especially the function of generating introspective reports, are typically the very means by which we 
access and measure subjective vision. This is particularly so in the case of visual awareness and ratings of 
visual clarity, as subjective reports on these processes constitute direct commentaries on the nature of 
the observer’s private and otherwise inaccessible subjective experience.  
 However, all of our findings have pertained to selective effects on ratings of perceptual clarity 
(Chapter 1) and metacognitive sensitivity (Chapters 1 – 4), controlling for differences in objective 
perceptual performance experimentally (Chapter 1) or mathematically (Chapters 2 – 4). Thus, to the 
degree that the current findings implicate PFC in subjective visual processing, the specific role played by 
PFC cannot be attributed to broad mechanisms such as attention or perceptual decision making. If PFC’s 
effect on visual metacognition were mediated by general purpose attentional or perceptual decision 





performance. Thus, the fact that PFC’s involvement was specific to metacognition at the very least 
implies the existence of separate underlying mechanisms for objective and subjective visual processing. 
 Furthermore, the findings that disruption of PFC impairs metacognitive, but not perceptual 
sensitivity, suggests that PFC not only has specific associations with subjective vision, but that this 
relationship is causal in nature. These findings are inconsistent with the interpretation that PFC reflects 
a downstream process that follows as a typical secondary result of subjective visual processing without 
directly contributing to such processing. Instead, PFC function appears to be necessary for the optimal 
functioning of metacognitive evaluation. 
 A third observation is that in the TMS study reported in Chapter 3, the subjective rating was a 
rating of perceptual clarity rather than a confidence rating. This suggests that the role of PFC in 
subjective visual processing is not purely decisional, in the sense of making an abstract overall 
evaluation of objective visual processing, but rather that PFC contributes to the informational integrity 
carried by direct reports on the nature of ongoing visual experience. Of course, it is possible to object 
that PFC may only be contributing to the report of perceptual clarity, rather than to the 
phenomenological clarity of the visual experience itself. We acknowledge that this is a possibility, and 
take this observation regarding the visual phenomenology only to be suggestive. At the very least, 
however, the current results support the claim that the report on perceptual clarity, whatever its 
ultimate nature, is specific to subjective visual processing, rather than being subsumed into a more 
general process that includes the reporting of both objective and subjective perceptual decisions. 
 
Relation of perceptual metacognition to PFC function 
 In Chapter 2, we showed that metacognitive sensitivity is impaired when subjects have to 
perform extensive operations on the contents of working memory. In turn, this suggests the possibility 





However, working memory and metacognition are not typically thought of as being interrelated 
processes, to the extent that they draw upon a common, crucial, limited set of functions or resources.  
In fact, recent proposals suggest that there may be no part of PFC that is specialized for the 
cognitive function of “working memory” as such. Instead, working memory may be an emergent 
phenomenon that arises from the flexible coordination of multiple cognitive/neural mechanisms that 
themselves are specialized for separate functions (Postle, 2006; D’Esposito, 2007). For instance, working 
memory could be characterized as the top-down attentional maintenance of sensory-, representation, 
or action-related functions (Postle, 2006). 
In turn, it may similarly be the case that perceptual metacognition is not a unitary cognitive 
function carried out by a specialized part of the brain, but rather emerges as the result of the 
coordination of a set of more basic component perceptual/cognitive/neural processes. For instance, as 
discussed in the Discussion section of Chapter 2, if dlPFC houses a common mechanism that contributes 
to both manipulation of WM contents and perceptual metacognition, at least two possibilities for such a 
mechanism present themselves. One is that dlPFC may contribute to the re-organization and re-
representation of sensory information, as captured by the phenomenon of “chunking” large amounts of 
information into more parsimonious, higher-level units of organization in memory tasks (Bor et al., 
2003), and the idea that perceptual metacognition may involve the construction of meta-
representations or “representational re-descriptions” of sensory information (Nelson & Narens, 1990; 
Schooler, 2002; Timmermans, Schilbach, Pasquali, & Cleeremans, 2012). Another possible common 
mechanism concerns the phenomenon of response selection in working memory (Curtis & D’Esposito, 
2003), whereby a mapping from the current context to an appropriate motor response is computed, and 
the phenomenon of criterion setting in metacognition, whereby a mapping from perceptual information 





 A similar consideration is suggested by the findings of Chapter 4, in which aPFC appears to 
contribute to the dynamics of both perceptual and metacognitive vigilance. The pattern of results in that 
series of studies suggested that while aPFC supports metacognitive sensitivity at the outset of a block of 
trials, as time wears on and perceptual sensitivity potentially declines due to vigilance decrement 
effects, aPFC shifts to supporting perceptual sensitivity and no longer supports metacognition. Here 
again is a case where a metacognitive process seems to share crucial yet limited resources with a 
seemingly unrelated cognitive function (in this case, perceptual vigilance). Perhaps, then, perceptual 
metacognition arises as an emergent phenomenon from the right coordination of a set of component 
neural processes, processes that are themselves not intrinsically “metacognitive” but rather can serve as 
essential components to a wide array of other complex functions that are similarly dynamic and 
emergent, such as working memory and perceptual vigilance. 
However, from a broader point of view, the evaluative function of subjective judgments of 
perceptual clarity and confidence do seem to dovetail well with the overall function or purpose of 
prefrontal cortex, which can be characterized as the sophisticated control of behavior, taking into 
account context, contingencies, and goals at various levels of conceptual abstraction and temporal 
separation (Fuster, 2001; Koechlin & Summerfield, 2007; Badre, 2008; Passingham & Wise, 2012). 
Metacognitive judgments presumably participate in this process by modulating stimulus-response 
mappings according to confidence in the perceptual identification of the stimulus. For instance, the 
same perceptual identification of a message written on a sign in the distance can be occasion for slightly 
different behaviors depending on the level of confidence with which the perceptual identification is 
made. If one reads the message clearly and fluently, one might resume the previously ongoing behavior; 
however, had one been less confident in the perceptual identification of the message, one might have 
looked at the sign longer or approached it in order to get a better look, until metacognitive evaluation 





engaged in a new pursuit. Such a role for perceptual metacognition in the control of behavior would be 
in keeping with theories postulating an anterior-posterior organization of abstract-concrete motor 
planning functions (Koechlin & Summerfield, 2007; Badre, 2008), to the extent that metacognition is 
generally associated with more anterior regions of lateral PFC such as anterior, rostrolateral, and 
dorsolateral PFC and plausibly serves the general function of supporting relatively sophisticated and 
abstract modulations of sensorimotor processing. 
 
Functions of subjective visual processing 
 We have argued that subjective visual processing is a kind of secondary, late stage process that 
supports explicitly represented knowledge about first-order perceptual processing, but does not directly 
participate in that first-order perceptual processing by means of which perceptual decisions about the 
state of the objective world are derived. On the way to arriving at this view, we have emphasized the 
need to treat objective perceptual performance as a confound in the study of subjective visual 
processing, and that only when such objective processing is “factored out” can we make inferences 
specific to subjective vision. This may give one the impression that there is not much work left for 
subjective visual processing to do in the cognitive economy. Indeed, many cognitive functions that once 
were thought to require conscious awareness, such as relatively complex cognitive control functions 
involved with task cuing (Lau & Passingham, 2006) and response inhibition (Van Gaal, Lamme, & 
Ridderinkhof, 2010), have been shown to be functional even when the relevant stimuli are not 
consciously perceived (Lau, 2009). In the face of such considerations, it may seem as if subjective visual 
processing is essentially epiphenomenal, and that in principle any function could potentially be carried 
out unconsciously. 
 However, even if subjective visual processing does not directly participate in the objective 





awareness of the stimuli triggering the relevant control mechanisms, there are still several candidate 
functions for subjective visual processing that are congruent with its role as a purely evaluative function 
that does not directly intervene in first-order objective visual processing. 
 
Initiation of spontaneous behavior 
 It is possible that demonstrations of the influence of unconscious stimuli on ongoing behavior 
may be relatively limited to the modulation of a behavior that has been initiated for some other 
reason—e.g. as a response to a consciously perceived stimulus, or as a result of task instruction, rather 
than resulting from spontaneous initiation. That is to say, visual awareness and/or higher levels of visual 
clarity or confidence may support a unique role for the spontaneous initiation of behavior or adoption of 
task sets. For instance, although blindsight patients can perform visual discriminations above chance 
level when prompted to make forced choice responses (Weiskrantz, 1997), their absence of visual 
awareness entails that they will not knowingly initiate spontaneous action on the basis of visual 
stimulation, since in a sense they do not know about (are not aware of) whatever objective visual 
processing is taking place. By way of illustration, de Gelder et al. (2008) reported that a blindsight 
patient with complete cortical blindness across the whole visual field, TN, was successfully able to 
skillfully navigate a hallway filled with obstacles. In a news article about the study, de Gelder is quoted 
as saying, “At first he [TN] was nervous. He said he wouldn't be able to do it because he was blind.” 
Thus, although TN was able to navigate the hallway quite skillfully even without visual awareness, his 
residual visual processing was not sufficient to prompt the spontaneous execution of such behavior. 
 
Information seeking, error monitoring, and error correction 
Metacognitive evaluations of perceptual clarity and confidence are closely related to error 





detecting and correcting their own errors in simple tasks without external feedback (Rabbitt, 1966), 
particularly under conditions of high time pressure (Yeung & Summerfield, 2012). Subjects also tend to 
have longer reaction times on trials following errors (Rabbitt, 1966). Error correction and post-error 
slowing demonstrate a direct way in which metacognitive evaluation can influence behavior. (Although 
post-error slowing may also be attributed to objective performance confounds in the comparison of 
correct and incorrect trials.) A related concept is that low levels of confidence may prompt information 
seeking behavior in order to resolve the perceptual uncertainty. 
 
Learning 
A phenomenon known as the “hypercorrection effect” in the memory literature concerns the 
influence of confidence upon error correction (Butterfield & Metcalfe, 2001; Butterfield & Mangels, 
2003; Fazio & Marsh, 2010). When subjects perform a memory test and receive performance feedback, 
on a subsequent re-test of the same items they are more likely to correct first-test errors that were 
endorsed with high, rather than low, confidence. Thus, confidence modulates learning following 
performance feedback, such that larger discrepancies between expectation and reality occasion 
stronger learning.  
 
Communication 
Accurate reporting of perceptual confidence can facilitate group decision making, and in fact 
two freely communicating observers who accurately calibrate their confidence ratings can perform 
better than a lone observer (Bahrami et al., 2010). Thus, metacognitive evaluation can facilitate the 







 This dissertation demonstrates that objective and subjective aspects of visual processing are not 
only conceptually distinct, but are also functionally dissociable and dependent upon different brain 
structures. Converging evidence suggests that metacognitive judgments of perceptual clarity and 
confidence are subserved by a high-level processing stage housed in regions of anterior and lateral 
prefrontal cortex. Our methodological approach of controlling for performance confounds and situating 
analysis of metacognitive performance in a signal detection theory framework will hopefully continue to 
shed light in the future on the evolving field of research concerning the relationship between objective 
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Signal detection theory analysis of type 1 and type 2 data: d’ and meta-d’ 
 
Introduction 
Signal detection theory (SDT; Green & Swets, 1966; Macmillan & Creelman, 2005) has provided 
a simple yet powerful methodology for distinguishing between sensitivity (an observer’s ability to 
discriminate stimuli) and response bias (an observer’s standards for producing different behavioral 
responses) in stimulus discrimination tasks. In tasks where an observer rates his confidence that his 
stimulus classification was correct, it may also be of interest to characterize how well the observer 
performs in placing these confidence ratings. For convenience, we can refer to the task of classifying 
stimuli as the type 1 task, and the task of rating confidence in classification accuracy as the type 2 task 
(Clarke, Birdsall, & Tanner, 1959). As with the type 1 task, SDT treatments of the type 2 task are 
concerned with independently characterizing an observer’s type 2 sensitivity (how well confidence 
ratings discriminate between an observer’s own correct and incorrect stimulus classifications) and type 
2 response bias (the observer’s standards for reporting different levels of confidence). 
In this Appendix, we present an overview of the SDT analysis of type 1 and type 2 performance. 
We first provide a brief overview of type 1 SDT. We then demonstrate how the analysis of type 1 data 
can be extended to the type 2 task, with a discussion of how our approach compares to that of Galvin, 
Podd, Drga, & Whitmore (2003). We provide a more comprehensive methodological treatment of our 
SDT measure of type 2 sensitivity, meta-d’ (Maniscalco & Lau, 2012), than has previously been 
published.  
 
The SDT model and type 1 and type 2 ROC curves 





Suppose an observer is performing a task in which one of two possible stimulus classes (S1 or 
S2)1 is presented on each trial, and that following each stimulus presentation, the observer must classify 
that stimulus as “S1” or “S2.”2 We may define 4 possible outcomes for each trial depending on the 
stimulus and the observer’s response: hits, misses, false alarms, and correct rejections (Table A-1).  
When an S2 stimulus is shown, the observer’s response can be either a hit (a correct classification as 
“S2”) or a miss (an incorrect classification as “S1”). Similarly, when S1 is shown, the observer’s response 
can be either a correct rejection (correct classification as “S1”) or a false alarm (incorrect classification as 
“S2”).3  
A summary of the observer’s performance is provided by hit rate and false alarm rate4: 
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                      (          |        )  
 (      S2          )
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where n(C) denotes a count of the total number of trials satisfying the condition C. 
Relative operating characteristic (ROC) curves define how changes in hit rate and false alarm 
rate are related. For instance, an observer may become more reluctant to produce “S2” responses if he  
                                                 
1
 Traditionally, S1 is taken to be the “signal absent” stimulus and S2 the “signal present” stimulus. Here we follow 
Macmillan & Creelman (2005) in using the more neutral terms S1 and S2 for the sake of generality. 
 
2
 We will adopt the convention of placing “S1” and “S2” in quotation marks whenever they denote an observer’s 
classification of a stimulus, and omitting quotation marks when these denote the objective stimulus identity. 
 
3
 These category names are more intuitive when thinking of S1 and S2 as “signal absent” and “signal present.” 
Then a hit is a successful detection of the signal, a miss is a failure to detect the signal, a correct rejection is an 
accurate assessment that no signal was presented, and a false alarm is a detection of a signal where none existed. 
 
4
 Since hit rate and miss rate sum to 1, miss rate does not provide any extra information beyond that provided by 





  Response 
  “S1” “S2” 
Stimulus S1 Correct Rejection (CR) False Alarm (FA) 
 S2 Miss Hit 
 
Table A-1. Possible outcomes for the type 1 task. 
 
 
is informed that S2 stimuli will rarely be presented, or if he is instructed that incorrect “S2” responses 
will be penalized more heavily than incorrect “S1” responses (e.g. Tanner & Swets, 1954; Macmillan & 
Creelman, 2005); such manipulations would tend to lower the observer’s probability of responding “S2,” 
and thus reduce false alarm rate and hit rate. By producing multiple such manipulations that alter the 
observer’s propensity to respond “S2,” multiple (FAR, HR) pairs can be collected and used to construct 
the ROC curve, which plots hit rate against false alarm rate (Figure A-1 B5).  
On the presumption that such manipulations affect only the observer’s standards for responding 
“S2,” and not his underlying ability to discriminate S1 stimuli from S2 stimuli, the properties of the ROC 
curve as a whole should be informative regarding the observer’s sensitivity in discriminating S1 from S2, 
independent of the observer’s overall  response bias for producing “S2” responses. The observer’s 
sensitivity thus determines the set of possible (FAR, HR) pairs the observer can produce (i.e. the ROC 
curve), whereas the observer’s response bias determines which amongst those possible pairs is actually 
exhibited, depending on whether the observer is conservative or liberal in responding “S2.” Higher 
sensitivity is associated with greater area underneath the ROC curve, whereas more conservative  
 
                                                 
5 Note that the example ROC curve in Figure A-1 B is depicted as having been constructed from confidence data 
(Figure A-1 A), rather than from direct experimental manipulations on the observer’s criterion for responding “S2”. 






Figure A-1. Signal detection theory models of type 1 and type 2 ROC curves. (A) Type 1 SDT model. On 
each trial, a stimulus generates an internal response x within an observer, who must use x to decide 
whether the stimulus was S1 or S2. For each stimulus type, x is drawn from a normal distribution. The 
distance between these distributions is d’, which measures the observer’s ability to discriminate S1 from 
S2. The stimulus is classified as “S2” if x exceeds a decision criterion c, and “S1” otherwise. In this 
example, the observer also rates decision confidence on a scale of 1 – 3 by comparing x to the additional 
response-specific type 2 criteria (dashed vertical lines). (B)Type 1 ROC curve. d’ and c determine false 
alarm rate (FAR) and hit rate (HR). By holding d’ constant and changing c, a characteristic set of (FAR, 
HR) points—the ROC curve—can be generated. In this example, shapes on the ROC curve mark the (FAR, 
HR) generated when using the corresponding criterion in panel A to classify the stimulus. (Note that, 
because this type 1 ROC curve is generated in part by the type 2 criteria in panel 1A, it is actually a 
pseudo-type 1 ROC curve, as discussed later in this paper.) (C) Type 2 task for “S2” responses. Consider 





panel A exceeding c. Then the S2 stimulus distribution corresponds to correct trials, and the S1 
distribution to incorrect trials. The placement of the type 2 criteria determines the probability of high 
confidence for correct and incorrect trials—type 2 HR and type 2 FAR. d’ and c  jointly determine to 
what extent correct and incorrect trials for each response type are distinguishable. (D) Type 2 ROC curve 
for “S2” responses. The distributions in panel C can be used to derive type 2 FAR and HR for “S2” 
responses. By holding d’ and c constant and changing c2,”S2”, a set of type 2 (FAR, HR) points for “S2” 
responses—a response-specific type 2 ROC curve—can be generated. In this example, shapes on the 
ROC curve mark the (FAR2,”S2”, HR2,”S2”) generated when using the corresponding criterion in panel C to 
rate confidence.  
 
 
response bias is associated with (FAR, HR) points falling more towards the lower-left portion of the ROC 
curve.  
Measures of task performance have implied ROC curves (Swets, 1986a; Macmillan & Creelman, 
2005). An implied ROC curve for a given measure of performance is a set of (FAR, HR) pairs that yield the 
same value for the measure. Thus, to the extent that empirical ROC curves dissociate sensitivity from 
bias, they provide an empirical target for theoretical measures of performance to emulate. If a proposed 
measure of sensitivity does not have implied ROC curves that match the properties of empirical ROC 
curves, then this measure cannot be said to provide a bias-free measure of sensitivity. 
A core empirical strength of signal detection theory (SDT; Green & Swets, 1966; Macmillan & 
Creelman, 2005; Figure A-1 A) is that it provides a simple computational model that provides close fits to 
empirical ROC curves (Green & Swets, 1966; Swets, 1986b). According to SDT, the observer performs the 
task of discriminating S1 from S2 by evaluating internal responses along a decision axis. Every time an S1 
stimulus is shown, it produces in the mind of the observer an internal response drawn from a Gaussian 





responses. For the sake of simplicity, in the following we will assume that the probability density 
functions for S1 and S2 have an equal standard deviation σ. 
The observer is able to discriminate S1 from S2 just to the extent that the internal responses 
produced by these stimuli are distinguishable, such that better sensitivity for discriminating S1 from S2 is 
associated with larger separation between the S1 and S2 internal response distributions. The SDT 
measure of sensitivity, d’, is thus the distance between the means of the S1 and S2 distributions, 
measured in units of their common standard deviation: 
 
    




By convention, the internal response where the S1 and S2 distributions intersect is defined to 
have the value of zero, so that µS2 = σ d’ / 2 and µS1 = – σ d’ / 2. For simplicity, and without loss of 
generality, we can set σ = 1. 
In order to classify an internal response x on a given trial as originating from an S1 or S2 
stimulus, the observer compares the internal response to a decision criterion, c, and only produces “S2” 
classifications for internal responses that surpass the criterion.  
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Since hit rate is the probability of responding “S2” when an S2 stimulus is shown, it can be 
calculated on the SDT model as the area underneath the portion of the S2 probability density function 
that exceeds c. Since the cumulative distribution function for the normal distribution with mean µ and 
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then hit rate can be derived from the parameters of the SDT model as 
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where omitting the σ parameter in ϕ is understood to be equivalent to setting σ = 1. 
By systematically altering the value of c while holding d’ constant, a set of (FAR, HR) pairs 
ranging between (0, 0) and (1, 1) can be generated, tracing out the shape of the ROC curve (Figure A-1 
B). The family of ROC curves predicted by SDT matches well with empirical ROC curves across a range of 
experimental tasks and conditions (Green & Swets, 1966; Swets, 1986a; Swets, 1986b). 
The parameters of the SDT model can be recovered from a given (FAR, HR) pair as 
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where z is the inverse of the normal cumulative distribution function. Thus, SDT analysis allows us to 
separately characterize an observer’s sensitivity (d’) and response bias (c) on the basis of a single (FAR, 
HR) pair, obviating the need to collect an entire empirical ROC curve in order to separately characterize 
sensitivity and bias—provided that the assumptions of the SDT model hold. 
 
Type 2 SDT 
Suppose we extend the empirical task described above, such that after classifying the stimulus 
as “S1” or “S2,” the observer must provide a confidence rating that characterizes the likelihood of the 
stimulus classification being correct. This confidence rating task can be viewed as a secondary 
discrimination task. Just as the observer first had to discriminate whether the stimulus was S1 or S2 by 
means of providing a stimulus classification response, the observer now must discriminate whether that 
stimulus classification response itself was correct or incorrect by means of providing a confidence 
rating.6 Following convention, we will refer to the task of classifying the stimulus as the “type 1” task, 
and the task of classifying the accuracy of the stimulus classification as the “type 2” task (Clarke et al., 
1959; Galvin et al., 2003). 
 
Type 2 hit rates and false alarm rates 
A similar set of principles for the analysis of the type 1 task may be applied to the type 2 task. 
Consider the simple case where the observer rates confidence as either “high” or “low.” We can then 
distinguish 4 possible outcomes in the type 2 task: high confidence correct trials, low confidence correct 
                                                 
6
 In principle, since the observer should always choose the stimulus classification response that is deemed most 
likely to be correct, then in a two-alternative task he should always judge that the chosen response is more likely 
to be correct than it is to be incorrect. Intuitively, then, the type 2 decision actually consists in deciding whether 
the type 1 response is likely to be correct or not, where the standard for what level of confidence merits being 
labeled as “likely to be correct” is determined by a subjective criterion than can be either conservative or liberal. 
Nonetheless, viewing the type 2 task as a discrimination between correct and incorrect stimulus classifications 






trials, low confidence incorrect trials, and high confidence incorrect trials. By direct analogy with the 
type 1 analysis, we may refer to these outcomes as type 2 hits, type 2 misses, type 2 correct rejections, 
and type 2 false alarms, respectively (Table A-2).7 
Type 2 hit rate and type 2 false alarm rate summarize an observer’s type 2 performance and 
may be calculated as 
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Since the binary classification task we have been discussing has two kinds of correct trials (hits 
and correct rejections) and two kinds of incorrect trials (misses and false alarms), the classification of 
type 2 performance can be further subdivided into a response-specific analysis, where we consider type 
2 performance only for trials where the type 1 stimulus classification response was “S1” or “S2” (Table 
A-3).8 
                                                 
7
 The analogy is more intuitive when thinking of S1 as “signal absent” and S2 as “signal present”. Then the type 2 
analogue of “signal absent” is an incorrect stimulus classification, whereas the analogue of “signal present” is a 
correct stimulus classification. The type 2 task can then be thought of as involving the detection of this type 2 
“signal.” 
 
8 It is also possible to conduct a stimulus-specific analysis and construct stimulus-specific type 2 ROC curves. For S1 
stimuli, this would consist in a plot of p(high conf|correct rejection) vs p(high conf|false alarm). Likewise for S2 
stimuli—p(high conf|hit) vs p(high conf|miss). However, as will be made clear later in the text, the present 
approach to analyzing type 2 ROC curves in terms of the type 1 SDT model requires each type 2 (FAR, HR) pair to 
be generated by the application of a type 2 criterion to two overlapping distributions. For stimulus-specific type 2 
data, the corresponding type 1 model consists of only one stimulus distribution, with separate type 2 criteria for 
“S1” and “S2” responses generating the type 2 FAR and type 2 HR. (e.g. for the S2 stimulus, a type 2 criterion for 
“S1” responses rates confidence for type 1 misses, and a separate type 2 criterion for “S2” responses rates 
confidence for type 1 hits.) Thus there is no analogue of meta-d’ for stimulus-specific type 2 data, since d’ is only 
defined with respect to the relationship between two stimulus distributions, whereas stimulus-specific analysis is 





  Confidence 
  Low High 
Accuracy Incorrect Type 2 Correct Rejection Type 2 False Alarm 
 Correct Type 2 Miss Type 2 Hit 
 
Table A-2. Possible outcomes for the type 2 task. 
 
 
    Confidence 




(Type 1 Miss) 
CR2,”S1” FA2,”S1” 
Correct 




(Type 1 False Alarm) 
CR2,”S2” FA2,”S2” 
Correct 
(Type 1 Hit) 
Miss2,”S2” Hit2,”S2” 
 
Table A-3. Possible outcomes for the type 2 task, contingent on type 1 response (i.e. response-specific 
type 2 outcomes) 
 
 
Thus, when considering type 2 performance only for “S1” responses, 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
could be conducted by positing how the type 2 criteria on either side of the type 1 criterion are coordinated, or 
similarly by supposing that the observer rates confidence according to an overall type 2 decision variable. For more 
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where the subscript “S1” indicates that these are type 2 data for type 1 “S1” responses. 
Similarly for “S2” responses, 
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From the above definitions, it follows that overall type 2 FAR and HR are weighted averages of 
the response-specific type 2 FARs and HRs, where the weights are determined by the proportion of 
correct and incorrect trials originating from each response type: 
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Confidence rating data may be richer than a mere binary classification. In the general case, the 
observer may rate confidence on either a discrete or continuous scale ranging from 1 to H. In this case, 
we can arbitrarily select a value h, 1 < h ≤ H, such that all confidence ratings greater than or equal to h 
are classified as “high confidence” and all others, “low confidence.” We can denote this choice of 
imposing a binary classification upon the confidence data by writing e.g.  
      
, where the superscript 
conf=h indicates that this type 2 hit rate was calculated using a classification scheme where h was the 
smallest confidence rating considered to be “high.” Thus, for instance, 
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Each choice of h generates a type 2 (FAR, HR) pair, and so calculating these for multiple values of 
h allows for the construction of a type 2 ROC curve with multiple points. When using a discrete 
confidence rating scale ranging from 1 to H, there are H – 1 ways of selecting h, allowing for the 
construction of a type 2 ROC curve with H – 1 points.  
 
Adding response-specific type 2 criteria to the type 1 SDT model to capture type 2 data 
As with the type 1 task, type 2 ROC curves allow us to separately assess an observer’s sensitivity 
(how well confidence ratings discriminate correct from incorrect trials) and response bias (the overall 
propensity for reporting high confidence) in the type 2 task. However, fitting a computational model to 
type 2 ROC curves is somewhat more complicated than in the type 1 case. It is not sufficient to assume 





analogy to the S1 and S2 distributions of type 1 SDT. The reason for this is that specifying the 
parameters of the type 1 SDT model—d’ and c—places strong constraints on the probability density 
functions for correct and incorrect trials, and these derived distributions are not normally distributed 
(Galvin et al., 2003). In addition to this theoretical consideration, it has also been empirically 
demonstrated that conducting a type 2 SDT analysis that assumes normal distributions for correct and 
incorrect trials does not give a good fit to data (Evans & Azzopardi, 2007).  
Thus, the structure of the SDT model for type 2 performance must take into account the 
structure of the SDT model for type 1 performance. Galvin et al. (2003) presented an approach for the 
SDT analysis of type 2 data based on analytically deriving formulae for the type 2 probability density 
functions under a suitable transformation of the type 1 decision axis. Here we present a simpler 
alternative approach on the basis of which response-specific type 2 ROC curves can be derived directly 
from the type 1 model.  
In order for the type 1 SDT model to characterize type 2 data, we first need an added 
mechanism whereby confidence ratings can be generated. This can be accomplished by supposing that 
the observer simply uses additional decision criteria, analogous to the type 1 criterion c, to generate a 
confidence rating on the basis of the internal response on a given trial, x. In the simplest case, the 
observer makes a binary confidence rating—high or low—and thus needs to use two additional decision 
criteria to rate confidence for each kind of type 1 response. Call these response-specific type 2 criteria c2, 
”S1” and c2,”S2”, where c2, “S1” < c and c2, “S2” > c. Intuitively, confidence increases as the internal response x 
becomes more distant from c, i.e. as the internal response becomes more likely to have been generated 
by one stimulus distribution or the other9. More formally, 
 
                                                 
9 See “Comparison of the current approach to that of Galvin et al (2003)” and footnote 11 for a more detailed 
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In the more general case of a discrete confidence scale ranging from 1 to H,  then H – 1 type 2 
criteria are required to rate confidence for each response type. (See e.g. Figure A-1 A, where two type 2 
criteria on left/right of the type 1 criterion allow for confidence for “S1”/“S2” responses to be rated on a 
scale of 1 – 3.) We may define  
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where e.g.         is a tuple containing the H – 1 type 2 criteria for “S1” responses. Each        
      
 denotes 
the type 2 criterion such that internal responses more extreme (i.e. more distant from the type 1 
criterion) than        
      
 are associated with confidence ratings of least y. More specifically, 
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The type 1 and type 2 decision criteria must have a certain ordering in order for the SDT model 
to be meaningful. Response-specific type 2 criteria corresponding to higher confidence ratings must be 
more distant from c than type 2 criteria corresponding to lower confidence ratings. Additionally, c must 
be larger than all type 2 criteria for “S1” responses but smaller than all type 2 criteria for “S2” responses. 
For convenience, we may define 
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The ordering of decision criteria in            from first to last is the same as the ordering of the 
criteria from left to right when displayed on an SDT graph (e.g. Figure A-1 A). These decision criteria are 
properly ordered only if each element of            is at least as large as the previous element, i.e. only 
if the Boolean function  (          ) defined below is true: 
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It will be necessary to use this function later on when discussing how to fit SDT models to type 2 
data. 
 
Calculating response-specific type 2 (FAR, HR) from the type 1 SDT model with response-specific type 2 
criteria 
Now let us consider how to calculate response-specific type 2 HR and type 2 FAR from the type 1 
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As discussed above, p(hit), the hit rate, is the probability that an S2 stimulus generates an 
internal response that exceeds the type 1 criterion c. Similarly, p(conf   h, hit), the probability of a hit 
endorsed with high confidence, is just the probability that an S2 stimulus generates an internal response 
that exceeds the high-confidence type 2 criterion for “S2” responses,        
      
. Thus, we can 
straightforwardly characterize the probabilities in the numerator and denominator of        
      
 in 
terms of the type 1 SDT parameters, as follows:  
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By similar reasoning, 
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And likewise for “S1” responses, 
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Figure A-1 C illustrates how type 2 (FAR, HR) arise from type 1 d’ and c along with a type 2 
criterion. For instance, suppose h = 3. Then the type 2 hit rate for “S2” responses,        
      
, is the 
probability of a high confidence hit (the area in the S2 distribution beyond        
      
) divided by the 
probability of a hit (the area in the S2 distribution beyond c). 
By systematically altering the value of the type 2 criteria while holding d’ and c constant, a set of 
(FAR2, HR2) pairs ranging between (0, 0) and (1, 1) can be generated, tracing out a curvilinear prediction 
for the shape of the type 2 ROC curve (Figure A-1 D). Thus, according to this SDT account, specifying type 
1 sensitivity (d’) and response bias (c) is already sufficient to determine response-specific type 2 
sensitivity (i.e. the family of response-specific type 2 ROC curves).  
 
Comparison of the current approach to that of Galvin et al (2003) 
Before continuing with our treatment of SDT analysis of type 2 data, we will make some 
comparisons between this approach and the one described in Galvin et al. (2003).  
 
SDT approaches to type 2 performance 
Galvin et al were concerned with characterizing the overall type 2 ROC curve, rather than 
response-specific type 2 ROC curves. On their modeling approach, an (FAR2, HR2) pair can be generated 
by setting a single type 2 criterion on a type 2 decision axis. All internal responses that exceed this type 2 





location of this type 2 criterion on the decision axis, the entire overall type 2 ROC curve can be traced 
out.  
However, if the internal response x is used to make the binary confidence decision in this way, 
the ensuing type 2 ROC curve behaves oddly, typically containing regions where it extends below the 
line of chance performance (Galvin et al, 2003). This suboptimal behavior is not surprising, in that 
comparing the raw value of x to a single criterion value essentially recapitulates the decision rule used in 
the type 1 task and does not take into account the relationship between x and the observer’s type 1 
criterion, which is crucial for evaluating type 1 performance. The solution is that some transformation of 
x must be used as the type 2 decision variable, ideally one that depends upon both x and c.  
For instance, consider the transformation t(x) = |x – c|. This converts the initial raw value of the 
internal response, x, into the distance of x from the type 1 criterion. This transformed value can then 
plausibly be compared to a single type 2 criterion to rate confidence, e.g. an observer might rate 
confidence as high whenever t(x) > 1. Other transformations for the type 2 decision variable are 
possible, and the choice is not arbitrary, since different choices for type 2 decision variables can lead to 
different predictions for the type 2 ROC curve (Galvin et al, 2003). The optimal type 2 ROC curve (i.e. the 
one that maximizes area under the curve) is derived by using the likelihood ratio of the type 2 
probability density functions as the type 2 decision variable (Galvin et al, 2003; Green & Swets, 1966). 
We have adopted a different approach thus far. Rather than characterizing an overall (FAR2, 
HR2) pair as arising from the comparison of a single type 2 decision variable to a single type 2 criterion, 
we have focused on response-specific (FAR2, HR2) data arising from comparisons of the type 1 internal 
response x to separate type 2 decision criteria for “S1” and “S2” responses (e.g. Figure A-1 A). Thus, our 
approach would characterize the overall (FAR2, HR2) as arising from a pair of response-specific type 2 
criteria set on either side of the type 1 criterion on the type 1 decision axis, rather than from a single 





2 criteria other than that they stand in appropriate ordinal relationships to eachother. For the sake of 
brevity in comparing these two approaches, in the following we will refer to Galvin et al’s approach as G 
and the current approach as C. 
 
Type 2 decision rules and response-specific type 2 criterion setting 
Notice that choosing a reasonable type 2 decision variable for G is equivalent to setting 
constraints on the relationship between type 2 criteria for “S1” and “S2” responses on C. For instance, 
on G suppose that the type 2 decision variable is defined as t(x) = |x – c| and confidence is high if t(x) > 
1. On C, this is equivalent to setting t(c2,”S1”) = t(c2,”S2”) = |c2,”S1” – c| = |c2,”S2” – c| = 1. In other words, 
assuming (on G) the general rule that confidence is high whenever the distance between x and c exceeds 
1 requires (on C) that the type 2 criteria for each response type both satisfy this property of being 1 unit 
away from c. Any other way of setting the type 2 criteria for C would yield outcomes inconsistent with 
the decision rule posited by G. Similarly, if the type 2 decision rule is that confidence is high when type 2 
likelihood ratio LR2(x) > cLR2, this same rule on C would require LR2(c2,”S1”) = LR2(c2,”S2”) = cLR2, i.e. that type 
2 criteria for both response types be set at the locations of x on either side of c corresponding to a type 
2 likelihood ratio of cLR2. 
On G, choosing a suboptimal type 2 decision variable can lead to decreased area under the 
overall type 2 ROC curve. This can be understood on C as being related to the influence of response-
specific type 2 criterion placement on the response-specific type 2 (FAR, HR) points, which in turn affect 
the overall type 2 (FAR, HR) points. As shown above, overall type 2 FAR and HR are weighted averages of 
the corresponding response-specific type 2 FARs and HRs. But computing a weighted average for two 
(FAR, HR) pairs on a concave down ROC curve will yield a new (FAR, HR) pair that lies below the original 
ROC curve. As a consequence, more exaggerated differences in the response-specific type 2 FAR and HR 





down the area below the overall type 2 ROC curve. Thus, the overall type 2 ROC curve may decrease 
even while the response-specific curves stay constant, depending on how criterion setting for each 
response type is coordinated. This reduced area under the overall type 2 ROC curve on C due to 
response-specific type 2 criterion placement is closely related to reduced area under the overall type 2 
ROC curve on G due to choosing a suboptimal type 2 decision variable.  
For example, consider the SDT model where d’ = 2, c = 0, c2,”S1” = -1, and c2,”S1” = 1. This model 
yields FAR2,”S1” = FAR2,”S2” = FAR2 = .14 and HR2,”S1” = HR2,”S2” = HR2 = .59. The type 1 criterion is optimally 
placed and the type 2 criteria are symmetrically placed around it. This arrangement of criteria on C turns 
out to be equivalent to using the type 2 likelihood ratio on G, and thus yields an optimal type 2 
performance. Now consider the SDT model where d’ = 2, c = 0, c2,”S1” = -1.5, and c2,”S1” = .76. This model 
yields FAR2,”S1” = .04, HR2,”S1” = .37, FAR2,”S2” = .25, HR2,”S2” = .71, and overall FAR2 = .14, HR2 = .54. 
Although d’ and c are the same as in the previous example, now the type 2 criteria are set 
asymmetrically about c, yielding different outcomes for the type 2 FAR and HR for “S1” and “S2” 
responses. This has the effect of yielding a lower overall HR2 (.54 vs .59) in spite of happening to yield 
the same FAR2 (.14). Thus, this asymmetric arrangement of response-specific type 2 criteria yields worse 
performance on the overall type 2 ROC curve than the symmetric case for the same values of d’ and c. 
On G, this can be understood as being the result of choosing a suboptimal type 2 decision variable in the 
second example (i.e. a decision variable that is consistent with the way the response-specific type 2 
criteria have been defined on C).In this case, the asymmetric placement of the response-specific type 2 
criteria is inconsistent with a type 2 decision variable based on the type 2 likelihood ratio. 
 
A method for assessing overall type 2 sensitivity based on the approach of Galvin et al 
In the upcoming section, we will discuss our methodology for quantifying type 2 sensitivity with 





response-specific type 2 ROC curves for both “S1” and “S2” responses, and in this way provides a 
measure of overall type 2 sensitivity. However, in doing so, it treats the relationships of type 2 criteria 
across response types as purely a matter of criterion setting. However, as we have discussed, 
coordination of type 2 criterion setting could also be seen as arising from the construction of a type 2 
decision variable, where the choice of decision variable influences area under the overall type 2 ROC 
curve. We take it to be a substantive conceptual, and perhaps empirical, question as to whether it is 
preferable to characterize these effects as a matter of criterion setting (coordinating response-specific 
type 2 criteria) or sensitivity (constructing a type 2 decision variable). However, if one were to decide 
that for some purpose it were better to view this as a sensitivity effect, then the characterization of type 
2 performance provided by Galvin et al may be preferable to that of the current approach.  
In the interest of recognizing this, we provide free Matlab code available online (see note at the 
end of the manuscript) that implements one way of using Galvin et al’s approach to evaluate an 
observer’s overall type 2 performance. Given the parameters of an SDT model, this code outputs the 
theoretically optimal10 overall type 2 ROC curve—i.e. the overall type 2 ROC curve based on type 2 
likelihood ratio, which has the maximum possible area under the curve. Maniscalco & Lau (2012), 
building on the suggestions of Galvin et al (2003),  proposed that one way of evaluating an observer’s 
type 2 performance is to compare her empirical type 2 ROC curve with the theoretical type 2 ROC curve, 
given her type 1 performance. By comparing an observer’s empirical overall type 2 ROC curve with the 
theoretically optimal overall type 2 ROC curve based on type 2 likelihood ratios, the observer’s overall 
type 2 sensitivity can be assessed with respect to the SDT-optimal level. This approach will capture 
potential variation in area under the overall type 2 ROC curve that is ignored (treated as a response-
specific criterion effect) by the meta-d’ approach. 
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Advantages of the current approach 
Our SDT treatment of type 2 performance has certain advantages over that of Galvin et al. One 
advantage is that it does not require making an explicit assumption regarding what overall type 2 
decision variable an observer uses, or even that the observer constructs such an overall type 2 decision 
variable to begin with.11 This is because our approach allows the type 2 criteria for each response to vary 
independently, rather than positing a fixed relationship between their locations. Thus, if an observer 
does construct an overall type 2 decision variable, our treatment will capture this implicitly by means of 
the relationship between the response-specific type 2 criteria; and if an observer does not use an overall 
type 2 decision variable to begin with, our treatment can accommodate this behavior. The question of 
what overall type 2 decision variables, if any, observers tend to use is a substantive empirical question, 
and so it is preferable to avoid making assumptions on this matter if possible. 
A second, related advantage is that our approach is potentially more flexible than Galvin et al’s 
in capturing the behavior of response-specific type 2 ROC curves, without loss of flexibility in capturing 
the overall type 2 ROC curve. (Since overall type 2 ROC curves depend on the response-specific curves, 
as shown above, our focus on characterizing the response-specific curves does not entail a deficit in 
capturing the overall curve.) A third advantage is that our approach provides a simple way to derive 
response-specific type 2 ROC curves from the type 1 SDT model, whereas deriving the overall type 2 ROC 
curve is more complex under Galvin et al’s approach and depends upon the type 2 decision variable 
being assumed. 
 
Characterizing type 2 sensitivity in terms of type 1 SDT: meta-d’  
                                                 
11
 Of course, our approach must at least implicitly assume a type 2 decision variable within each response type. In 
our treatment, the implicit type 2 decision variable for each response type is just the distance of x from c. 
However, for the analysis of response-specific type 2 performance for the equal variance SDT model, distance from 
criterion and type 2 likelihood ratio are equivalent decision variables. This is because they vary monotonically with 






Since response-specific type 2 ROC curves can be derived directly from d’ and c on the SDT 
model, this entails a tight theoretical relationship between type 1 and type 2 performance. One practical 
consequence is that type 2 sensitivity—the empirical type 2 ROC curves—can be quantified in terms of 
the type 1 SDT parameters d’ and c (Maniscalco & Lau, 2012). However, it is necessary to explicitly 
differentiate instances when d’ is meant to characterize type 1 performance from those instances when 
d’ (along with c) is meant to characterize type 2 performance. Here we adopt the convention of using 
the variable names meta-d’ and meta-c to refer to type 1 SDT parameters when used to characterize 
type 2 performance. We will refer to the type 1 SDT model as a whole, when used to characterize type 2 
performance, as the meta-SDT model. Essentially, d’ and c describe the type 1 SDT model fit to the type 
1 ROC curve12, whereas meta-d’ and meta-c – the meta-SDT model—quantify the type 1 SDT model 
when used exclusively to fit type 2 ROC curves.   
How do we go about using the type 1 SDT model to quantify type 2 performance? There are 
several choices to make before a concrete method can be proposed.  In the course of discussing these 
issues, we will put forth the methodological approach originally proposed by Maniscalco & Lau (2012). 
 
Which type 2 ROC curves? 
As discussed in the preceding section “Comparison of the current approach to that of Galvin et 
al (2003),” we find the meta-SDT fit that provides the best simultaneous fit to the response-specific type 
2 ROC curves for “S1” and “S2” responses, rather than finding a model that directly fits the overall type 2 
ROC curve. As explained in more detail in that prior discussion, we make this selection primarily because 
(1) it allows more flexibility and accuracy in fitting the overall data set, and (2) it does not require 
                                                 
12 When the multiple points on the type 1 ROC curve are obtained using confidence rating data, it is arguably 
preferable to calculate d’ and c only from the (FAR, HR) pair generated purely by the observer’s type 1 response. 
The remaining type 1 ROC points incorporate confidence rating data and depend on type 2 sensitivity, and so 





making an explicit assumption regarding what type 2 decision variable the observer might use for 
confidence rating.  
 
Which way of combining meta-d’ and meta-c? 
A second consideration is how to characterize the response-specific type 2 ROC curves using 
meta-d’ and meta-c. For the sake of simplifying the analysis, and for the sake of facilitating comparison 
between d’ and meta-d’, an appealing option is to a priori fix the value of meta-c so as to be similar to 
the empirically observed type 1 response bias c, thus effectively allowing meta-d’ to be the sole free 
parameter that characterizes type 2 sensitivity. However, since there are multiple ways of measuring 
type 1 response bias (Macmillan & Creelman, 2005), there are also multiple ways of fixing the value of 
meta-c on the basis of c. In addition to the already-introduced c, type 1 response bias can be measured 
with the relative criterion, c’: 
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This measure takes into account how extreme the criterion is, relative to the stimulus distributions.  
Bias can also be measured as β, the ratio of the probability density function for S2 stimuli to that 
of S1 stimuli at the location of the decision criterion: 
 
       
 
Figure A-2 shows an example of how c, c’, and β relate to the stimulus distributions when bias is 
fixed and d’ varies. Panel A shows an SDT diagram for d’ = 3 and c = 1. In panel B, d’ = 1 and the three 






Figure A-2. Example behavior of holding response bias constant as d’ changes for c, c’, and β. (A) An 
SDT graph where d’ = 3 and c = 1. The criterion location can also be quantified as c’ = c / d’ = 1/3 and log 
β = c * d’ = 3. (B) An SDT graph where d’ = 1. The three decision criteria plotted here represent the 
locations of the criteria that preserve the value of the corresponding response bias exhibited in panel A. 
So e.g. the criterion marked c’ in panel B has the same value of c’ as the criterion in panel A (= 1/3), and 
likewise for c (constant value of 1) and β (constant value of 3).  
 
 
measures in panel A. Arguably, c’ performs best in terms of achieving a similar “cut” between the 
stimulus distributions in panels A and B. This is an intuitive result given that c’ essentially adjusts the 
location of c according to d’. Thus, holding c’ constant ensures that, as d’ changes, the location of the 
decision criterion remains in a similar location with respect to the means of the two stimulus 
distributions.  
By choosing c’ as the measure of response bias that will be held constant in the estimation of 





similar type 1 response bias, in the sense that they have the same c’ value. This in turn allows us to 
interpret a subject’s meta-d’ in the following way: “Suppose there is an ideal subject whose behavior is 
perfectly described by SDT, and who performs this task with a similar level of response bias (i.e. same c’) 
as the actual subject. Then in order for our ideal subject to produce the actual subject’s response-
specific type 2 ROC curves, she would need her d’ to be equal to meta-d’.” 
Thus, meta-d’ can be found by fitting the type 1 SDT model to response-specific type 2 ROC 
curves, with the constraint that meta-c’ = c’. (Note that in the below we list meta-c, rather than meta-c’, 
as a parameter of the meta-SDT model. The constraint meta-c’ = c’ can thus be satisfied by ensuring 
meta-c = meta-d’ * c’.) 
 
What computational method of fitting? 
If the response-specific type 2 ROC curves contain more than one empirical (FAR2, HR2) pair, 
then in general an exact fit of the model to the data is not possible. In this case, fitting the model to the 
data requires minimizing some loss function, or maximizing some metric of goodness of fit.  
Here we consider the procedure for finding the parameters of the type 1 SDT model that 
maximize the likelihood of the response-specific type 2 data. Maximum likelihood approaches for fitting 
SDT models to type 1 ROC curves with multiple data points have been established (Ogilvie & Creelman, 
1968; Dorfman & Alf, 1969). Here we adapt these existing type 1 approaches to the type 2 case. The 
likelihood of the type 2 data can be characterized using the multinomial model as 
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Maximizing likelihood is equivalent to maximizing log-likelihood, and in practice it is typically 
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θ is the set of parameters for the meta-SDT model: 
  
  (                                    ) 
 
     (       |               ) is a count of the number of times in the data a confidence rating 
of y was provided when the stimulus and response were s and r.  
y, s, and r are indeces ranging over all possible confidence ratings, stimulus classes, and stimulus 
classification responses, respectively. 
     (       |               ) is the model-predicted probability of generating confidence 
rating y for trials where the stimulus and response were s and r, given the parameter values specified in 
θ.  
Calculation of these type 2 probabilities from the type 1 SDT model is similar to the procedure 
used to calculate the response-specific type 2 FAR and HR. For notational convenience, below we 
express these probabilities in terms of the standard SDT model parameters, omitting the “meta” prefix.  
For convenience, define 
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An illustration of how these type 2 probabilities are derived from the type 1 SDT model is 
provided in Figure A-3. 
The multinomial model used as the basis for calculating likelihood treats each discrete type 2 
outcome (conf=y | stim=s , resp=r) as an event with a fixed probability that occurred a certain number of 
times in the data set, where outcomes across trials are assumed to be statistically independent. The 
probability of the entire set of type 2 outcomes across all trials is then proportional to the product of the 
probability of each individual type 2 outcome, just as e.g. the probability of throwing 4 heads and 6 tails 
for a fair coin is proportional to .54*.56.  
Likelihood, L(θ), can be thought of as measuring how probable the empirical data is, according 
to the model parameterized with θ. A very low L(θ) indicates that the model with θ would be very 
unlikely to generate a pattern like that observed in the data. A higher L(θ) indicates that the data are 
more in line with the typical behavior of data produced by the model with θ. Mathematical optimization 






Figure A-3. Type 2 response probabilities from the SDT model. (A) An SDT graph with d’ = 2 and 
decision criteria c = .5, c2,”S1” = (0, -.5, -1), and c2,”S2” = (1, 1.5, 2). The type 1 criterion (solid vertical line) is 
set to the value of 0.5, corresponding to a conservative bias for providing “S2” responses, in order to 





criteria are used in all, segmenting the decision axis into 8 regions. Each region corresponds to one of 
the possible permutations of type 1 and type 2 responses, as there are two possible stimulus 
classifications and four possible confidence ratings. (B-I) Deriving probability of confidence rating 
contingent on type 1 response and accuracy. How would the SDT model depicted in panel (A) predict 
the probability of each confidence rating for correct “S1” responses? Since we wish to characterize “S1” 
responses, we need consider only the portion of the SDT graph falling to the left of the type 1 criterion. 
Since “S1” responses are only correct when the S1 stimulus was actually presented, we can further limit 
our consideration to internal responses generated by S1 stimuli. This is depicted in panel (B). This 
distribution is further subdivided into 4 levels of confidence by the 3 type 2 criteria (dashed vertical 
lines), where darker regions correspond to higher confidence. The area under the S1 curve in each of 
these regions, divided by the total area under the S1 curve that falls below the type 1 criterion, yields 
the probability of reporting each confidence level, given that the observer provided a correct “S1” 
response. Panel (D) shows these probabilities as derived from areas under the curve in panel (B). The 
remaining panels display the analogous logic for deriving confidence probabilities for incorrect “S1” 
responses (F, H), correct “S2” responses (C, E), and incorrect “S2” responses (G, I). 
 
 
concordance between the empirical distribution of outcomes and the model-expected distribution of 
outcomes.  
The preceding approach for quantifying type 2 sensitivity with the type 1 SDT model—i.e. for 
fitting the meta-SDT model—can be summarized as a mathematical optimization problem: 
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where type 2 sensitivity is quantified by         . 
  (              ) is the Boolean function described previously, which returns a value of “true” 





We provide free Matlab code, available online, for implementing this maximum likelihood 
procedure for fitting the meta-SDT model to a data set (see note at the end of the manuscript). 
 
Toy example of meta-d’ fitting 
An illustration of the meta-d’ fitting procedure is demonstrated in Figure A-4 using simulated 
data. In this simulation, we make the usual SDT assumption that on each trial, presentation of stimulus S 
generates an internal response x that is drawn from the probability density function of S, and that a type 
1 response is made by comparing x to the decision criterion c. However, we now add an extra 
mechanism to the model to allow for the possibility of added noise in the type 2 task. Let us call the 
internal response used to rate confidence x2. The type 1 SDT model we have thus far considered 
assumes x2 = x. In this example, we suppose that x2 is a noisier facsimile of x. Formally, 
 
                 (    ) 
 
Where N(0, σ2) is the normal distribution with mean 0 and standard deviation σ2. The parameter 
σ2 thus determines how much noisier x2 is than x. For σ2 = 0 we expect meta-d’ = d’, and for σ2 > 0 we 
expect meta-d’ < d’. 
The simulated observer rates confidence on a 4-point scale by comparing x2 to response-specific 
type 2 criteria, using the previously defined decision rules for confidence in the type 1 SDT model.13 
                                                 
13 Note that for this model, it is possible for x and x2 to be on opposite sides of the type 1 decision criterion c. This 
is not problematic, since only x is used to provide the type 1 stimulus classification. It is also possible for x2 to 
surpass some of the type 2 criteria on the opposite side of c. For instance, suppose that x = -0.5, x2 = +0.6, c = 0, 
and        
      
 = +0.5. Then x is classified as an S1 stimulus, and yet x2 surpasses the criterion for rating “S2” 
responses with a confidence of h. Thus, there is potential for the paradoxical result whereby the type 1 response is 
“S1” and yet the type 2 confidence rating is rated highly due to the relatively strong “S2”-ness of x2. In this 
example, the paradox is resolved by the definition of the type 2 decision rules stated above, which stipulate that 
internal responses are only evaluated with respect to the response-specific type 2 criteria that are congruent with 





We first considered the SDT model with d’ = 2, c = 0, c2,”S1” = (-.5, -1, -1.5), c2,”S2” = (.5, 1, 1.5) and 
σ2 = 0. Because σ2 = 0, this is equivalent to the standard type 1 SDT model. The SDT graph for these 
parameter values is plotted in Figure A-4 A. Using these parameter settings, we computed the 
theoretical probability of each confidence rating for each permutation of stimulus and response. These 
probabilities for “S1” responses are shown in panels C and D, and the corresponding type 2 ROC curve is 
shown in panel E. (Because the type 1 criterion c is unbiased and the type 2 criteria are set 
symmetrically about c, confidence data for “S2” responses follow an identical distribution to that of “S1” 
responses and are not shown.)  
Next we simulated 10,000,000 trials using the same parameter values as the previously 
considered model, with the exception that σ2 = 1. With this additional noise in the type 1 task, type 2 
sensitivity should decrease. This decrease in type 2 sensitivity can be seen in the type 2 ROC curve in 
panel E. There is more area underneath the type 2 ROC curve when σ2 = 0 than when σ2 = 1.  
We performed a maximum likelihood fit of meta-d’ to the simulated type 2 data using the 
fmincon function in the optimization toolbox for Matlab (MathWorks, Natick, MA), yielding a fit with 
parameter values meta-d’ = 1.07, meta-c = 0, meta-c2,”S1” = (-.51, -.77, -1.06), and meta-c2,”S2” = (.51, .77, 
1.06). The SDT graph for these parameter values is plotted in Figure A-4 B.  
Panels C and D demonstrate the component type 2 probabilities used for computing the type 2 
likelihood. The response-specific type 2 probabilities for σ2 = 0 are not distributed the same way as those 
for σ2 = 1, reflecting the influence of adding noise to the internal response for the type 2 task. 
Computing meta-d’ for the σ2 = 1 data consists in finding the parameter values of the ordinary type 1 
SDT model that maximize the likelihood of the σ2 = 1 response-specific type 2 data. This results in a type 
1 SDT model whose theoretical type 2 probabilities closely match the empirical type 2 probabilities for  
                                                                                                                                                             
responses to begin with. Instead, it would find that x2 does not surpass the minimal confidence criterion for “S1” 
responses (i.e. x2 > c >         
      
) and would therefore assign x2 a confidence of 1. Thus, in this case, the paradoxical 
outcome is averted. But such potentially paradoxical results need to be taken into account for any SDT model that 






Figure A-4. Fitting meta-d’ to response-specific type 2 data. (A) Graph for the SDT model where d’ = 2 
and σ2 = 0 (see text for details). (B) A model identical to that in panel A, with the exception that σ2 = 1, 
was used to create simulated data. This panel displays the SDT graph of the parameters for the meta-d’ 
fit to the σ2 = 1 data. (C-D) Response-specific type 2 probabilities. The maximum likelihood method of 
fitting meta-d’ to type 2 data uses response-specific type 2 probabilities as the fundamental unit of 
analysis. The type 1 SDT parameters that maximize the likelihood of the type 2 data yield distributions of 
response-specific type 2 probabilities closely approximating the empirical (here, simulated) 
distributions. Here we only show the probabilities for “S1” responses; because of the symmetry of the 
generating model, “S2” responses follow identical distributions. (E) Response-specific type 2 ROC 
curves. ROC curves provide a more informative visualization of the type 2 data than the raw 
probabilities. Here it is evident that there is considerably less area under the type 2 ROC curve for the σ2 






the simulated σ2 = 1 data (Figure A-4 C and D). Because type 2 ROC curves are closely related to these 
type 2 probabilities, the meta-d’ fit also produces a type 2 ROC curve closely resembling the simulated 
curve, as shown in panel E. 
 
Interpretation of meta-d’ 
Notice that because meta-d’ characterizes type 2 sensitivity purely in terms of the type 1 SDT 
model, it does not explicitly posit any mechanisms by means of which type 2 sensitivity varies. Although 
the meta-d’ fitting procedure gave a good fit to data simulated by the toy σ2 model discussed above, it 
could also produce similarly good fits to data generated by different models that posit completely 
different mechanisms for variation in type 2 performance. In this sense, meta-d’ is descriptive but not 
explanatory. It describes how an ideal SDT observer with similar type 1 response bias as the actual 
subject would have achieved the observed type 2 performance, rather than explain how the actual 
subject achieved their type 2 performance. 
The primary virtue of using meta-d’ is that it allows us to quantify type 2 sensitivity in a 
principled SDT framework, and compare this against SDT expectations of what type 2 performance 
should have been, given performance on the type 1 task, all while remaining agnostic about the 
underlying processes. For instance, if we find that a subject has d’ = 2 and meta-d’ = 1, then (1) we have 
taken appropriate SDT-inspired measures to factor out the influence of response bias in our measure of 
type 2 sensitivity; (2) we have discovered a violation of the SDT expectation that meta-d’ = d’ = 2, giving 
us a point of reference in interpreting the subject’s metacognitive performance in relation to their 
primary task performance and suggesting the possibility of suboptimal metacognition; and (3) we have 
done so while making minimal assumptions and commitments regarding the underlying processes. 
Another important point for interpretation concerns the raw meta-d’ value, as opposed to its 





there is a sense in which they have equivalent metacognition, as their confidence ratings are equally 
sensitive in discerning correct from incorrect trials. But there is also a sense in which A has superior 
metacognition, since A was able to achieve the same level of meta-d’ as B in spite of a lower d’. In a 
sense, A is more metacognitively ideal, according to SDT. We can refer to the first kind of metacognition, 
which depends only on meta-d’, as “absolute type 2 sensitivity,” and the second kind, which depends on 
the relationship between meta-d’ and d’, as “relative type 2 sensitivity.” Absolute and relative type 2 
sensitivity are distinct constructs that inform us about distinct aspects of metacognitive performance. 
 
Code for implementing overall and response-specific meta-d’ analysis 
We provide free Matlab scripts for conducting type 1 and type 2 SDT analysis, including 



















Comparison of dual channel SDT models in Chapter 1 and Del Cul et al (2009) 
 
Although our SDT implementation of the independent dual channel model described in Chapter 
1 (call it DCSDT) is intended to capture the primary computational features of the model described in Del 
Cul, Dehaene, Reyes, Bravo, and Slachevsky (2009) (call it DCaccum), it is not identical. In this supplement, 
we discuss the relevant similarities and differences between the models. Despite their technical 
differences, they share core computational features that encapsulate a general theory of the sensory 
processing structures underlying perceptual decision making and reports of conscious awareness. Here 
we discuss the conceptual similarities between the models and demonstrate that the core behavioral 
patterns captured by DCaccum in Del Cul et al can also be produced by DCSDT. Thus, DCSDT is an acceptable 
stand-in for DCaccum in the present work, capturing the core features of its sensory processing 
architecture. 
Computationally, both models describe the perceptual decision making process as arising from 
the comparison of noisy sensory evidence to a decision criterion. The primary difference between the 
models is that DCaccum is an accumulator model that explicitly describes the dynamics of this perceptual 
decision process within the level of individual trials (Laming, 1968; Link, 1992; Ratcliff & Rouder, 1998), 
whereas DCSDT does not.  
The full details of DCaccum are described in the supplementary material of Del Cul et al. (2009). 
Here, we provide a brief summary. In DCaccum, two separate processing channels, one “conscious” and 
the other “unconscious,” accumulate noisy sensory evidence over time for each possible stimulus 
identification response (e.g. evidence for responding “squares” and evidence for responding “diamonds” 
would be accumulated simultaneously). Response alternatives “race” each other in each channel, such 





the channels achieves a threshold level of evidence. The first channel to achieve this threshold level of 
evidence for a response alternative within a predefined time period δ emits the corresponding stimulus 
identification response. If the stimulus identification response arises from the conscious channel, the 
observer additionally reports that the stimulus was “seen.” Conversely, if the stimulus identification 
response arises from the unconscious channel, the observer reports that the stimulus was “not seen.” If 
no stimulus identification response achieves the threshold level of evidence within δ, then the 
unconscious channel emits a response on the basis of the stimulus alternative that currently has the 
most sensory evidence. 
Crucially, independent sources of noise contaminate sensory processing in the two channels, so 
that noisy fluctuations in evidence accumulation in one channel are not reflected in the noisy 
fluctuations of the other. These independent sources of noise correspond to the physiological notion 
that sensory computations are taking place in separate, unconnected processing streams. 
DCSDT does not explicitly describe the temporal dynamics corresponding to evidence 
accumulation within a trial. However, for two main reasons, it remains conceptually comparable to 
DCaccum:  
(1) DCSDT and DCaccum share the same core computational principle, namely that trials associated 
with subjective reports of high and low stimulus visibility are associated with distinct processing 
channels which are subject to independent sources of noise. This general principle is what we wish to 
assess by including DCSDT in the model comparison analysis described in the manuscript. 
(2) One major advantage of accumulator models over atemporal SDT models is that the former 
can model patterns in behavioral response time data. However, although Del Cul et al’s model posits a 
dynamic evidence accumulation process, they did not constrain their model fitting procedure with 
response time data. Rather, they fit the model only to measures of task performance and reports of 





Del Cul et al were also used to fit DCSDT to the data in the current manuscript. It is thus not the case that 
DCaccum, as described in Del Cul et al, accounts for a wider range of behavioral data than does DCSDT, in 
spite of their computational differences.  
In summary, DCSDT and DCaccum are broadly comparable in that they posit the same core 
computational principle in order to account for patterns in the same sorts of behavioral data.  
Nonetheless, it remains possible that the technical differences between the models are 
sufficient to make them different in the particular patterns of behavioral data that they can account for. 
Below, we perform a simulation analysis that reproduces the key patterns of behavioral data in patient 
and control populations used to support DCaccum in Del Cul et al, and show that DCSDT can also generate 
these patterns. Thus, the two models are comparable not just at a broad conceptual level but also in the 




In Del Cul et al, subjects performed a digit identification task. One of ten digits (0 – 9) was 
displayed on every trial, followed by a mask. The target-mask stimulus onset asynchrony could take on 
one of eight possible values. Subjects verbally indicated whether the masked digit was seen or not, and 
then provided a forced-choice judgment regarding the digit identitiy. The authors computed measures 
of task performance and subjective report for frontal lesion patients and healthy controls, and fit DCaccum 
to this data set. 
DCaccum has 5 free parameters: 
 
σi : standard deviation of the noise added to sensory signals at every time step during the “input” stage; 





σr : standard deviation of the noise added to sensory signals at every time step for the unconscious 
channel 
σw : standard deviation of the noise added to sensory signals at every time step for the conscious 
channel 
θ : the decision threshold describing how probable a given response alternative must be in order for the 
corresponding behavioral response to be emitted 
δ : the period of time during which evidence accumulation occurs; if no response is generated within δ 
time units, then the best-supported stimulus identification response in the unconscious channel is 
emitted as the behavioral response 
 
In their data fitting, Del Cul et al constrained θ to be equal in the conscious and unconscious 
channels, and a priori set δ = 6 (corresponding to the number of SOAs; although data was collected at 8 
SOAs, the model was fit to data from the first 6 SOAs only). They first fit DCaccum to the data from the 
healthy subjects, yielding parameter values of σi = 3.44, σr = 9.07, σw = 1.12, and θ = 0.893. They then fit 
the model to the patient data, using the same parameter values and allowing only σw to vary. The value 
of σw obtained for patients was 2.53. 
We created a simulation aiming to reproduce the relevant features of the behavioral data in Del 
Cul et al by using DCaccum. In all simulations, we specified the parameter values of DCaccum a priori, 
simulated 20,000 trials at each SOA for each subject group (patients / controls), and subsequently 
computed mean levels of task performance and subjective report as a function of SOA and subject 
group.  
In order to compare DCaccum to DCSDT, it was necessary to adjust DCaccum to account for 2 stimulus 





Initially, we set the parameter values in our simulation equal to those found for healthy subjects 
in Del Cul et al, as described above. However, this had the effect of yielding near-chance levels of task 
performance in the simulated data. It is possible that this occurred due to the fact that, after each time 
step, accumulated evidence is normalized and converted into a probability value. The normalization 
factor grows larger with the number of response alternatives. Thus, with only 2 stimulus alternatives, 
evidence for response alternatives may more rapidly arrive at the decision threshold than it would in the 
10 stimulus case, even in spite of having the same level of sensory noise. This reduction in the time 
devoted to evidence accumulation would have the effect of reducing task performance.  
In order to correct for this, we adjusted the parameter values as follows. We defined constraints 
on the parameter values such that 
 
σr = (9.07/3.44) * σi 
σw, control = (1.12/3.44) * σi 
σw, patient = (2.53/3.44) * σi 
 
and manually searched for the value of σi that would yield a similar profile of behavioral data to that 
found in Del Cul et al. Thus, we tuned the parameter values of DCaccum to be suitable for adaptation to 
the 2-stimulus case, while still preserving the ratios between parameter values found by Del Cul et al. 
We found that setting σi = 0.2 yielded a satisfactory result, as displayed in Figure B-2 (compare 
with our Figure B-1, which is a reproduction of the results of model fitting originally presented in Del Cul 
et al’s Figure S3). In particular, our implementation of DCaccum captured the primary patterns of interest 
in the behavioral data as identified by Del Cul et al: 
 Overall task performance (p(correct)) and subjective report (p(seen)) increase with SOA, and 





 Task performance conditioned on subjective report (p(correct | seen) and p(correct | not seen)) 
is virtually identical for patients and controls (Figure B-2 C) 
 Subjective report conditioned on task performance (p(seen | correct) and p(seen | incorrect)) is 
larger for controls than for patients (Figure B-2 D) 
 
 
Figure B-1. The model fit of DCaccum to patient and control data originally described in Del Cul et al 
(2009). All displayed curves are generated by the model (i.e. actual data from patients and controls, to 








Figure B-2. Adaptation of DCaccum to the 2-stimulus case. We adapted the model described in Del Cul et 
al (2009) to apply to tasks with 2 response alternatives rather than 10, but otherwise adhered to the 
model specifications described in the supplemental material in Del Cul et al (see Appendix B for details). 
Here we show that our 2-stimulus implementation of the model can produce results similar to those 








Next, we investigated whether DCSDT could produce a pattern of results similar to those of 
DCaccum, as originally found by Del Cul et al (Figure B-1) and reproduced in our adaptation to the 2-
stimulus case (Figure B-2). DCSDT was implemented as described under “Independent Dual Channel” in 
the “Model descriptions” section of the manuscript, with minor differences.  
 
 Because we needed to simulate 6 SOA levels rather than 8 as in the manuscript, we required 
only 6 levels of μdiff C and μdiff U.  
 To simplify modeling, we assumed that stimulus identification responses arising from the 
unconscious channel were unbiased, and so we set cU = 0.  
 Because we needed to simulate 2 levels of stimulus visibility (“not seen” and “seen”) rather than 
4 as in the manuscript, we required only 2 levels of the decision criteria for subjective report, cC. 
To further simplify the model, we also assumed that these two criteria were set symmetrically 
about 0, the point of unbiased responding, so that we needed to specify only one value of cC.  
 
We adopted a heuristic approach to converge upon an appropriate set of parameter values, as 
follows.  
First, we computed the mean values of p(correct) at each SOA level for the patient and control 
groups in the DCaccum simulation (Figure B-2).  We converted these to d’ values by assuming unbiased 
responding using the formula d’ = 2*z[p(correct)], where z is the inverse of the normal cumulative 
distribution function (Macmillan & Creelman, 2005). Call these d’ values d’SOA. For the simulated control 
group, we set μdiff C, control = d’SOA at each SOA level. This ensured that, for the control group, p(correct) as 
a function of SOA resembled the corresponding curve generated by DCaccum. The values of μdiff C, control thus 





To further constrain the search space, we ensured that the following relationships between 
parameter values were enforced at each level of SOA: 
 
μdiff U, control  = w1 * μdiff C, control 
μdiff C, patient  = w2 * μdiff C, control 
μdiff U, patient  = μdiff C, control 
 
The first constraint characterizes sensitivity in the unconscious channel as some constant 
fraction of the sensitivity in the conscious channel for controls. The second constraint characterizes 
sensitivity in the conscious channel for patients as some constant fraction of the sensitivity in the 
conscious channel for controls. The third constraint is that sensitivity in the unconscious channel for 
patients and controls is equal, mirroring the assumption of equally noisy unconscious channels posited 
by Del Cul et al in their model fitting. 
We manually adjusted values of w1, w2, cC, control, and cC, patient so as to produce a pattern of results 
resembling that produced by DCaccum, as depicted in Figure B-1. We found that setting w1 = .14, w2 = .9, 
cC, control = .45, and cC, patient = .65 accomplished this result well (Figure B-3). The key patterns in the data 
originally found in Del Cul et al are reproduced by the DCSDT model, and the specific numerical values for 
all plotted curves produced by DCSDT (Figure B-3) closely approximate the numerical values for the 
curves produced by DCaccum (Figure B-2). 
Thus, not only do DCaccum and DCSDT share core assumptions about the computational 
architecture underlying perceptual decision making, but they also can generate (and therefore account 
for) similar patterns of behavioral data. We therefore are justified in using DCSDT as a model 







Figure B-3. Reproduction of DCaccum results with DCSDT. Our SDT implementation of the independent 
dual channel model, DCSDT, was able to produce results closely matching those produced by the 
accumulator model of dual channel processing, DCaccum, posited by Del Cul et al (2009) (compare this 
figure with Figure B-2).  
 
